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
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
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MAP O



ROUTE.



The Re-making of the Nations

By
J. H. NICHOLSON, M.A.



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INTRODUCTORY

AMONG many causes for gratitude, I must place first the great liberty of action which has been given me during my year of travel as an Albert Kahn Fellow, of which year this book is, for the moment, the most tangible outcome. I have availed myself of this freedom to the full ; its exercise has been one of the chief charms of a very wonderful experience. While I have tried to see at least something of most sides of life in the countries through which I have passed so rapidly, I have allowed myself a wide latitude : leisure to linger and to " browse," time to rest and meditate, and to recover a little from the insistent throng of impressions.

I have travelled by boat wherever I could, and the long days and warm nights on deck under the stars have been very pleasant—a luxury of indolence for which I have been grateful, after crowded times of seeing and hearing and doing. I have learnt much, too, in a quiet way, on these sea-trips. Nowhere else, perhaps, can one find quite the same kind of relationship as on a boat—close intimacy, in the most casual of settings ; for (not to be cynical) it is the moral certainty that one's fellow-passengers will again be total strangers at the end of a few days, or at most weeks, which allows the most reticent to unbend. A few lasting friendships must have been made in this way, but how few ! The Pullman and the Observation Car provide interesting studies in humour and the more obvious character-traits ; but the relationship is trivial, a " pass-time " at best. The boat gives leisure and freedom from occupation, and a large enough society to allow play to motive and character. It may be that life on shore provides as rich a variety of romance and tragedy, loyalty and petty intrigue ; but the springs of action are more

easily hidden ; or maybe one has more concerns of one's own, and less time for other folk's business !

The smoke-room of an ocean-going ship is the freest club in the world. There are few taboos : the battles of faith and conduct are fought over its tables with a frankness which no other club would permit. There are few things in earth or heaven on which the man who happens to be both a good sailor and a good listener cannot glean, from amongst the chaff and banter, much interesting first-hand information. Here, it may be, are the men on whom the future of Europe-in-Asia hangs (in very differing proportions) ! The best of them never speak directly of their job ; but they tell many stories. Most of them are good stories ; even so, to the listener from home, the interest lies less in their " point " than in the flood of light which they throw, incidentally and unconsciously, upon ways of life and thought that are new and strange : they imply a background.

I did little during my journeyings in the way of systematic study. I read just enough (where possible) to know what to look for. For the rest, I trusted to such observations as I was able to make, and to the information given me by many friends and by those to whom they had introduced me. I cannot be sufficiently grateful for all the help I have received. I am only too conscious that my enquiries can have covered only a small fraction of the field, and that, even so, my view of it must have been strangely biassed by the chances which have governed my search for " contacts." I have been singularly fortunate in meeting many leaders in thought and action, and I have tried, wherever possible, to hear all sides of debatable questions. I must have made many errors of emphasis, if not of fact. I can only hope that I have not gravely misrepresented any point of view which has been put to me : I cannot pretend to hold the scales between them.

The difficulties of writing some sort of record of my experiences hardly need stressing. If I understand rightly the purpose of the Foundation, of which I was lucky enough to become a Fellow, what is required is neither a mere

diary on the one hand, nor, on the other, any attempt at a completely balanced and reasoned account. What I have tried to set down here is a personal impression. The dangers which surround such an attempt are obvious; yet it is perhaps the one thing really worth doing, and I can only plead that the friends of many races and faiths, who have helped me so generously during my travel, into whose hands it may come, will be as kind to its crudities and shortcomings as they have shown themselves to those of the writer.

I set out from Paris in September, 1922, without having drawn up any very definite scheme: in fact, I deliberately refused to bind myself by rigid plans. I had, however, in mind a general line of approach. It was obvious that in the East I should have to depend upon the interpretation of its life by those conversant with a European language, for I know no Oriental tongue. I proposed, then, frankly to accept this limitation, and to concentrate my attention upon the point of contact between East and West, while penetrating, as far as time and circumstances would permit, into the life of the lands I visited, and drawing (or at least checking) my information whenever possible from the knowledge of citizens of the country itself. In particular, I determined to try and discover whether the influence of one race upon another could in any way be explained by the character of the relationship between them: whether the adoption of many features of Western civilisation had been an indiscriminate borrowing, or a conscious selection of elements suited to their own needs; and how these additions were being harmonised with the existing national tradition. I hoped also to understand what part in all this was being played by the schools and colleges.

To such wide questions there can be no simple and no general answer. At the end of my tour I realise more clearly than before how complex are the issues involved, and how impossible it is to set up a satisfactory criterion of success, still more to suggest lines of advance. The value of such a rapid survey can lie only in the possibility for general comparisons. Such conclusions as I seem to have reached must be stated very tentatively. Neverthe-

less, one or two suggestions emerge with perhaps sufficient clearness to make them worth putting forward as working hypotheses.

Perhaps the fact which has been impressed most vividly upon my imagination and understanding is the universal character of the change which is coming over general civilisation. In every country which I visited I found a desire for change. Nowhere, I think, is there any real sense of the stability and permanence of existing values or institutions. This is essentially a time of movement. There are, of course, in all countries many who regret that it is so, and who regard every change as a further evidence of decay. Yet, curiously enough, I found little conservatism of a purely negative type. World-society has moved so fast and so far in recent years, that those who regret the past are being driven back upon a policy of reconstruction, based upon a return to "tradition." The parties of change have thus forced upon the parties opposed to them, willy nilly, something of their own feverish activity; they, too, have their programmes and congresses, their machinery of propaganda. In this way, there arises that curious blend of orthodoxy and rebellion which is so characteristic of the present age. In situations so widely different as to give piquancy to any attempt at comparison, orthodoxy is challenging what were, till recently, recognised as the undoubted achievements of modern science and modern thought. In Europe, a kind of Neo-Catholicism which has overflowed the limits of existing Churches finds a strange ally in the psychology of instinct, in its attack on rational processes and values. In India, a nationalism which is doing its utmost to find self-expression in modern terms seeks its spiritual sanction in a return to the Vedas. America retires from Europe under cover of the Monroe Doctrine—and finds an outlet for her energies in the cultural and economic penetration of China. There is a widespread reaction from the urban character of modern civilisation: witness the anti-machine movement in India, the revived interest in handicraft almost everywhere, and the "colonising" reforms in Austria. May it be that change and progress have become such hackneyed, and

often such fruitless conceptions, that the world is ceasing to react to their stimulus—and orthodoxy has turned challenger and assumed the qualities of glamour and adventure which form the halo of the Great Rebels? In Italy that stage has already been reached in Fascism; Confucianism in China, and Buddhism in Japan show signs of revival.

Whatever its direction, I have felt the universal character of this change so strongly that I have found it difficult to think of the peoples I have visited as exhibiting fixed "types" of culture. Indeed, I have come to feel that the best way of approaching the whole subject will be to give up any attempt to define "fundamental" characteristics, and to concentrate upon a description of the various changes as I have seen them, allowing the permanent factors, as it were, to emerge from the analysis of change.

Everywhere, as I see it, there is felt an imperative need for readjustment, though the intensity with which the need is felt varies. Economic change—often of a violent and even disruptive character—explains much of it; the political relations of the new European States to one another are to a great extent economically determined, while in a State like Austria an entire social revolution is implied in the loss of the provinces. In the East, economic change, though slower, is still surprisingly rapid; in China, it is undermining the older social sanctions; in India and Egypt it is often exploited by an "effendi" class, which has already outgrown its function. But, beneath these manifestations, lies a deeper set of causes, a fundamental instinctive need—the need for human society to base itself upon some intelligible ideal, self-consistent, harmonious. It is, at bottom, the same need which psychology has discovered in the mental life of the individual, and it is subject to the same repression and misdirection. It is a need which has always arisen when a nation has been stirred to activity by some great event. The first demand of re-awakened group-consciousness is that there shall be no element within the group which is fundamentally inconsistent with its own essential life. It is not primarily a question of political autonomy—though that is directly

involved. It is a question of self-consistency. The most fundamental adjustment—that between a traditional Oriental culture and modern European Science—is as vital a problem in “free” Japan as in “subject” India, though with marked differences of emphasis. Political autonomy increases, or it may be diminishes, the power to command harmony ; it is a means to an end.

It is probably impossible for two civilisations to come into close contact without a considerable amount of interaction taking place. But, for the process which results, the “osmosis” of physics is perhaps the best metaphor : it is from the “weightier” culture that elements tend to pass through the screen of custom which keeps the races apart. Some such infiltration is perhaps inevitable ; it occurs, even where the relation between the peoples remains one of strict equality. A striking example is furnished by Japan, whose deliberate adoption of many of the externals of Western civilisation went on (though unequally) during the whole time of her progress to the position of a Great Power. Under these conditions, the selection of the elements to be adopted is at its freest, and the process most fully conscious. At the other end of the scale stands a relationship of political dependence. If (as is suggested by MacDougall) the impulse to imitate springs primarily from a relation of inferior to superior, then political domination must be a powerful factor in determining the process. My impression is that this is so. Limiting factors—such as Caste in India—must be allowed for. But the whole tendency to imitate is powerfully influenced by the political relationship ; in particular, it becomes less a matter of conscious choice, and more a “mechanism” of assimilation. In the “free” relationship, the imitator retains a fuller measure of control, a keener critical faculty. The house of a cultured Japanese is not merely in exquisite taste ; it is a unity. There may be a room in which European guests are received, adapted to their customs ; but from the house itself all suggestion of foreign influence is excluded.

I believe that a very great deal which seems at first sight inexplicable in the westernising of Asia, and in the re-

vulsion against it, can be explained in terms of "prestige-suggestion"—which carries with it a counter-suggestibility, if the domination of the European comes to be resented. But the phenomenon is not confined to cases of race-dominance; I trace a parallel tendency in lands where no such domination has existed for many years—only here, it is the reaction of some section of the people against ideas and practices which events have discredited, or which have proved inadequate to the demands of the present day.

I have made the search for the self-consistency of the group the key-note of this record, and the basis of such order as it can claim to possess. Abandoning any attempt at an arrangement according to time, geography, or race, I have allowed myself to wander freely over the whole field of my travels in the search for parallels and illustrations. It is not only the nation-group which seeks self-consistency, though this search is crucial for Asiatic nationhood. But the religious group is quite as profoundly affected, and some great contests and many obscure struggles can be traced directly to a conflict of loyalties, of which the most striking example is the position of the Indian Mohammedan. I have ventured the opinion that in Asia (apart from Japan) religious groups show a greater power of cohesion than nation-groups. In Japan, the two coincide as nowhere else. The apparent break-up of China has been hastened by the absence of any closely-knit religious organisation; while it is difficult to say whether Hindooism, the majority religion, is doing more to help forward or to hinder the formation of a united India.

Out of the ferment caused by closer contact with the West, a variety of conflicting tendencies have arisen. It is the insertion into Oriental cultures of elements so alien to their own basis which has set the problem of adjustment; on the other hand, in the scientific and historical method of approach, Europe has supplied a powerful critical weapon, which is being turned against herself.

Finally, in invoking the rights of nationhood and self-determination, Europe has run the danger of being "hoist with her own petard"—though (again with the exception

of Japan) it is to be doubted whether nationalism in the Western sense is widely understood in Asia.

The working of "prestige-suggestion" is interesting in this connection—chiefly because it weights the scales, introduces irrelevant emotional factors, and so interferes with the selective and harmonising processes. To a situation of great inherent difficulty, it adds complication. It is, of course, indissolubly bound up with the whole history of the relations of East and West.

My plan in this book has been to describe first what I have seen of some of the European problems of adjustment set by the War and the Peace. I have next explored, very cursorily, the three great avenues—political, economic, and cultural—along which Europe had passed to the penetration of the East. Turning, then, to Asia, I have sketched in outline my impressions of the great religions, and especially of their influence upon social and national groupings. I have then tried to study in more detail some of the greater national experiments. The few pages on the United States and Canada demand an apology. I stayed in Asia till almost the last possible moment; my passage through America was of necessity rapid—just long enough, in fact, to confirm a resolution to visit, more at leisure, the lands which must almost inevitably become the centre of the new World-Order. The book concludes with a few notes on special problems, where the point seemed best illustrated from observations made outside the countries where I passed most of my time.

J. H. N.

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I

EUROPE IN TRANSITION

(I) TWO MOVEMENTS OF REVULSION

(1)

I SPENT the first two months of my tour in Europe. Among other reasons, I intended to take a rapid survey of European conditions before travelling East. Some of the lands I visited were known to me, some I was visiting for the first time. The general impression I received was one of great movement but uncertain direction. Looking back upon those two months, one feels European civilisation as in some sense a unity over against the great civilisations of the East ; but one sees it cursed by a provincialism and tendency to “ split ” which can hardly be equalled anywhere else in the world. The true comparison, surely—if size is to count for anything—is between the unity of Europe, and say, the unity of China. The attempt which is often made to contrast one closely-knit European State with the formless Chinese republic is grossly unfair. There is perhaps nothing in Asia which can compare with the European nation-group, except Japan. Many Orientals draw the comparison directly between Europe as a whole and one of the sub-continents of Asia ; and, looked at in this way, it is by no means certain that

Europe is nearer unity and public order. To those outside, she often seems to have sacrificed the possibility of a Continental unity to the luxury of intense group-feeling; and the price which she is paying for the hardening-off of her nation-states is a fissure which threatens to split her civilisation from top to bottom. Thoughtful Orientals are correspondingly critical of the sanctions and values upon which European civilisation is based, and this tendency has undoubtedly given point to the revived interest in her own origins which is very widespread in Asia.

It is nevertheless true that, seen in this perspective, Europe appears to be making frenzied efforts at equilibrium. The adjustments required are all the more difficult, because they must be made in a material less yielding than the unsettled forms of Asiatic political life. The shrinkage or rapid expansion of many States affects gravely the whole economic, social and political structure of the groups concerned, and implies also great problems of administration. There is, in addition, a natural revulsion against tendencies which have brought disaster, and in places pessimism of a very radical type.

The opposition of Youth and Age is a very old theme, but in post-War Europe it is seen in a new setting. It may be that the War itself produced the new Youth by imposing premature responsibilities and granting unheard-of liberties as their counterpart. It was perhaps inevitable that a catastrophe of such magnitude should shake the faith of Europe in the basis of her civilisation and its sanctions, and that, since someone must be blamed, it should be the Bad Old Men who were in positions of control—with a corresponding

revulsion towards the Younger Generation—which those of us who belong to it cannot feel to be wholly unnatural ! The Edwardian Age is already becoming a kind of myth, and the modern world may be roughly divided into those who believe in it and those who do not. The men and women of one's own generation were still young enough then to feel hostility to *any* age and its values—merely because it was their own ; and with laudable consistency, having come to curse, they now refuse to bless in retrospect.

England loves compromises, and nowhere more so than in her public life ; and so her Youth has failed to organise itself for action in opposition to her Age ; such Leagues as they have formed have won all too easily the blessing of maturity, and opened their doors to receive eager converts. In some European countries, notably in Italy and in Germany, the history of the Youth Movement has been different. In Germany, it has gone definitely into opposition ; in Italy, it has broken the citadel of Age like a house of cards.

I was in Venice while Mussolini was marching on Rome. I entered Italy through the Brenner Pass a few days before, and found myself in an atmosphere of crisis. At first, it was a little difficult to take seriously these youths in their black shirts. They seemed so extremely, so blatantly young. They boarded our train at the frontier station, and at every stop as we passed over the plains of Lombardy, and inspected the passengers. There was no disturbance—the black shirt and black, tasselled cap were openly welcomed by many, who returned the Roman salute—arm raised to the level of the shoulder, and extended. A few Black Guards,

armed often only with sticks (though some had revolvers) could be seen on the platforms. I entered Venice to find martial law proclaimed—and immediately rescinded, for the King had refused to sign the proclamation. It was my first visit ; I had expected to see a city of the dead. But the Piazza of S. Mark was alive with citizens canvassing political chances, gaily decorated with bunting, and guarded by rival bands in black and khaki.

Proclamations by the party leaders were posted from time to time upon the pillars. Finally, on Sunday, 28th October, the Lion of S. Mark again looked down upon the making of a despotic Government. The news came in a broadsheet, issued by the *Gazetta di Venezia*. There was perfect order ; never, perhaps, have the principles of any revolution been better exhibited by their exponents at the moment of its success. After a few wild minutes of cheering crowds and whirling pigeons, I went into Florian's to hear the Youth of Italy toasting the new Risorgimento. It was a mad moment—far too rapid for my scanty Italian. But the essential points were clear, and they became still clearer as I crossed Italy, through Milan and Genoa. The scenes of the War were repeated. At Milan, ladies met the “troop” trains of black-shirts, which were covered with patriotic legends, and greeted the returning heroes with roses and salutations.

I travelled from Genoa the only “civilian” in a carriage-load of demobilised Fascisti, men and girls. All wore black shirts, all were armed, if only with sticks. The women wore black bandeaux over their bobbed hair. They were singing the praises of “liberty and discipline.” I remember a typical verse :

“ Chi va piano, va sano ;
Chi va sano, va lontano . . .
Per firmar' la libertà.”

Among political and social movements Fascismo is perhaps unique. It is a rising of Youth, disciplined and demanding discipline and unity, against an older generation, hopelessly divided (and so incapable, as the Fascisti claim, of “ giving Italy a Government ”)—politically sterile, though possessing men of individual talent.

Such an exchange of rôles between Youth and Age may seem at first sight almost a reversal of the order of Nature. Yet, in view of the condition of Italy, it is easily understood. In spite of her chequered history, and of the *mélange* of many races which have gone to the making of the South, there is in Italy no outstanding racial question: above all, no racial minority in the political sense. The gap between North and South is economic—a barrier often insuperable to Age, but a slight one to Youth.

I see in the success of Fascismo the clearest example of the impulse towards self-consistency and harmony, its *form* determined by reaction against the alien elements—here, international Communism. The fight against Communism was not more fundamental to its aims than was the fight against slavery to Lincoln's. It was an incident in the struggle to defend and re-affirm the unity of the nation, led by the men who had re-won Italia Irredenta at the point of the bayonet.

(2)

No contrast could be more striking at first sight than that between Fascismo and the Youth Movement of Germany. The "Jugendbewegung" started many years before the War with the "Wandervögel," bands of town-bred youths of school age who went on long wanderings in the country, and lived hard and simply in the open air. They took with them little by way of provision, and depended upon the hospitality of the villages through which they passed. I met many of these young men, on a walking-tour in the Schwarzwald—clad in shirt and shorts, wide-brimmed hat, rucksack on back, and generally carrying a mandoline with coloured streamers, sometimes also a book or two of folk-lore or woodcraft. They were cheerful, simple people, with no "aim" to reach or proselytes to make, entirely natural and healthy. At this stage, it is easy to recognise the "gang-spirit" of adolescence, and at first the youths showed also the tendency to shun the society of girls, which often appears at about the middle of that period of youth. But the movement had also special features springing directly out of its German origin. It was a "return to Nature," a revulsion from the mechanism and solid urbanity of pre-War Germany, with its ordered pleasures and organised "physical care"—a throw-back to the origins of German society, with its local autonomies and franchises, its resistance against absorption by any Holy Roman Emperor, its love of the soil, of woods and spaces and open skies; an appeal from the German of Hegel to the Germany of Heine and Hans Andersen.

“ Lasst mich nur an meinen Sattel gelten ;
Bleibt in Euren Hütten, Euren Zelten,
Und ich reite froh, in alle ferne,
Über meiner Mütze nur die Sterne.”

But it is difficult to think of Hans without Gretchen ; the singers who sang of the hills sang also of love, and so it must be again. From folk-lore to folk-dance is a short step, and soon the maidens of Germany joined the youths—not, one may be sure, without much opposition on the part of the hausfrau, but in such numbers as to rouse the censure of the Churches. There was no organisation ; the movement was a real “ bewegung,” a spontaneous uprising of Youth, a direct challenge to the “ pflegung ” where self-activity is discouraged. So fearful were these young people of falling back into a state of bondage, that they at first forbade even the appointment of leaders from among themselves. There was no programme, there were no rules. Nothing was to be taken on trust ; convention and tradition were to be ignored, the Youth of Germany was to live at first hand, assuming nothing, and work out its own salvation. In particular, anything savouring of “ townsmen’s custom ” was to be cast aside. The bonds of family discipline had been broken ; marriage itself was no doubt “ bürgerlich.”

By 1913, the movement had grown to considerable dimensions—though, since no records were kept, it is impossible to give numbers. In that year, a big meeting was held at the Höhen Meister in Saxony to try and discover some basis of agreement. But it was found impossible to discover any form of cohesion which could

be adopted without endangering that freedom which was the mainspring of the movement; and, after pledging themselves only "to live in directness, and independence and naturalness" the meeting dispersed.

When the War broke out, large numbers of these youths entered the Army below the age of compulsion, as volunteers. They told me that they regarded it as a War in defence of the countryside which they had come to love in their wanderings—(and can anyone who has experienced the joint power of mass-suggestion and organised publicity deny that they were sincere?) The War checked development for a time, but it also loosened the bonds of social custom, and after the Peace the movement grew rapidly.

It was impossible, however, for an uprising of this size to remain entirely unorganised. The necessity for leadership had to be recognised—though all outside interference was rigidly excluded. At the same time, in direct re-action from the super-organisation of the War, many movements of a similar kind sprang up and grew rapidly. Most notable among them are the "Freivolkschulen" which found some sort of parallel in the reaction of certain sections of the English Adult Education movement from all contact with the Universities or administrative Departments.

Meanwhile, Parties and Churches started rival movements to the Jugendbewegung, in which the leadership was reserved for older people—many of them admirable movements in their way. Among them is the "Neuwerkbewegung," which has a religious basis. I spent two days in the hills of Thuringia as the guest of one such Society, a farm colony who cultivate the land in

common, keep open house, and live in apostolic simplicity. Three or four houses are scattered over the land of the colony, which consists of a few married couples, and a number of younger people. Between members of the community no money passes ; each has a task assigned by the leader, an able young German with keen eyes. For the most part, work in the fields is done by hand. Clothing is of the simplest, and diet vegetarian. The society is in no sense anti-intellectual, and a pleasant Swiss pastor who was living there had a good library and was keenly interested in questions of the day ; a school was also being built. Though I had been unable to give notice of my visit, I found a ready welcome. A card hanging on the wall asked guests to undertake some work while staying there. My ignorance of farm-work caused me some embarrassment, but I hit upon the happy idea of offering to meet at the station in the valley below some ladies who were coming from Frankfurt, and help with their luggage—an offer which was gratefully accepted. I fear, however, that, after all, I escaped paying my score ; I found these ladies very charming—but their luggage consisted of a hand-bag !

My experience of the Jugendbewegung and allied movements was entirely happy. I met many of these young people—some students, some (save the mark !) married, others managing and staffing the book-shop of the movement in Berlin—a charming place, in which books on woodcraft and handicraft and travel rubbed shoulders with the fairy-tales and folk-lore of almost every people. I liked them for their freshness and reality. It was a disappointment to me that I was

unable, at the last moment, to gain admission to a meeting of members from all over Germany, held in the offices of Vorwärts, while I was in Berlin; but, in spite of the good offices of one or two members, it proved impossible.

The Jugendbewegung has already created a considerable literature. Following the original "Wander-vogel," a number of magazines and periodicals have appeared, as well as collections of folk-tales and allied writings. The movement has attracted a good deal of attention, and has already its historians and even its psychologists.

The Jugendbewegung has played no part in Germany comparable in any way to that of Fascismo in Italy. To compare the two seems at first sight like setting the doings of schoolboys beside the achievements of grown men. If I bring them into relation, it is only to point out that the mainspring of both is the revulsion of Youth from the prevailing political and social standards. Both despair of "salvation" at the hands of the present rulers, or within the existing political system. The malady of Italy is under-organisation and weakness; the remedy is to seize control, and the ease with which Fascismo succeeded is the best proof that her criticism was just. For the over-organisation of Germany there is no such simple cure—perhaps no cure at all, short of that return to simplicity and directness of feeling and expression which the Jugendbewegung embodies.

(II) STATES WHICH HAVE SHRUNK

ONE of the most difficult adjustments with which post-War Europe is faced is the reconciliation of her shrunken States to their diminished areas and importance. It is not merely that size is in itself an important factor in national consciousness (it would be ludicrous to tell Switzerland to "think imperially"!) a shrinkage is as depressing in effect as an expansion is exhilarating, and tends to damp endeavour rather than to stimulate effort for new tasks. Whatever have been the sins of Hungary in relation to her subject Slavs (and they were many and griveous) the loss of Transylvania and many other territories is felt to be a violation of her "millenial frontiers," a laceration of the body and spirit of a proud people. Austria is in even worse case. Her history has been one long story of adding field to field—a work of colossal patience, a network of marriages and alliances, consecrated by a hundred treaties. The Holy Roman Empire was little more than a shadow when Austria resigned it in the beginning of the Nineteenth Century at the point of French bayonets ; she consoled herself fairly easily, and engaged in a see-saw struggle with the rising State of Prussia for the leadership of the reconstituted German confederation. After Sadova, victorious Prussia was not slow to point the way across the Balkans ; and, still in tull possession of her German territories, Austria could turn her energies to checkmating the Russian championship of the op-

pressed Christian populations of Turkey-in-Europe, while offering them her own closer protection, if possible, under the flag of the Dual Monarchy. Austrian capital and Austrian constructive enterprise had penetrated deeply into Bosnia-Herzegovina before 1908, and the annexation, though important diplomatically, was, in fact, little more than the recognition of a *fait accompli*. Further, Austria could claim with some show of truth that her policy towards her Slav subjects was not illiberal; in some cases (notably in Galicia) it was markedly generous. Just as she had built up her Empire less by war than by marriage, so she ruled it rather by an astute balancing of groups than by active repression. There was even a party—of unknown strength, though it included some powerful adherents—which more or less openly advocated “Trialism”—the taking of the Slavs into partnership, thus converting the Dual into a Trial Monarchy.

The mentality of the Austrian nation was cast in this mould: a thousand years of steady growth behind her, during most of which time she was the undisputed leader of Christendom, and no small part of it the effective dictator of Europe; conscious of great powers of consolidation, and an easy habit of avoiding crises and redeeming defects; a proud people, cultured, conciliatory, yet in a sense missionary—the instruments of a deliberate “Drang nach Osten,” guardian of the road from Berlin to Bagdad.

Vienna was built to be the capital of such a people and the centre of such an Empire. It was here that the Emperor normally lived, and that the Government was housed. Schools, Colleges and Technical Institu-

tions were created to train men for the Services, or for positions of control in business. The World of Art, Philosophy and Fashion was served by luxury-trades of every description. The whole conception and organisation of the city implied its economic background. The superb Opernring, the Opera House itself, the Museums and Galleries and Parks, are the deliberate and mature creation of a people with centuries of culture and unquestioned rule behind them.

As the result of the War, Austria ceded Bohemia, Galicia, the Italian lands of the south, and her share in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The separation from Hungary followed ; the Dual Monarchy had been built upon the union of the Crowns, and was dissolved with the fall of the King-Emperor. Besides some further loss of territory, Austria was deprived of direct access to the food-supply of the Hungarian plains. (Luckily, common sense has succeeded in establishing a simple form of economic frontier ; passenger trains are not even delayed for Customs' examination).

These changes have involved a fundamental remodeling of the whole idea of the State. The only considerable deposits of raw material left to her were iron-ore and some coal of poor quality ; and the " Succession-States " naturally protected their mineral wealth by export regulations and duties. Further, the contribution of Vienna to business organisation had been largely that of direction, and many firms now found themselves compelled by legislation to register their branches in the new States as autonomous units.

Administratively, the problem of the new State might seem to be simplified. But the Services found

themselves over-staffed. There was a flow to the Capital, not only of unemployed Civil Servants, but of many others whose occupation had depended directly or indirectly upon the Austrian Provincial Governments. (Some parallel can be found in the glut of the teaching profession in Germany with teachers dismissed from Schools in ceded territories). In certain other cases, an option to choose nationality was allowed, and a further immigration took place.

Even without this increase of population, the Capital was absolutely out of proportion to the needs of the new State. To take a single example: the military academies were left functionless, and for the most part dissolved. The whole educational system implied a background which no longer existed, and had had to be remodelled—a process which has called for much ingenuity and not a little heroism. It is pleasant to recall a visit to one of these new Schools, a “mittelschule” set up in the building vacated by an Officers’ Academy. The Director had toured Europe in his search for models, and the result was a singularly attractive type of school. The characteristic Austrian genius for the Arts was turned to account even in these straitened circumstances. Excellent modelling and carving was being done in simple plaster and wood, and handicrafts of a practical type, such as bookbinding and carpentry, were very successful. A novel feature was the introduction of printing, the “dies” being cut in linoleum. In organisation, the school drew on Swiss models, though with a wide liberty: the distinction between teaching and disciplinary staff was maintained, and an “Erzieher” allotted to each group of boys; there

was little by way of a perfect system. But the boys were organised in small groups, housed in homely rooms very different from the barrack-like dormitories of some Continental schools, and allowed much more freedom. Boys of the same age or standing were, however, grouped together, in distinction to the "House" system as understood in England.

I saw also an excellent girls' school, with a very definite bent towards an interest in Social Science. The work of the Art classes for Viennese children is well-known in England, and is a really amazing witness to the power of creative effort, of which I found so many instances.

The economic circumstances of Austria have been widely discussed in connection with the work of reconstruction taken in hand by the League of Nations. When I was in Vienna, the plan for the loan was still under discussion. At that time (October, 1922), distress was very acute and painfully obvious, especially among those whose incomes depended in any way upon the pre-War value of the crown. To take a few examples: an officer's widow, who had lost also two sons in the War, was drawing as a pension for all three a sum per month just about equivalent to the charge for a room per day at a moderate hotel; a landlord was receiving as the yearly rent of a good flat the price of a couple of loaves of bread. A professor in the University was living with his family in one room of his house, the rest of which was let off to strangers; and the roof of the Great Hall of the University was leaking so badly that it could not be used.

Apart altogether from economic reconstruction, the

change of mental attitude required of Austria was fundamental. Vienna must come to consider herself almost as a provincial Capital. With her changed function must come a grading-down of the standard of employment; she must train more boys for manual work, fewer for posts of direction; she must make fewer luxury goods, more things for use; she must spend less on the arts and graces of life—for her, almost its essentials: (it was a joy to find that the glorious music of her Opera was still faithfully and brilliantly performed); above all, she must decentralise, abandon the town for the country. It is a stupendous task for any nation to perform, above all at a time when the national energy is spent in an unsuccessful War. It has been faced with admirable courage.

I spent some time in and near Vienna in studying the Settlement movement, a most characteristic attempt to “deurbanise.” The motives which have driven thousands of Viennese outside the city on to the land are quite other than those behind the garden-city and town-planning movements in happier lands. These settlers are cottage-dwellers by necessity, and not by choice. Many factors contributed to the breakdown of city life: notably, the flight to the Capital of those whom the Peace or the Revolution had uprooted from the provinces, and the restriction of sources of food-supply which was a result of the same catastrophe. The exchange was then, of course, heavily in favour of Germany, so that, quite apart from a policy of restriction, it would have been almost impossible to buy in the German market. Vienna was faced with famine conditions; in particular, the scarcity of milk threatened the life of her children, and

the lack of green vegetables and other garden produce menaced the health of her adults. The prices for such food as was available were both unstable and extremely high. The only solution was to return to the ideal of the self-sufficing village community. Out they went *by occupations*, to the end of a tramway or local railway-line, and built themselves houses of such materials as they could find, supplemented by meagre purchases and a few generous gifts. But, even in this extremity, the sense of order and the canons of beauty were preserved: the Settlements ("Siedlungen") are distinctly attractive in appearance, well ordered and planned, and quite sanitary and healthy in every way. There is no suggestion of the "squatter's hovel"—such as, for instance, clings to many of the tiny houses which in Belgium have, even more heroically, risen from the ruins of Ypres or Vlamertinghe. The site has been well chosen and carefully drained, and the Settlement planned by well-known surveyors and architects. Grants, loans and gifts have made these beginnings possible; the rest of the money is subscribed by the settlers themselves from their small savings. Those who have no money work extra hours as an equivalent; in some cases confiscations following on the Revolution have provided the title—as, for instance, in the case of the Settlement of ex-soldiers built in the Emperor's hunting-park. The houses are generally either villas or short rows of cottages. The sand or gravel found on the site has been utilised, and made into concrete blocks by the addition of a minimum of cement. The labour is provided by the colonists themselves, in their spare time (for most of them retain their city-occupation, and travel in to Vienna each day

to the office or workshop). A few skilled craftsmen have been hired as instructors and supervisors. For the rest, the labour is quite voluntary and unpaid. Workshops are erected on the site, and here the city clerk or salesman makes the window frames and all other fittings for the house, including the furniture. There are shops for carpenters, for ironworkers and tinsmiths. Some outside societies, such as the Friends, have given help in organisation, and the Government has done all in its power to help forward the scheme. But most of the organisation has been done by the colonists, on co-operative lines. There is no right to ownership in a house, on the grounds that a man has worked at its construction; each does his task, and the houses, as they are completed, are allotted according to the urgency of the need of the applicants.

The houses vary greatly in type. The best of them, though small, are quite adequate. But the pressure of economy (for the schemes are classed as "unproductive") necessitated a restriction of the original plans, and some of the more recent houses consist of two tiny rooms, roofed with a kind of waterproof paper which seemed a slight protection against stormy weather; but, as the prospective tenant of one such house explained to me, the plan allowed for extension, and the present living-room might later do for the goats! Each house has a garden of sufficient size to supply the family with green vegetables, and generally a chicken-run and rabbit-hutch, as well as a shed for goats. Itinerant instructors train the settlers in gardening and poultry-keeping. In addition, there is sometimes a co-operative farm established at some

distance from the colony, cultivated in common by its members. The object of the Settlements is quite definitely to make the settlers self-sufficient for essential food supplies.

I came across one incident of a humorously pathetic kind. A small colony of artists started to build such a settlement; but the work progressed slowly, and in despair at their own ineptitude the artists approached a neighbouring colony of railway men, and offered to decorate their houses, in exchange for help in the construction of their own. A bargain was struck to the satisfaction of both parties. This incident illustrated rather aptly the spirit in which Austria is setting her house in order, and the Settlement movement itself is perhaps the most novel and interesting of the many schemes by which Austria is trying to reconstruct her national life, and adapt herself to changed conditions.

In Hungary, the problem is in some ways simpler, since the country is not so highly developed industrially. But the situation is complicated by a much more serious political and social upheaval, which has absorbed much of the national energy. My short stay in Buda Pest did not enable me to gain any very clear idea of the issues involved. But a definite "irredendist" movement to recover the "millennial frontiers" of Hungary is obvious to the most casual observer. One gains, too, the impression of a national character much less adaptable than the Austrian. The policy of Magyarisation, by which Hungary attempted to assimilate and absorb her Slav subjects, contrasts strongly with Austrian diplomacy and intrigue. Buda Pest itself, fine city as it is, strikes one as a fitting Capital

for a State based upon subject races ; its architecture is so deliberate, so calculated to impress. The " Royal Castle " crowns a steep hill rising sheer from the Danube, and pierced by tunnels ; a fortress commands river and plain ; the public buildings—except one fine Church—are piled up against the side of the hill—severe columns of an almost barbaric Greek type are the outstanding features. (One is reminded forcibly of the Acropolis of some Greek city, built by the labour of servile populations). A visit to the excellent Ethnographical Museum reveals the fact that Magyar civilisation can show comparatively little which is older than the Turkish invasions. Nevertheless, one is conscious of a proud and ancient people ; officials move with quiet and almost paternal assurance which contrasts pleasantly with the assertiveness sometimes met with in the newer European States.

It is plain that there has been much real hardship, especially among the cultured and directing classes, though it is less marked than in Vienna. I was told that in some districts of the country, the financial breakdown has resulted in a return to barter. I had an amusing, though somewhat embarrassing, experience of the widespread distrust of credit instruments. Through a mistake over a train, and delay at the Czech frontier for an additional visa, I reached Buda Pest on Saturday afternoon, after the banks were closed. Though I had with me a Bank of England letter of credit, I found it quite impossible, at my hotel, to obtain meals except for cash. I secured a light breakfast by the childish subterfuge of staying in bed, growling my order at the waiter in barely intelligible German,

and feigning sleep or ill-temper on his return ; for the rest, I discovered that it is just possible, in Buda Pest, to exist for two days on the equivalent of one and sixpence !—and the respectable company in which I found myself in the small restaurant—supplied, I suspect, from the leavings of one of the hotels—to which I resorted, proved that to many of the old directing classes this was no temporary expedient, but a daily necessity.

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(III) STATES WHICH HAVE GROWN

Of the States new to the map of modern Europe, I visited Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. I stayed some time in Poland, visiting Warsaw, the district east of Kovel (towards the Russian frontier) and Galicia. In Czecho-Slovakia, I visited Prag only.

Perhaps the fact which impressed me most was the extent to which these "new" States are governed by their long history and old traditions. In both cases, I believe this to be the determining factor in their national mentality. In this respect, Czecho-Slovakia is by far the happier. Bohemia looks back to a time when she gave Emperors to Europe; and though she afterwards became an integral part of the Austrian dominions, it was by marriage and not by conquest. Her unity has always been respected—to violate it would be too obvious a sin against the logic of Geography; and while her history under Austrian rule has been chequered, she has enjoyed at times a wide measure of local autonomy, and her language and culture have never been deliberately attacked.

Poland has long been synonymous with martyrdom. The cynical crime of the "partitions," and the ruthless suppression of her bid for liberty in the 'thirties, have stamped deeply upon her the character of a suffering nation. Her earlier history has been forgotten—except by herself. She was at one time the chief Baltic power, occupying frontiers far wider than her racial boundaries;

she has a long military history, and a strange constitutional weakness—a genius for political impasse. The old Polish Diet was ridden by aristocratic coteries whose factions made sound government impossible; for a single dissentient voice was, for many purposes, enough to veto business. It would be ungenerous to recall such old history, if the mentality it reveals were not one of the chief difficulties with which modern Poland has to cope.

To Bohemia and to Poland alike, it is no new thing which was brought to life by the Treaty of Versailles. The two Republics are, in their own eyes, the lineal descendants of their political ancestors—seised of their lands, their claims, their traditions. The time of eclipse was simply an interregnum—and Poland, at least, knew many such in the days of her freedom. Two principles are thus inherently at conflict: the interpretation of nationality, as implied in Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, and recognised (*mutatis mutandis*!) in the Treaty of Versailles; and the heritage of the past, stored in the national memory of the "new" States. This national memory also includes traditional alliances: notably that between Poland and France, strengthened by the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw by Napoleon.

The task which faced the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was no easy one; yet the Czechs had many material advantages over their Polish neighbours, as well as their late Austrian masters. Shut in by mountains, Bohemia forms a natural geographical unity, yet is so centrally placed in Europe as to be the obvious meeting-ground of Slav and Teuton. The

country is well-watered, and very rich in minerals. The population, though not homogeneous—for the German “colonists” form a considerable percentage—is free from the extreme racial admixture which constitutes such a grave problem in other Austrian Succession States. Her people are lively, energetic and enterprising; born linguists and travellers; sturdy, independent, and able. She has been blessed with a few statesmen of the first rank, and a host of men skilled in administration, for which Austrian policy allowed considerable scope. Her chief problem was economic: the control of much of her resources and the direction of not a little of her industry was in alien hands. There was in particular a grave agrarian problem, created by the confiscations which followed certain abortive efforts at freedom.

The most serious difficulty was, however, the inclusion in the same State of the Slovak territory. I did not visit Slovakia, but I heard in Prag echoes of the controversy which was then almost at its height. The Slovaks are racially hardly distinct from the Czechs, but their history has been widely different. They formed part of the dominions of the Hungarian Kingdom, and had been subjected to a stern policy of Magyarisation, which suppressed all local freedom, and penalised the Slovak language. There was then perhaps some point in the Czech contention that the Slovaks were merely a backward branch of the family, speaking a debased dialect of literary Czech, with no knowledge of the art of government: peasants and in some sense boors, with no claim to separate treatment or autonomy within the State. I heard this view stated very forcibly

by a Czech statesman of great ability and breadth of mind, and while I am unable to judge the linguistic issue on its merits, I could not help feeling it unfortunate that such an attitude should be possible in a State which had just won its own right to self-determination. There was, it is true, some provision in the Constitution for the safeguarding of minority rights, but this proved unacceptable to the Slovaks, and feeling was really embittered at the time of my visit. The situation was naturally enough exploited by the German minority, which had its own grievances. I understand that the difficulty has since been solved in a sense agreeable to both parties. It certainly raised in an acute form questions of the meaning of self-determination, which, in other lands, have proved very intractable.

A new Government, if it labours under disadvantages, has also its compensations : it is not bound by the past, and so has a free hand. No administration bound by the continuity of policy could have dealt effectively with the agrarian problem ; the Government of Czecho-Slovakia attacked it directly, decreed the break-up of large estates, and the limitation of future holdings. Questions of industrial and social organisation were dealt with as drastically. Every commercial undertaking employing more than thirty workers must have its Workmen's Council, and measures for the protection and insurance of workpeople were at once put in force. The treatment of venereal disease was made compulsory. The rulers of the new State have taken full advantage of the wave of national sentiment which accompanied the establishment of the Republic, and have been well supported by the industrialists. Largely as an in-

direct result of social and economic legislation, the control of all kinds of business is passing rapidly into Czech hands. The administration seems already to have reached a high level of efficiency. Skilful finance and wise propaganda have already secured for the crown an exchange value almost equal to that of the Italian lira (October, 1922), and everything possible is being done to attract capital to the country. Czecho-Slovakia is fortunate in possessing great natural resources, and these are being systematically developed.

I found in Prag not only a fine Capital with the consciousness of a history and a future, but a very pleasant sense of social security, the welcome of a host of assured position. There is an excellent Syndicat d'Initiative; banks and business houses are prompt and courteous, and it is equally easy to do one's business in any one of five languages—for the Czechs are born linguists and travellers, and the new State finds ready to her hand thousands of men and women who know France, England and Germany as intimately as their homeland. Even the Police Office—that bugbear of Continental travel—has a pleasantly furnished waiting-room, provided with armchairs and magazines. There is an adequate staff of officials, and one is treated as the guest of the State, and interviewed in private—an admirable arrangement, if the formality of registering all foreigners is still adhered to.

The Assembly was in session, and (thanks to the good offices of a friend) I was able to be present at a debate. There is already a parliamentary library of considerable proportions, suitably housed and efficiently staffed. Its volumes include not only full materials

for the political history of the State, but also copies of the records of almost every Parliament, Hansard among the rest. The detailed arrangements, from the printing of the order-papers to the number of one's hat in the cloakroom, are excellent.

I left Prag feeling that, in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Europe had gained not only a new cultural unit, but a very definite centre of stability. Up to the present, the direct contact of Slav civilisation with the rest of Europe has been very partial. The Czech State is admirably fitted, both by position and by the distinctive character of her national genius, to interpret Slav culture to the West, which as yet knows it only (if at all) in its literary dress.

Every difficulty with which Czecho-Slovakia is faced exists also in Poland, in most cases in an aggravated form. In addition, Poland has problems peculiar to herself, which make the work of nation-building one of almost insuperable difficulty.

Her territory is very extensive; it has no real geographical unity, and (except in Posen and Galicia) it is ill served by railways and trunk roads. Her population is very mixed, and more so than ever since the War against Russians and Ukrainians pushed her Eastern frontier far beyond the limits justified by ethnology. In Eastern Galicia, I am told that 85 per cent. of the population is Ukrainian; in the district east of Kovel, which I visited, at least 90 per cent. must be Russian and Little Russian. There is also a large Jewish population, occupying roughly the economic position of the middle class whose absence has always been one of the problems of Polish national organisation.

It is now 150 years since the dismemberment of Poland began. At the time of the first Partition, nationality in the wider sense was hardly recognised in Europe. The members of the Polish State were forced against their will into developing national systems. Every means—political, social, administrative, educational—was used to assimilate them. In Posen, a definite policy of colonisation was undertaken by Germany. There was a wide divergence of policy. In Prussian Poland, a man might not even call himself a Pole. In the provinces under Russia, he might describe himself as a “Russian Pole,” and Congress Poland, with Warsaw as capital, had some kind of individual existence. Galicia alone had a measure of autonomy, for, true to her policy of “divide and rule,” Austria governed the Rutherian peasantry through the Polish landlord class, whose members were even admitted to the Civil Service. The result is that the new State has the problem of building into a unity provinces which have lived for over a hundred years under different laws and different social systems; for instance, while in the Prussian districts there was universal education of a German type, in the Russian provinces Congress Poland alone had an educational system, and that of the slightest. In Galicia, the system was comparatively free in organisation; but by no means universal. As a result, the only administrators ready to the hand of the new State were those trained in Austrian methods.

The question of an educational system is itself a stupendous task. In the Russian provinces, the percentage of illiteracy must reach the '90's. In Posen, where school buildings exist, the German teachers have

for the most part been withdrawn or dismissed. Thousands of young men and women are now being trained for the Service, but since Secondary Education is very backward, the question of the supply of suitable candidates is a grave one. The levelling-up and assimilation of such facilities as exist must be the work of years, and the problem well illustrates the reserve with which such general declarations as the principle of universal education must be received.

The Service of defence and public order must also be built up almost from the foundations. I found the railway police in South Poland staffed mainly by men who have been trained in the Prussian Service. Poland has received gratefully several allied "Missions" who have helped with the work of organisation. The primary difficulties of order are being rapidly overcome. An excellent Police Force—smart, efficient and courteous—has already been trained, and is looked upon with pride in the cities. (A Polish boy, the son of my host at a Warsaw Pension, asked me if London had yet introduced mounted police?) Railway administration has been regularised; the new Army has already won its spurs.

One of the gravest troubles is the reconstruction of the Eastern battle area, a great tract of country of whose *present* condition Western Europe has no conception. Through the kindness of one of the relief units of the Society of Friends, I was able to visit a section of the country through which the old Russo-German trenches ran. I travelled to the East of Kovel by rail, drove across country, visiting various points, and returned to Warsaw by another branch of the railway.

The scene is one of almost unimaginable desolation, even to those who know the Western Front—for it is in some sort inhabited. Whole populations live in the shallow dug-outs of the old trenches, without other shelter, clothed in rags, weakened by typhus, living for the most part on wild roots in a wilderness which they have no means of cultivating. Refugees from Russia arrive daily, only to find that all trace of their former villages has been wiped out. To the rear, for hundreds of miles, is a straggling hinterland, which can spare nothing from its own necessities. I am well aware that the pre-existing conditions in this district must have been poor, for I visited some villages outside this area. But even these seemed only to throw into relief the unimaginable horror to which this corner of Europe has been reduced, with little prospect of amendment. I conceived the greatest admiration for the work of the Friends' organisations, and for their sane and common-sense handling of unprecedented problems, both here and in other parts of stricken Europe. With the resources now available, such work can do little more than point the way for national reconstruction, and explore the best methods. Even so, it is pioneer work of the first order; and it has already in many instances provided the mould into which the national effort, when it becomes possible, can be poured.

The chief asset of Poland in dealing with all these grave problems is a keen sense of nationality, and her ardent patriotism, touched with a mystical idealism: (a section of the Church interprets her sufferings in terms of the Servant of Isaiah, and looks for some signal contribution to mankind, which shall spring from

the tragedy of her history). There is also, however, a certain tendency to Chauvinism, natural enough at a time of the rebirth of a people, but full of danger. She possesses an ancient culture, in which her long story is enshrined. Unfortunately, it bears the marks of feuds and acute political divisions—features which seem to reproduce themselves only too readily under present conditions. The tendency to split up into small groups is acute; there are twenty-two parties in the Polish National Assembly, and in the building where it is temporarily housed—a Secondary School—each party has a separate class-room for its “Club.” Such fertility of political variation is a source of weakness, especially in a nation like the Poles: temperamental, ardent in its affections and hatreds, excitable, volatile.

A Pole who has played a prominent part in the National movement said to me:—“What we need most is time.” A habit of public confidence takes time to build up; it is even harder, perhaps, to live down a tradition, such as existed under the Russian régime, that Government, and especially the Police Force, is a power to be resisted by any and every possible means. The new State is coming seriously to grips with the widespread venality which such a system engendered. Stern measures are being taken, but the evil is too deep-rooted to be easily eradicated, and I heard the opinion expressed that years of education would be needed before the country was free of it.

The task before these new States is not merely the attainment of internal stability, but also the adjustment of external relations: the question of language is crucial. It is unfortunately unlikely that Western Europe will

have the leisure or inclination to learn a Slav tongue, and the medium for intercourse must probably be a speech already widely understood in the West. The geographical position of these States suggests German as the most suitable, and I generally found it possible, in the cities, to do my business in that tongue. But I found also a not unnatural reluctance to use it. In one case, a Pole, after discoursing vigorous Nationalism in his office in fluent German—the only language in which we could communicate with any freedom—warned me as we left together that he could not speak it in the street! Prag is truly cosmopolitan; but, in general, the problem is a real one, and a solution must be found. Both Czechs and Poles are learning French with enthusiasm, but it must be long before it can become a *lingua franca*.

Another feature of the new European states-system gives one seriously to think. There is a through train from Lemberg in Galicia to Buda Pest. To travel by it, one must take five tickets in three different currencies, obtain three visas, and pass through four customs examinations. I was the only passenger by that train across the Polish frontier, and I do not wonder. These things are a parable. Can Europe afford this complex of franchises which has been set up in the name of liberty, and the duplication of Services which it implies? Or must the omni-competent State, entrenched behind its political and economic frontiers, give place to something less absolute? Must the multiplication of sovereignties result in a modification of the idea of national sovereignty? Or will the whole machinery of the new European States-system collapse under its own weight?

II

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST

(IV) THE EAST—SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

OUR grandfathers of the "splendid isolation" often spoke, and thought—and what is more important, felt—as if Europe were a vast but peripheral entity called "The Continent," just distinguishable within that wider entity called "Abroad." I am inclined to think that we are still dominated by a mis-classification which is equally misleading: "The East." As a matter of history, it is India which has bulked most largely in our Eastern relationships; and this concept "The East" seems to be a generalisation from Indian conditions as seen by us. I was not a little startled, at the beginning of my tour, to find a very different classification in a book by an eminent Japanese scholar.* The writer contrasts with Japanese culture an entity called "Indo-European civilisation." What startled me was not that he should feel distinctions between types of Oriental culture, more fundamental than the distinction between "East" and "West"; but that he should split off one half of that entity "The East," and group it with Europe: and he was speaking not in racial but in "cultural" terms. That a Japanese

* Mitsakuri: *La Vie Social Au Japon*.

observer of this standing, after long contact with "The West," should feel Indo-European culture as an entity, is a tremendous warning against superficial classification.

It would be very hard to point to any set of characteristics which are true alike of India, China and Japan ; perhaps a certain fundamental fatalism might be cited—the quality which treats an Indian famine, a Chinese flood, or the roads of Tokyo,* as irremediable evils. Most of the other characteristics commonly quoted—spirituality and passivity, for example—seem to me to be true only of India. Such unity as the East possesses has been forced upon her, and is a reflection of the attitude of Westerners. Oddly enough, it is only by contact with the East that the West has come to feel itself in any sense a unity ; the Legation Quarter of Peking, for example, is the symbol of something which is almost non-existent in Europe. Just as many Westerners have confounded Sikh and Arab and Mongol and Japanese, and a hundred others, and dubbed them all "Orientals," assigned them to nations corresponding to the coloured spaces on the map, and invested all alike with a selection of incompatible traits, so for the Asiatic there exists a being known as the Foreigner or the European, who may be anything from a Russian to a Scot. Of course, a small minority, both in East and West, know better ; even so, their reactions are coloured by their experience of the race with which they have had closest contact.

On the other hand there is between East and West a close parallelism of another kind. There is hardly a race or nation which has escaped the convulsions of the last ten years. The old bases of society have been

*This was written before the earthquake.

shaken, in East and West alike. Everywhere is felt an imperative need to frame some intelligible, self-consistent principle upon which to reconstruct. In the West, the need for revision springs from the redistribution of political and economic power. With the very doubtful exception of "self-determination," no new element has recently entered the life of Europe. In the East, while some important developments (such as the anti-Japanese boycott in China) can be traced largely to economic causes, the main problem is certainly the reconciliation of Western science, and methods of organisation, with the traditional oriental cultures.

One of the most fascinating puzzles in the East to-day is to try and discover why certain features of Western life have been adopted, and others rejected. The selection seems so haphazard; Western elements are often so incongruous in a traditional setting, or isolated survivals look odd in the midst of change. It is very difficult to say how far or how deep the change has gone.

In assimilating what it needs from a foreign civilisation, a nation seldom selects the elements it adopts on intellectual grounds alone: it is influenced by emotion and circumstance in much the same way as an individual. It came to my notice that an eminently reasonable Asiatic gentleman, of progressive ideas, whose wife had been kissed by a European at a dance, tried to convince her by arguments that dancing was a Western custom unsuited to the East; in a hot climate, such exercise was unnecessary, and the practice itself was an unpatriotic imitation of an alien custom. This last argument, if used of Western dancing only, may be sound commonsense. But the motives underlying it

are obvious, and entirely reasonable—though they might well have found more direct expression. In much the same way, both Asiatic and European nations are influenced in their judgment of each other by deep-seated emotional bias. Their selection of points for imitation is freest, intellectually, when they meet on a footing of social and political equality. A relation of subjection or dependence at once weights the scales. In the absence of any strong antagonism, there is a powerful impulse to indiscriminate imitation; manners, customs, ideas and values are accepted by “prestige-suggestion.”

Till recently, this force must have been very strong in India. Its most obvious product is the “Babu.” His mental make-up has been very largely determined by his education, but his manners, his dress and his general outlook are chiefly the result of prestige-suggestion. It is only Caste, which shuts off society into water-tight compartments, that has delayed the adoption of such trappings of European civilisation by the mass of the people.

Prestige-suggestion is most powerful in the case of actual conquest; but a display of economic or even intellectual force may also set the process of imitation in motion. Europe impressed the imagination of Asia, partly by virtue of her power of penetrating and holding huge tracts of country, but also by the success of her traders and the inventions of her scientists and engineers. For a time, by sheer suggestion, Asia accepted *en masse* the whole complex of European civilisation as superior to her own, without pausing to examine critically wherein the virtue lay. Here and there, custom,

tradition, faith, prejudice, or inertia, might prove too strong to be overcome. But, for the rest, she treated Western culture as a magic ritual, whose efficiency might be lost if she omitted any part; the meaning lay in the whole, though, taken separately, its elements might make nonsense.

It is true that the "unity" of Western civilisation is in part an illusion; but it is an illusion shared by most Europeans, and the soldiers, administrators and merchants who came to Asia were men of action for the most part, race-conscious, and little given to self-analysis. So long as their prestige was incontrovertible, the impulse to imitation ran riot. For example, a former King of Cambodia had a statue of himself made in the dress of Napoleon III as General. Reason often seems to govern such imitation as little as it determines "fashion" in Europe. It is curious, too, and rather sad, to notice how narrow are the limits within which even cultivated taste may work. In the majority of Eastern palaces (there are notable exceptions) priceless collections of art-treasures of the finest oriental workmanship rub shoulders with the trashy products of some European factory; (and the converse is surely just as true, though less obvious to European eyes). Where the standard of craftsmanship is less a matter of living perception than of tradition, the onset of Western influences may be very rapid and destructive. In Java, cheap cretonnes imported from Europe are debasing the fine "batik" work. In India, standardised European household utensils are tending to drive out the work of the village potter; and even the kerosene tin, in its stark ugliness, is replacing the graceful lines

of the earthen water-jar. In Indo-China, many arts and crafts, including damascening and dyeing, are being saved from total extinction at the eleventh hour.

In India, the tide has now turned, and an invention or a custom probably stands less chance of being widely adopted if its origin is European. The non-co-operators wished to abolish machinery and return to hand-labour ; but such a radical reversion has little hold outside the ranks of a few idealists. Gandhi himself travelled by train, though somewhat unwillingly. In fact the reaction against the West is almost as uncritical and as much influenced by emotional bias as the imitation of Europe had been. Machinery and even organised government are attacked by extremists as instruments of foreign control. This is perhaps not as unreasonable as it sounds. It is true that Japan has succeeded in adopting Western methods of manufacture and administration, and at the same time retaining control. A strengthening of Shinto and of the traditional loyalty to the Imperial House have actually been instruments in the process of change. But Hindooism is not Shinto, and the Indian is not the Japanese—his virtues and his faults are alike different. Racially, culturally, ethically, the two peoples are as the poles apart. Japan herself has invented no really new form of industrial organisation. She has not avoided “factory-civilisation,” with its problem of Capital and Labour, its ethic of competition, its ugly masses of industrial towns, its invasion of the sphere of the artist and the craftsman by the products of mass-production. The “foreign devil” is not dependent for his activity upon an incarnation in European bodies.

The turning of the tide has left much Eastern thought and feeling somewhat "in the air." Return to national tradition is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases; the habit of it has been lost, and revivals are apt to be mechanical and unreal. But the critical faculties, developed by Western studies, are turned back upon Western civilisation, as seen in the light of recent events. Much of the current criticism of Europe is specious, and based upon inaccurate or partial knowledge. The fact remains that Europe no longer seems entirely worthy of imitation; and it must be admitted that among Europeans themselves there is a widespread pessimism with regard to the bases of their own civilisation, and a manifest impotence to resolve its immediate problems, which cannot be hid from the thoughtful Oriental; an attitude which is bound to react upon the relations of East and West. Somewhere at the back of the mind of the most practical Westerner lurks the doubt as to whether Western values are after all ultimate. "It is easy to civilise Asia," a British administrator said to me; "You need only open up roads and railways, the rest follows . . . if it is civilising," he added after a pause. America seems as yet hardly touched by this searching of heart; her buoyant self-confidence was not shaken by the War, and she stands aloof from the European tangle. It is important, too, that her main contact has been with China and not with India, so that "The East" to the average American holds a very different content from the British conception which is based mainly upon experience in India.

It was the Russo-Japanese War which first awakened Europe to the possibility that the traditional conception

of "The East" might have to be revised. In Europe, however, the internal difficulties of Russia were fairly well-known. For Asia, the defeat of Russia by Japan meant the defeat of a typical European nation by one of the smallest of Asiatic peoples. The moral effect of the Russian collapse has been felt all over Asia, and is far more important than the territorial adjustments which followed. In Japan, Asia sees her claim to race-equality with Europe justified, and a very powerful stimulus has been given to national and racial movements. Quite irrespective of their race-characteristics, situation, or history, most Asiatic peoples feel that what Japan has done they could do. The reaction on the Indian situation has been very marked. Few Indians know Japan (though recently, interest has extended so far as to lead to the study of Japanese conditions and policy by a few specially picked men; the Education Minister of one of the largest Indian States has just returned from six months' intensive study of Japanese schools). Ignorance of local conditions has only made it easier to draw parallels. Much of this parallelism would be dispelled by closer contact and more exact knowledge. But there are too many examples in history of great movements founded upon a misinterpretation of precedent, for another such to be dismissed as fantastic because it happens to be based upon a false analogy.

The Great War, though it did little to change Asiatic boundaries (except in the case of Turkey) affected profoundly the attitude of Asia to Europe. For the first time since steamships and telegraphs and wireless had brought East and West into close contact, Asia saw

Western civilisation divided into two camps so equally balanced that the outcome—and the future position of the warring groups in the East—hung in the balance for over four years. Further, each group appealed to Asia for support. In some cases, large drafts of men were recruited either for the fighting Services or for labour corps. (In China, I have been addressed as “Mus-soo,” a relic of coolie labour in France). For the first time, European Powers competed on a large scale for the support not only of the Governments, but of the public opinion of Asia. There can be few corners of the world so remote that the campaign of propaganda did not reach them in some measure. The educated and thinking classes of Asia have been deeply impressed by the failure of Western religious and ethical sanctions to preserve the unity of the civilisation based upon them. Much of the current criticism is second-hand and out of date, but it is none the less powerful and perhaps growing.

The Allies in Europe talked much of Self-determination and Democracy, and these formulas were consecrated by the sacrifices of the War and justified by victory. It is not surprising that they should have been widely adopted by Asiatic leaders and propagandists. Heightened group-consciousness is a highly contagious condition. In Europe, it finds its expression most easily in nation-groups. In Asia (with the remarkable exception of Japan), I doubt if nationality has at all the same meaning. It is the religious group which counts. The growth and activity of the Arya Somaj is the measure of the Hindoo revival; Buddhism is stirring in Ceylon, Japan and even in China. The recovery of

Turkey under the leadership of Angora has had an influence much wider than Islam itself.

However deeply one may sympathise with the refugees from the Soviet régime, who have migrated through China in great numbers, it is impossible to ignore the fact that European prestige has suffered greatly through their unfortunate economic situation. In Shanghai, many Russians are being lodged in one room of the poorer Chinese houses, living in conditions of destitution, and driven by sheer necessity to accept any employment which offers. In Japan, the exclusion of further refugees has been discussed.

The effect of all this has been cumulative, and European prestige probably stands lower in the East than at any time since Europeans first obtained a permanent footing there. As a consequence, the period of blind imitation has passed. There is no longer a wide-spread presumption in favour of Western ideas (whether political, social or religious). Generalisation is dangerous, if not impossible. In China, it is still probably true that Western origin makes for acceptance ; in India the reverse seems the case. In Japan, the process of selection is less influenced by emotional bias than elsewhere, for the international position of Japan is now unassailable.

There can be no political or social peace until the warring elements within the life of Asiatic nations have found some principle of harmony. The problem must be faced and solved separately by India, China and Japan. There can be no general solution, for their civilisations are in some ways more widely separated than those of Europe and India, or Europe and China.

In each case, there is the element of Western science and critical method and organisation and industry to be reconciled with a traditional culture and set of social values. Japan has made most advance towards a solution, but it would be rash to predict that India or China will develop along the same lines. It is probable that in each case inspiration will be sought much more in traditional national ethics than seemed likely ten years ago. An interesting index of this return may be seen in dress—especially women's dress. In India, the sareh, in Japan the kimono, is now safe from fear of displacement by European costume. In Java, the Dutch themselves adopted the sarong for day-wear in country districts. In Japan, sandals are holding their own against shoes. In China, on the other hand, Western influence in dress is stronger, but here, too, there seems to be a reversion to national dress among women of the student class.

(V) POLITICAL PENETRATION

(1)

A contrast is sometimes drawn between the loosely-knit States of the ancient world in the East and the more compact highly organised political life which seems somehow to have resulted from the Westward movement of civilisation and the shifting of its focus to the Mediterranean. The contrast between these two types of States was thrown into relief by the Wars between Greece and Persia, and action and re-action between them has gone on ever since. It is curious that with this movement of civilisation towards the West there came another change. Not only were the Western States more compact in organisation than the great Empires of the ancient East, but also, for some unexplained reason, which may or may not be related to the new compactness and stability, these Western States showed from the first a strong tendency towards political freedom. It may be an accident, but it is a very striking fact that Greece should have been the home of the first democracy and also the inspiration of democratic thought from her day to our own. Western civilisation had lived through some two thousand five hundred years of self-conscious history before the great movement of expansion occurred. It was, of course, no accident that the end of the fifteenth century saw the discovery of America, and of the routes around the

Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, and through the Straits of Magellan on the other. Curiously enough, this enterprise of exploration was in some sort a reaction on the part of Europe to Asiatic aggression. It was at the height of the Turkish power, when the taking of Constantinople, the invasion of the Balkans and the infesting of the Eastern Mediterranean by Turkish pirates made the old routes to the East unsafe, that European seamen were almost driven to find alternative ways to Asia. It was a stroke of luck that Copernicus should have discovered that the world was a planet, and therefore probably round, just in time to remove ignorance and prejudice which might otherwise have made such ventures seem impious.

The direct influence of Islamic culture upon Europe was of course profound. Its indirect importance for world-civilisation was perhaps not less, for it interposed a barrier between Europe and Asia for many hundreds of years, and also in a long series of Crusades concentrated the military piety of Europe upon objectives nearer home. When at last Europe was ready to throw the weight of her man-power and her culture, invigorated by the Renaissance-Reformation, into the struggle for new lands, it was a very mature and self-conscious civilisation which her mariners took with them. Free-booter, trader, colonist and Jesuit missionary alike were the products of a long period of intense living. In some cases, such as that of the Pilgrim Fathers, or the Catholics who settled in Maryland, the men who went out from Europe left it because they could not themselves fit in with its social and religious requirements. But, in the main, the soldiers who conquered the newly-

discovered countries or the old civilisations of Asia in the name of Europe, were men who believed intensely in the standards of European life and religion. They were "missionaries" almost to a man. True, the earliest travellers came back from the Empire of the great Cham and from the Court of Kubla Khan full of strange stories of the power and glamour of Eastern rulers; stories which fired the imagination of Europe, enriched her literature and stimulated her thought. But this admiration soon turned, first to a desire to possess, and then, with possession, to a feeling of superiority.

Many circumstances, and not least climatic conditions, re-inforced this feeling of race-superiority. In all but a very few cases, Europeans in Asia were exiles. It was apparently biologically impossible for European races to "settle" Asia in the way in which America was settled. Two alternatives were open; they must regard the home-country frankly as their base, returning to it for "leaves" and sending their families home for education; or if they decided to throw in their lot entirely with the people of the land, and inter-marry with them, they must merge at least some of their European characteristics in the character of the peoples among whom they settled, and found a mixed race, in which European characteristics were at best only dominant. In the majority of cases, the first alternative was the one chosen. The English in India have remained culturally a "garrison," quite apart from the question of a military occupation or political government. The same is true, with differences, of the French. Perhaps their special genius lies in a capacity for appeal-

ing to the imagination of those races which they rule, and making full use of such organisation as exists. A striking example of this is, I believe, to be found in the use that has been made of the prestige and power of the natural leaders in Algeria, upon whom the French conferred high military rank at a time when other European nations were still very chary of appointing non-Europeans to such posts.

The methods of the Dutch in Java provide an outstanding instance of the second alternative referred to above. At the time when Java and the surrounding islands were first colonised, the sailing distance from Europe was very great and made it almost impossible to maintain the kind of close connection with the Mother Country upon which the English rule in India has always been based. Another factor, too, was important. The Dutch are not a numerous race, and it would have been difficult perhaps to build up a Dutch Colonial Empire on the model adopted by the British or the French. On the other hand, the Dutch share the disabilities of other European races in hot climates. The solution adopted was the recognition of the children of mixed marriages as full-blooded Dutchmen with all the civil and social rights which this recognition implies. There is thus in Java no Eurasian problem in the sense in which it is understood in India. The same recognition has been extended to the children of Dutch and Javanese parents even where no marriage has taken place, upon an acknowledgment of paternity by the father. So far has this system been extended that the greater proportion of those who claim full Dutch nationality in Java are of mixed race. It is of course very difficult

to say how far parallels may be drawn between the situation in Java and that in India (for example), since both the European and the Asiatic races in these two countries differ widely. There could indeed hardly be a greater contrast than that between the warlike Indian races of the North, or the high-caste Hindoo, and the small easy-going Javanese, who have even been content to adopt, as a *lingua franca*, the language of a minority of Malays. At the same time, the social and legal status which has been accorded to Eurasians in Java must have had marked consequences. Curiously enough, the line is still rigidly drawn between the "Dutch" (whether pure or half-blooded) and the Javanese. These latter were until recently strongly discouraged from any attempt to learn the Dutch language or to adopt Dutch habits of life and thought. On the other hand, the Dutch themselves have maintained little of that rigid adherence to home customs which is symbolised among the British in India by the boiled shirt. Dutch women outside the towns have even adopted the indigenous "sarong" and the curious little tight bodice of the Javanese women, as the ordinary costume for the day. In the evening they wear European clothes, though in Batavia the rather charming custom of walking in the park in the evening without a hat is still followed. Whatever its demerits, this attitude has resulted in the existence of a mixed race which can live permanently in Java without returning for home leave or retiring outside the island during the "hot weather." The Dutch have also accepted as a basis the organisation of the two Central Provinces of Java, and have maintained their rulers in a semi-

regal state. It is impossible to doubt the difficulty of keeping quite rigidly to European standards of administration in such conditions as these. It is difficult to imagine that a great country like India, with its strong and ancient cultural traditions and its warlike races, could have been brought within the Dutch colonial system as I saw it in Java. It is perhaps no accident that the early Dutch colonists in India and the Dutch East India Company were soon beaten in the race for expansion by their French and English rivals. At the same time, in the special circumstances which Java presents, which of course were still more difficult at the time the settlements were made, Dutch methods have achieved a measure of success which perhaps could not have been reached upon the lines of French or English colonisation.

It is interesting here to draw a parallel between Dutch rule in Java and the history of the colonisation of the seaboard of Ceylon by Holland. During my visit to the island, I saw some charming relics of Dutch rule ; in particular, the old Fort at Galle is a witness to its strength and reality, and the whole of this coast is dotted with interesting, though less important, remains. At Matara I saw a very curious star-shaped Fort, now occupied as a house by the British engineer. Close by was the Residency, built round a very charming circular room, whose original purpose no one seemed able to discover. The "burghers" of Ceylon provide a parallel with the "Dutch" of Java. Here, the same policy seems to have been followed, though it was cut short by the loss of the island. The burghers seem to be perfectly acclimatised ; they regard Ceylon as their

homeland, and their political and cultural ambitions are bounded by its shores. Some of them, no doubt, are full-blooded Dutchmen, but they must be in a small minority. The burgher community here also includes descendants of the Portugese who visited Ceylon for purposes of trade before the British conquest.

The British methods in India and the Dutch policy in Java may be taken as roughly typical instances of the alternatives before a European race with Asiatic ambitions. In both cases, it seems impossible to consider the political relationship except upon the back-ground of a military conquest. Once the soldier has done his work, however, he falls into the background, and the administrator takes his place. It may be ultimately true that the political systems of India, Indo-China and Java rest alike upon force—a sanction which perhaps lies behind every political government, though in varying degrees and often in a very different sense. But the converse is surely also true: while the rule of the British in India and the Dutch in Java cannot be said to rest upon consent in the same way as the power of a Home Government, still, the recent history of these countries would be unintelligible if “consent” did not mean something more than acquiescence.

It is perhaps only in recent times that European races have felt themselves definitely responsible for the political education of Asia. Indeed, one of the most striking changes which has taken place in the attitude of Europeans towards their responsibility for their Asiatic subjects can be found here. In the old days it was claimed with some justification that “British

justice" in India (for example) was in itself a sufficient return for the obvious economic advantages which resulted to the ruling race. Almost from the first, a definite attempt was also made to convert the subjects of the British Raj to Christianity; but this was no concern of Government, and in fact the Queen's Proclamation after the Mutiny laid it down as a fundamental principle that Government should not concern itself with such matters. Interference with religious and social custom has been confined to the suppression of such practices as suttee, and can be justified on broad humanitarian grounds.

From an early date, Europeans have taken in hand the development of the economic resources of the countries they have conquered. It is no doubt true the motive was quite openly the increased power of production which would result—a policy which has sometimes been stigmatized as "exploitation." But perhaps this development has never been entirely divorced from some attempt to raise the standard of living and to establish some degree of "economic" justice. In recent years, definite movements for economic reform have been set on foot, of which the most striking is perhaps the establishing of co-operative enterprise in many parts of India, referred to in a later chapter. Such efforts are apt to become inextricably involved in the religious situation, for in India, at all events, it is impossible to touch the question of land-settlement without impinging upon religious sanctions, for the law of inheritance and the like has never passed out of the domain of ecclesiastical lawyers.

Political education, then, although it marks a new

phase in the relations between Europe and Asia, must be read as a development of an existing policy : the ideal of even-handed justice first invaded the sphere of economic relationships, and gave birth to a policy of constructive reform. It is impossible to say how long this phase might have lasted if recent events in Europe had not hastened a development, and made the introduction of political reforms imperative. The English, like the French and the Dutch, though in different ways, had from the first made use of the co-operation of Indian princes. The distinction between " British India " and the " Native States " is still maintained in full vigour. The latter States are graded into classes, each of which has its distinct rights and privileges as well as an order of precedence. In fact, one of the difficulties in the way of constitutionalism is that the British Government is bound, by its treaties with many of these States, not to interfere in matters of internal administration. So far as the constitutional movement has spread to the Native States it has been by imitation of British examples and not by any direct imposition from the British Government. The wide differences which exist among these States and the varying attitude of their rulers towards reform present a problem not less complicated than that of the reconciliation of religious minorities.

A good deal of political education comes under the general heading of " advice." A British Resident is accredited to the ruler of each Native State in India, and his duty is to give " advice." On matters of external policy this advice must in practice be followed. On internal questions the extent to which he controls policy varies. The more powerful States are practically

autonomous in such matters ; the smaller States have a more limited freedom. Specialist Ministers are also often "lent" by the British Government, especially when some development of policy is being worked out. On the other hand, the British Government has always welcomed the "advice" of notable Indians, and representatives of many different points of view, selected by the Imperial Government, have for long past been added to the Councils by which provincial Governors, as well as the Viceroy, are assisted. The recent reforms consist, then, in the introduction of elective machinery and the allotment of a majority of seats upon the Councils to elected representatives. In addition, a wide class of powers—roughly those which concern local Government, education, and other home affairs—have been handed over to "responsible Ministers," while the remaining Departments are administered as before by an officer of the Government. These changes are often considered as an experiment, but it is an experiment in a special sense—that is, the handing-over of selected functions of Government for a period of years, at the end of which a re-examination of the whole ground is to take place, with a view not to the withdrawal of powers already handed over, but to the extension of the machinery, if it is found to work well, to a much wider field. I have described in a later chapter my impressions of some of these new Councils. The point I wish to make here is that they represent an attempt to translate into the political life of Asia a form of Government which won acceptance in Europe only after a long period of struggle. A belief in representative Institutions has become one of the assumptions of European political life. There are,

perhaps, indications from the South of Europe that the acceptance of the democratic theory of Government is not as widespread or as whole-hearted as had been thought. But neither Italy nor Spain has big commitments in Asia. The great colonising powers are all of them nations which have accepted constitutionalism as an axiom of political Government at home. It is an interesting speculation whether there may not be some intimate connection between their political theory and practice in this regard, and their power to influence profoundly the development of general civilisation. If there is in this suggestion any measure of truth, it is a sound intuition which is bringing them to realise that a continuation of their influence depends upon a new view of their responsibilities. The time is perhaps past when Europe could contribute to the development of Asia by directing it from the pedestal of race-superiority.

(VI) POLITICAL PENETRATION

(2)

The attempt to apply to the Government of Asiatic nations political principles which have been developed in so alien a soil is little less than heroic, whether the initiative comes from Europeans domiciled in Asia or from citizens of Asiatic nations. The practical difficulties are immeasurably great. Take, for instance, the simplest machinery by which an election can be carried through. In the West it depends upon every hand and turn upon the existence of an electorate which is, at very least, literate ; yet, except in Japan, this is an assumption which is not true of Asia. It has taxed the ingenuity of those responsible to devise a method of distinguishing between the ballot boxes of the rival candidates, so as to make sure that votes are cast in the way intended. For instance, in a report of the Indian elections, *The Times* described how, where there were only three or four candidates, the difficulty was met by giving each a party colour, and painting the ballot boxes accordingly. It was found, however, that where there was a larger number of candidates it was not possible to find for them colours which would always be recognised ; in this case each candidate was given an animal as a badge, and representations of these animals were affixed to the respective ballot-boxes. If the machinery of democracy at its

simplest is so difficult to make fool-proof, it seems hard to imagine that in matters of high policy the electorate is at present capable, in all cases, of intelligent decision.

It is curious how completely the marks of the intense struggles by which constitutional government has established itself in the West have disappeared from the forms and institutions of most countries in Europe. Another point arises here : only comparatively recently the history taught in European schools in Asia was Western history, and those who taught it carried with them the political assumptions of the West. Thus, in British schools in India it is assumed that Hampden is a hero and Wilkes not entirely a villain ; that the personal experiment of George III was doomed to failure since it set the clock back ; that the successful attempt to control policy by withholding supplies from the Crown was amply justified by its results ; that the responsibility of ministers to control is the keystone of political liberty ; and that Government should rest upon the consent of the governed. As long as the race-bar was felt by those on both sides of it to preclude the drawing of any direct parallel between political history in the West and in the East, these examples from Western history had little direct bearing upon life in the East ; they were regarded less perhaps as the basis of political education than as the traditional material of that " mental training " which some fifty years ago was generally believed to be the object of education. It is almost ironical that the Schools and Colleges, which have often been criticised as remote from every-day life, should indirectly have inspired the present political upheaval. It is unfortunate, too, that so much that is essential to the right

understanding of the growth of political liberty should have formed no part even of Western history. For instance, the first serious attempt to write an account of the development of the British Home Civil Service was completed only last year, and is as yet unknown even in English schools. It is unfortunate, too, that a formal training in history should so often have been separated from any attempt to deal with its philosophic and psychological background—that the impression should often have been left that the mechanism of constitutional government holds within it magic power which is independent of political habit. To say this is not in any sense to blame those responsible for the educational system. They gave to India the best they knew; the new Universities were founded upon the most recent English model, and if the Government Colleges were at first (following the policy described by Macaulay) intended to impart to Indians a kind of Western knowledge which would fit them for junior posts under the British Civil Service, there were other schools into which the enthusiasm and unstinted effort of idealists was poured with a lavish hand.

In the political, no less than in the religious sphere, the West has contributed to the East the product of a long period of development, without distinguishing very clearly between its essentials and incidental circumstances. It is hardly unfair to suggest the analogy of a ready-made suit of clothes; one is sometimes tempted to think that, just as in many parts of Asia a return to national costume is one of the features of the present uprising, so the new political and religious life, once it is fully self-conscious, will refuse to clothe itself in Western

dress. In India, at any rate, it is possible to distinguish between three phases of the reform movement. Asia is interested less in the forms of constitutional government than in the general principle that it should rest upon the consent of the governed. Even this seems at times to be accepted less as an end than as a means ; it is, in many cases, the principle under cover of which a transference of power from Europeans to the new States can take place. I am not convinced that even this transference represents the real aim of Asiatic nationalism ; behind it and beyond it, though expressing itself for the time being in these terms, there seems to lie a more fundamental demand—that it shall be possible for the new national civilisations to live their own life in their own way. Everywhere, as I see it, there is springing up a consciousness of the need for unity and harmony. It becomes increasingly clear that the basis of this harmony will be found in national tradition ; how far European elements can form a part of it must depend ultimately upon the possibility of expressing them in a form which is compatible with this basis. I cannot believe that the uprising of Asia is at bottom political, in the sense in which Europe understands politics. It is a question of social values, and in India, at all events, their re-settlement will probably be made in terms not political, but religious.

I have sometimes heard the view expressed that political Institutions in India in the Western sense of that term depend entirely upon the British connection, and that without this support they would collapse almost at once. While, in my view, the work of political education is only beginning, my impression is that

already Constitutionalism has been grafted on to the Indian national ideal. But it does not seem to me likely that politics will ever play in India the dominant rôle which they have played in the West. There is a fundamental difference of outlook which cannot be accounted for simply by saying that India is backward or passing through a different stage of development. From the point of view of Europe, this is no doubt true of Indian politics as of Indian industry. But from the point of view of the best Indian minds it is but a partial truth. An Indian friend told me that while, in his view, Europe had been awakened by the War to some realisation of eternal issues, America was still in its childhood as regards the things of the soul. It is interesting that India should have made at least one important contribution to a political problem which is still puzzling Europe—the question of minorities. There are many disadvantages in the system of communal constituencies which has been adopted as the only way of re-assuring religious minorities in India. But then in Europe there has been in recent years a distinct movement of political thought in the direction of personal, as opposed to territorial grouping; guild-socialism may perhaps stand for this tendency in the sphere of economic thought, though parallels could be found in the claims of the Catholic School of churchmanship in England, while on the Continent there has been a revival of the “concordat” view of the relations of Church and State. In the eyes of Mohammedans in India, the communal constituency is a permanent institution, and it is difficult to imagine that they would agree to its abandonment, except in exchange for some arrangement which gave equal

security. While, then, I would not seem to suggest that India is not really interested in politics, it does seem to me true that religion and not political life is her primary interest, and that this must become more and more clear as her autonomy develops. There is in Europe a wide gap between the implications of St. Augustine's "City of God," for example, and such modern Utopias as those of Mr. Graham Wallas or even the League of Nations in its more ideal aspect. Whether or not India will travel along the same road, it is impossible to forecast ; but at all events the immediate effect of full autonomy would certainly be a shifting of interest from political to religious questions, which would put a great strain upon the new constitutional machinery. For this reason, if for no other, the British Raj seems to me the indispensable background upon which national unity in India can be built up.

The spread of political reform in Asia in lands which have retained their independence is not less striking, though it has taken a somewhat different form. Perhaps China presents the most interesting example of the difficulties which are met with. The Revolution was primarily a national movement, and its object was the expulsion of the Manchus. It was, however, no accident that the men who led it had been trained in Western modes of thought. It was natural, then, that the new constitution should be framed on democratic lines. There had been no period of initiation ; the leaders of the new State were called upon to exercise full powers with very little preliminary training in the practice of Government. Most of them had been trained in European or American Colleges, and they were perfectly

familiar with the feel of constitutional government as the citizen knows it. My impression is, however, that it is very difficult for the citizen in the most democratic of States—still more for the foreigner—to understand the part played by administration in the work of Government. Office routine plays a very small part in Press reports, and the ban which prevents Civil Servants from taking an active part in politics also perhaps helps to conceal from the public the extent to which Government depends upon their work. To the casual observer, the links between the passage of a Bill through Parliament and the execution of the new law by the Officers of a Local Authority are not obvious. Ministers may seem to answer questions in the House by virtue of some quality of omniscience which descends upon them with the official mantle. The clerks of all grades who have spent hours in collecting the material for these answers are outside the political consciousness of the public. The recent history of China is full of examples of the breakdown even of such administrative machinery as exists ; perhaps the most striking case I came across was the working of children of eight and nine years of age for twelve hour shifts, day and night, in Shanghai Cotton Mills, at a time when there was in force an admirable code issued by the Peking Government, dealing with these very questions. There is of course some clear advantage which China gains from her position of independence : questions of internal politics are not cut across at every hand and turn by the (often irrelevant) issues of nationalism. But, on the other hand, such a situation has its own difficulties. It is not easy for Europeans in the Chinese Services to carry out the kind

of work which is being done by the I.C.S. The working out of a policy of government calls for a wide measure of discretion and a reasonable freedom from interference. In China, it is true, the Post Office and the Customs have been organised by Europeans, and have attained a great measure of efficiency. On the other hand, the discretion allowed to the European officials in the service of the Chinese Government is apt to be less wide in questions which directly affect the political life of the country. No sphere of administration is more important in China at the present time than that which deals with industrial development. Yet it is just here that "interests," whether local or foreign, are most powerful and least inclined to admit the right of Government to interfere. There is in Peking an admirable "Economic Office," which seems to be in touch with the most important developments all over China, and is under European control. But its function is, of necessity, wholly advisory, and the example quoted is only typical of the gap between the Government's intention and performance.

There seem to be two political alternatives. Political freedom may come to a country, as it were, from outside ; in this case, it finds ready to its hand an administrative machinery and a political tradition, but, on the other hand, the difficulties of transition are increased by questions of high policy, as in India. In the case of China, there is no single European Power which is strong enough to dictate a policy, and (as was shown in the unfortunate Lincheng incident) even the united pressure of the Legations may be impotent to enforce demands upon a Government which has no control over

its own provinces. Here, then, there is no basis of unity upon which to build freedom. India and China are approaching the problem from opposite poles. It is never possible to draw parallels between nations so different in temperament, character and history ; but the situation in India and China respectively does at least illustrate the difficulties which attend the democratisation of Asia, whether the impulse comes from direct political "penetration," or from the imitation of European models.

The existence of extra-territorial European settlements in China, and (formerly) also in Japan, has had a direct influence upon the development of political institutions in these countries. They have provided working models of a community which, if not entirely self-governing, had at any rate a large measure of control over the conditions of its own life. Streets, buildings and public services of cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai and Hankow have introduced a new idea of town life into China. The Treaty Ports have become industrial centres, from which the life of the factory has invaded China proper. From these outposts of Europe political ideas have spread, and in them not seldom Chinese political Societies have flourished.

In this matter of the adoption of many of the forms of Western political life, as in most other things, Japan holds a unique position. Most striking of all is the adaptability with which she has set to work to select, to adapt and to combine the results of European experiment. The Restoration of the 'sixties implied no such break with tradition as was brought about by the Revolution in China. The new Government could thus

base its policy upon an existing national unity, and the Imperial power and the veneration of the Japanese for their Emperor were deliberately used to help forward reform, whether economic or political.

The absence of European control has not then in Japan carried with it the same consequences as in China. On the other hand, the very process of careful selection and combination by which Japan has so successfully brought herself into line with modern developments carries within itself a difficulty of a special kind. The result is somewhat of a patchwork, finding its coherence less in the suitability of its parts to each other than in the unity of the whole within the concept of patriotism.

The spread of Western political ideas in Asia, by whatever mechanism it has been achieved, has brought with it changes quite outside the sphere of Government. It depends for its success upon the building up of a habit of thought and a way of life, and a power of organising human material into stable groups. The new nationalism has direct connections with artistic and literary expression. Its needs have called into existence a great economic expansion, and are rapidly transforming hand industry into factory civilisation. This economic and cultural development is not of course dependent at all points upon political change ; but the two can hardly be separated even in thought, and one of the most vital problems of the new Asia is the control of the new industrial society by the new national Governments. Curiously enough, the West is, at the present time, passing through a phase of adjustment in this regard ; economic groupings in Western society, whether on the employing or the labour side, are becoming yearly more

powerful; in America the issue has been definitely joined for some years past, and in Europe it has perhaps only been postponed by the events of the War. In introducing into Asia her politics and her industrial civilisation, Europe is handing on a problem which she has not herself solved. It may be that in this new setting new solutions will be found; but during my time in Asia I saw little sign of it, and there is a real danger that economic development will outrun political, and that when the new Governments have attained political stability they will find themselves face to face with economic interests even more closely organised than themselves.

(VII) ECONOMIC PENETRATION

Japan never passed through the "gas-age"—when the inhabitants of her villages gave up oil as an illuminant they took at once to electric light. In every valley of Japan the streams which come down from the hills turn water-wheels, and make power which is used for electric railways and tramways, running up from the big towns far into the country, or is converted into light. It is not only in the matter of lighting that Japan has moved directly out of the middle ages into modern times, and this is true also of very many other parts of Asia. A development which in Europe was spread over something like one hundred and fifty years has often been brought about in fifteen. Two important consequences result; in the first place the coming of industrial civilisation has been much more rapid, and adjustments correspondingly more difficult; it has also been very uneven, and the most modern methods of industry can sometimes be seen side by side with survivals which date back to antiquity. In Japan I have seen, on a small country station, ice-cream in the American fashion, sold by uniformed boys, who also offer sterilised milk in hermetically sealed jars. The railway itself was electrified, and provided with the latest safety and signalling devices. Outside the station, often in full view of the line, would be a village temple in which the

ancient magical practices were still in full force. This rapidity and indefiniteness of development constitutes a very grave problem in all those countries where the mechanism of Western civilisation is being developed much more quickly than an understanding of its principles. It would be very easy to multiply examples of this lop-sided economic development. In Peking, I saw workshops where silk is spun and wound by hand, chiefly by boy-labour. There are also shops in which weaving is done by looms where even the shuttle is passed from side to side without any mechanical help. Others again show a type of machine in which there is a kind of treadle which operates the shuttle, and in this case feet and hands often move together with surprising rapidity; curiously enough, even on these hand-loom there is often a very elaborate device for controlling the pattern—the method used being a long succession of cards in which holes are punched, very similar to those which release the keys of a pianola, the cards being made to rotate round a wheel above the loom. I was told that hand workshops of this kind can still compete on favourable terms with mills in which modern machinery is used. This results apparently from the different class of work undertaken, for the hand-shops often specialise in fabrics of high quality and intricate design. There is, however, another cause—the low rate of wages, which makes it possible to obtain human labour often cheaper than mechanical power. It is of course true that labour in machine-driven mills is equally cheap; but the result is simply that the cost of labour is so small a proportion of the total cost of production that it can in many cases almost be neglected.

Another interesting fact is that while in the hand-shops a very high degree of skill and precision is obtained, there seems to be a difficulty in training machine-minders up to the standard of efficiency found in Europe. I was told by a Chinese manufacturer in Wu-Chang, who knew Lancashire mills fairly well, that he had to employ from three to four times the number of Chinese operatives that would be necessary in an English mill doing the same class of work. Here again, however, there is a curious anomaly, for in the Shanghai mill referred to in another chapter boys perhaps ten years old were doing work which I was assured was equal to that of skilled adult craftsmen in England—the setting-up of a frame, preparatory to its introduction to the loom.

In India, one can see three widely separated stages of development taking place side by side. Mills in Bombay, Delhi and elsewhere are often organised on modern lines, including even in some cases efficient welfare work. At the same time, they have not as yet displaced hand-weaving for certain classes of goods. On the other hand, there is already a definite movement for the revival of hand-work, stimulated on the one hand by the Swadeshi movement, and on the other by those who see in a revival of craftsmanship a necessary part of the attempt to reconstruct the life of the villages. Further parallels can be drawn from almost every Eastern country, though in very varying degrees.

The consequences of this movement of industrialism are profound, and can be traced in every sphere of the national life. Perhaps the most obvious result is a

movement for standardization. The older hand-industry delighted in a variety of local specialisms. It would be impossible, for instance, for the most casual observer to mistake the brass made in Jaipur for that which comes from Peshawur or Benares or from the South. To some extent, too, designs were traditional in certain families, in which the secret of craftsmanship was handed down from father to son, a process made easy by the system of occupational castes. The introduction of machinery, and the flooding of the market with machine-made goods (whether manufactured in the country itself or imported from outside) has resulted in a process of levelling. To some extent, there is a levelling up; the products of the factory are at their best superior in some ways to the less satisfactory efforts of the ruder craftsmen. But the general effect is, I think, clearly in the opposite direction. Helped no doubt by the suggestion of superiority which is attached somewhat unreasonably to the products of Europe, machine-made goods are tending to displace, not only the products of the local craftsman, but the canons of taste and appreciation upon which the demand for his goods depended. I came across countless examples of this deterioration in taste. It must be admitted that in many cases there was no longer a really living tradition; the goods were made in accordance with patterns which had been used and accepted perhaps for centuries—the very forms of decoration were often limited to a close range of patterns, outside which the craftsman strayed at his peril. It seems possible that the decline of hand-industry before the oncoming of the machine has been most marked in those countries

and districts where it has come to depend almost entirely upon tradition. Where the creative spirit still lives in any form of craftsmanship, the machine has succeeded only in displacing it from a part of the field, leaving its best products almost untouched. In Japan, for instance, I found that the high-grade pottery manufacture of Kyoto had not been severely damaged by the coming of modern methods, and still attracted the interest of real artists to its craftsmanship. On the other hand, Japan shows the most striking examples of the effects of standardization. I saw in Kobe a very interesting exhibition of Japanese products in the Commercial Museum, and there seems to be a definite attempt to secure that level standard which is necessary for export trade.

Perhaps the most amusing example of the narrow limit within which taste is apt to work was furnished by a piece of brass which I saw in Kandy. It was made by a craftsman in a school which has done extremely valuable work for the maintenance of craftsmanship and the development of the industry in accordance with its traditions. The piece in question was a tray, given by the craftsman as a present to an Englishman engaged in teaching. In order to give the present a topical interest, it was ornamented with a series of pictures representing the whole life of a boy who went to the school in question; the story began with his infancy, showed his admission, the progress of his studies and his achievements in the cricket-field, his leaving school, his marriage and family life, and, if I remember rightly, the story ended with his funeral. These illustrations were very vigorous, but the crudity

of the drawing was in striking contrast with the really wonderful craftsmanship of the products which followed traditional lines.

To some extent, the decay of taste (where this is marked) is due to the displacement of household utensils and the like, formerly in use, by European goods of an entirely different kind. Utility and cheapness—two of the tests which Europe applies pretty stringently to products of this kind—have begun to take precedence over æsthetic considerations. There comes to my mind as the best illustration of this a saying of Dr. Tagore, quoted elsewhere in this volume:—"For water-jars they use kerosene tins, and they have no shame." But even where the character of the goods is unchanged, there has often been a real deterioration in the character and execution of their ornament. One of the most interesting, and at the same time the saddest examples of this, is to be found in the debasement of the fine batik work in Java through the introduction of European cretonne. In this case both the form and colour have been affected, and even the red roses which appear in so many of the cheaper European products have begun to bloom on Javanese sarongs. The vigorous efforts which are being made in many parts of the world to revive and develop traditional patterns and methods of manufacture, valuable as they are, always smack of the artificial. It is only, I think, rarely that they succeed in recovering what might be called a spontaneous market; for the most part, if the undertaking is to succeed financially, and to provide its craftsmen with a living wage under competitive conditions at a time of rising prices, there must be a good deal of "after-

care"—the establishing of agencies to act as middlemen and to capture the taste of foreigners who are at first attracted by this kind of workmanship more by reason of its novelty than through any real appreciation of its artistic value. After a somewhat sketchy but fairly wide investigation of such movements as these in countries as far apart as Poland and China, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that any attempt to stem the tide at its point of greatest impact must end in failure. It may, however, be possible to concentrate upon the direction of such creative skill as survives into the manufacture of articles of taste, where cost would be a less important factor, and where the demand might well be sustained by motives of fashion if not of appreciation. For the village industries of Asia as a whole I can see no clear future. It must be long before the products of the factory can displace them entirely from everyday use; but they are falling rapidly into a place of less honour, and it is difficult to imagine how they can escape destruction. Sadly enough, the marked rise in the standard of living which is noticeable in many parts of Asia is itself hastening their passing—partly because it demands wages which only machine-industry can pay, but also because the introduction of European articles seems to be a definite part of this rising standard.

Quite apart from its products, the new machine-industry has even wider implications for society than (as has been suggested) for politics. In China, a two-fold re-grouping is proceeding apace. Until modern times, Chinese society was based first upon the family, and secondly upon the cultivation of the land. There

were, of course, very ancient Guilds, whose power and function still survive. But the stability of Chinese economic and social life alike was based upon a system of agriculture, which had, I understand, almost reached a point where the progressive exhaustion of the soil was no longer a factor: in direct contrast with the new lands of the United States and Canada, the Chinese had evolved a stable agriculture, capable of subsisting (under the old conditions) to the end of time. Factory civilisation cuts across this old social life at two points. Chinese society must inevitably be based more and more upon the growing towns; and the social unit of the "big family" must give place to the industrial unit crowded round the factory. The power of the father of the family or the grandmother of the clan—a relation at once personal and hereditary—must give place to that of employer and employed, bound often by little more than "the cash-nexus." This change implies also the introduction into Chinese society of a form of industrial government which the West developed to meet its own needs—the Limited Liability Company, and in some cases even the Combine or Trust.

It is not only in China that these changes can be observed—though for rapidity and unevenness the Chinese development is without parallel. In Bengal, I found the beginnings of that dependence of the countryside upon the big towns of which perhaps the best example in the world is the position of the Home Counties in relation to London. Already Calcutta dominates a large and growing area. Landlord absenteeism is a factor in the situation. Village life is losing its solidarity;

the temples are falling into disrepair (a sure sign in Hindooism of the weakening of social sanctions); the country-side is being drained of its produce to supply the needs of the town. Where (as, for example, around Dr. Tagore's Asram) serious work in reconstruction has been undertaken, it has been necessary to build up afresh from rock-bottom the idea of communal co-operation. In rather a different way, the commercialising of rural land, and the relationships based upon it, has attacked the villages of Northern India and the Central Provinces. The money-lender is, of course, a very old phenomenon; but it is only since the deliberate efforts of Government to build up co-operative credit and agriculture that the wide-spread decay of the village community has fully come to light. Thus, both directly and indirectly, the commercial habit of mind of an industrial urban society has invaded the country-side. There is hardly a problem of urban civilisation in the West which is not being reproduced in Asia, often with grave aggravations. It would almost seem sometimes as if Europe has learnt little from her own sufferings and mistakes, at the time of the industrial revolution, and as if Asia must re-learn the lessons of the last century, almost without profiting by European experience, except perhaps that the period of transition is abbreviated, though none the easier for that. The old evils which sprang from the introduction of machinery, as well as the great humanitarian movement of the nineteenth century, are reproduced, but they must be lived through again in a new and even more difficult setting. So far as my observation goes, there is in Asia very little that is new in the way of the structure

or organisation of industrial society—and what little there is cannot be regarded as an improvement. For instance, in the new cotton towns of China are to be found thousands of villagers, often young men and women who have been detached from their family setting, and concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the factory, under conditions for which even the history of the industrial revolution in England, as seen, for instance, by the Hammonds, can show no complete parallel. There is also in operation a system of indirect labour under which positions in the factory are filled by the foremen, who generally require an excessive entrance fee, and even a considerable percentage of wages. In Japan it is less easy than in China to see factories; but I understand that the evils of industrialism there are not less grave. One hears somewhat lurid accounts of a type of residential factory in which girls from the country were housed and placed under restrictions which made a return, should they wish it, very difficult. I had no opportunity of seeing such conditions at first hand. Both China and Japan have recently introduced industrial codes which should go far towards the drastic reform of such conditions which is called for by international public opinion. But, as I have suggested elsewhere, this legislation is in China, at all events, almost a dead letter, dependent for its execution upon the voluntary co-operation of those concerned.

In many parts of Asia, I have seen welfare schemes of a European type. Here, too, there is no remarkable deviation from the methods employed in the factories from which these schemes were imitated. There seems

to be little difference in principle between the organisation of Asiatic factories in the hands of Europeans and the methods adopted by managers of the same race as their employees. If it is true that Europe has exploited both the material and the personal resources of Asia for her own ends, it is also true that she has found there only too many imitators of her own methods at their worst. Machine-industry seems to be an integral part of the formula of progress. Where, as in India, there is a strong opposition to the coming of the factory, the alternative suggested is too often a mere negation—the return behind the civilisation of machine-industry to the village and its craftsmen.

This repetition of European development includes also the struggle between Capital and Labour. In Hong Kong shortly before my visit, there had been a successful strike of dock workers. When I was in Colombo, I saw a serious attempt at a general stoppage, which involved such widely different types of workers as the waiters in the large hotels and factory-girls. It is interesting perhaps to notice that the cause of this trouble was generally given as “disaffection stirred up by foreign agitators from India.” There was certainly no realisation of the beginning of a new relationship between employer and employed. There seems, however, to be no hope that the old trade organisations in Asia, even at their strongest, will be able to develop in a way which will avoid the rift between Capital and Labour. I am told that even the Chinese Guilds are losing ground, and that factory workers, where they have any sense of their new position, are looking to the precedents of European Trade Unionism. Here again

it seems that for Asia there are no short cuts, still less alternative routes.

Perhaps there is one result of the coming of the factory which is more important even than its effects upon the re-grouping of population, or social standards and questions of taste. The gospel of competition is almost implicit in an industrial development of this rapid type. The race for markets, in the absence of any effective administrative control of wages, hours or conditions, takes on all too readily the aspect of a scramble, in which the rules of the game are cast to the winds. Industry in Europe has been for so long a part of the structure of society that social criticism can readily be brought to bear upon it. In the East, those who enter the factory, in whatever capacity, often cut themselves off almost completely from the society in which they grew up. The industrialist is separated from his fellow-countrymen by a gap of a kind without parallel in the West. It will be long before the general population of Eastern countries is powerful enough or indeed sufficiently interested to impose its standards upon the industrialists. In the meantime, industry must, so to speak, find its own level. Maxims of business, taken out of their setting, are often in strange contrast with traditional standards in the East. The most striking contribution to political and social thought has been the doctrine of competition, in the sense in which that word was understood in Europe in the middle of the last century.

The penetration of Oriental societies by the economic life of Europe and America, then, has an importance which can hardly be exaggerated. It is true that its

direct influence is confined to those parts of Asia where Europeans have established themselves, and that a European passing through rapidly must depend to an unfortunate extent upon the impression gained at such points. But these industrial centres are affecting an ever-widening area of their hinterland, moulding its life to their necessities, and imposing upon it their own criteria of success. The coming of the factory is perhaps the most powerful single influence at work in the "awakening of Asia." It strikes at the root of the old order of society with a directness in comparison with which political movements are but superficial phenomena. There is perhaps only one other factor sufficiently strong seriously to challenge it—the factor of religion. It is no accident that India should be the centre of a protest against the new industrialism, and its standards, which is at once one of the most heroic, idealistic and impossible movements in modern Asia. In the name of the old Indian society and its crafts, the leaders of this movement have tried to eliminate the machine entirely and return to hand-industry. Gandhi himself regarded the necessity of travelling by train as lamentable. In India, at all events, there must some day come a struggle between religion and industrialism, and upon the solution which India finds may well depend the future of social and political organisation throughout the East.

(VIII) CULTURAL PENETRATION

It was one of my Chinese friends in Peking who first suggested to me that the most important contribution of Europe to Asia had been the scientific method. The conclusions of science, and especially the idea of evolution, have of course been very important in themselves ; but the methods by which they have been reached and applied are even more important than these results. Western science is empirical, concrete, fearless ; it distrusts any conclusions not reached by cold, logical induction from a wide range of undoubted facts. This habit of mind has an importance for Western thought quite outside the particular investigations in which it has grown up. The " historical method " is really a generalised form of the scientific approach of the study of phenomena. With the publication of Maine's " Ancient Law " the " comparative method " won an acknowledged place in historical enquiry ; and that method is, in the narrowest sense, scientific. With these new weapons in its hand, Western scholarship attacked afresh the question of the origins of European civilisation. Nothing was too sacred to be questioned, no tradition was exempt from analysis and criticism. Echoes of the controversy which centred round Bishop Colenso's acceptance of evolution and Bishop Gore's " Lux Mundi " are still heard from time to time, and these controversies are only typical of the widespread revision of accepted positions throughout Europe.

It is no accident that the importance of the scientific method in its bearing upon the re-making of Asia should have been brought home to me most clearly in China, for it is there that it is being most fearlessly applied. Chinese scientists and historians are working over the whole material of their traditional knowledge. In matters of pure and applied science the result is, for the most part, the acceptance of conclusions already reached in the West. In the case of the newer sciences of Psychology and Sociology some original work is already being done. The sociologists must to some extent wait for the historians, whose re-examination of Chinese origins is proceeding apace, but has hardly as yet reached concrete conclusions. Even so, as results emerge, they are being made available for teaching work in colleges and schools, and the work of writing text-books to replace the old oral and traditional teaching has been seriously taken in hand. The younger generation of Chinese scholars is attempting nothing less than the reconstruction, not only of Chinese history, but of Chinese social and ethical ideals, in the light of the new knowledge. For this reason, if for no other, China is passing through a period of searching of heart which carries with it of necessity a good deal of uncertainty, in the face of current problems. Nowhere perhaps—not even in Europe—are conclusions so rapidly and directly applied to everyday living; sometimes, one feels that progress is a little too rapid and that conclusions are acted upon with undue haste. At the same time, this fearless empiricism will prove one of the greatest assets of China, once it has learnt to give tradition due weight as a factor in social progress and

stability. At present, there is a rather obvious gap between an ultra-scientific and somewhat utilitarian view of the nature of social sanctions, and what is perhaps a growing movement of revulsion against the extremer measures of the younger enthusiasts. At the same time, I gained the impression that the Universities and Colleges of China have accepted the burden of the task of reconstruction to a greater degree than similar institutions in other parts of Asia. For example, a great deal of the Indian enthusiasm for the study of origins has been canalised into the service of a revived Hindooism as understood by the Arya Somaj. In Japan, while criticism and experiment in social and religious matters is left very free, national origins are still to a great extent sacrosanct; for example, a recent book by the Mayor of Tokyo contains this sentence: "A legend is a legend after all, and its delicacy defies the inquisitive attempts of latter day brains, full of vice and evil." Perhaps the attitude of the Chinese scholar towards fundamental questions of national or religious tradition explains to some degree both the lack of grip and sureness of touch which are only too obvious in China to-day, and, on the other hand, that curious sense of reality which is a marked characteristic of her best minds. Certainly, during my short stay in China, I found it easier to discuss social questions in terms which both my Chinese friends and I used in the same sense, than anywhere else in Asia. I do not mean to suggest that it is only in China that scientific work of a high order is being pursued. The most remarkable example I saw this year of the power of Asia to add to scientific knowledge and methods was the Institute of Sir J. Bose in Calcutta.

As I have suggested elsewhere, I met in India thinkers as fearless as those to be found anywhere, and many of them had retained their faith in eternal values. But I was conscious—or so it seemed to me—of a difference which it is very hard to express in words. Perhaps I may suggest that, for most Indians, scientific truth and religious truth seem incommensurable; thought on the scientific plane is thus free, but ultimate truth is hardly within its reach. The Chinese reaches freedom in a more direct way, by accepting the scientific unity of existence. On this basis, it seems often very difficult for the Chinese student to retain his faith in values which are inaccessible to reason; though at this price he finds a freedom whose quality is perhaps unparalleled in the civilised world at the present time. Most nations seem to have passed through alternate periods of “reason” and “emotion.” It may well be that the events of recent years in China have for the time set a premium upon the rational method of approach, and that a reaction from this somewhat extreme rationalism will inevitably occur. The present is a time of breaking-down, and the difficulty of re-building the elements of Chinese civilisation into a synthesis which will satisfy both traditional values and the demands of the new knowledge needs no stressing, for its results are only too obvious in the present condition of the country.

In China, I was very interested to find that the teaching of John Dewey had borne fruit, and that he was one of the most frequently cited authorities upon educational theory and practice. China already realises the necessity of regarding the school as a unit of social organisation, organised in definite relationship to the

other functions of society. The whole question of educational policy has been taken in hand and an attempt is being made to build up a national system upon broad and liberal lines. A beginning has already been made with the training colleges, but these depend for their material upon the secondary schools, which in their turn require efficiently trained teachers. Progress cannot be very rapid, but it is something that the need should have won general recognition.

In India, as I have suggested elsewhere, I found a clearly articulate opposition to the Western type of school and its products. I must confess that this opposition seemed to me stronger upon its critical than upon its constructive side, and many Indians express the view that, for good or for ill, the older tradition has passed away too completely to be revived. One part of this criticism finds its parallel in the West, for such schemes as the Dalton plan could hardly have been widely adopted by the teaching profession if teachers had felt satisfied with the results of the older class teaching. On many occasions during my travel through Asia, I felt that some scheme of individual teaching within the class group might point the way to a reconciliation of the real educational ideals of East and West, and I imagine that as the new recognition of the value and the claims of individuality wins its way into Western schools in Asia, it will become easier for the school to become the meeting-ground of what is best in tradition and in the new learning.

I wish very much that I had possessed at least some knowledge of Oriental languages, for without this I could only catch glimpses of what must have been the

very profound influence of Western literature upon Asiatic thought and writing. I had the curiosity to ask in different countries which English books were most read by students. Everywhere, I found that Mr. H. G. Wells had a great vogue, and that his writings upon social questions were read and known. Mr. Bernard Shaw also had a wide circle of readers, and had furnished many of the keener minds of Asia with a critical view of European civilisation which they were not slow to turn to account. In India, I found a real interest in and understanding of the Irish school; Synge was greatly appreciated, and Yeats was also read and liked. Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and other scientific writers of the mid-Victorian age, still enjoy in most Asiatic countries a popularity and a following which in the West they have somewhat lost. I understand that in China there is a definite school of writers who are trying to do for their own civilisation and traditions what, in their view, these various writers have done for the life of Europe—with what success I have unfortunately no means of judging.

Modern European schools of painting have had a widespread influence in Asia, though it has, I imagine, been confined to a fairly restricted circle in each country, and has hardly as yet touched the springs of popular art and taste. In Osaka, I saw a most extraordinary collection of modern Japanese pictures. Some of these were in the crudest style of realism, both as regards form and colour; others were obviously conceived directly under the inspiration of the Cubists; others again, while they owed much to recent experiments in colour, showed traces of greater power of acclimatisa-

tion. The whole exhibition contrasted very vividly with the wonderful drawings of fish which I saw in the guest-rooms of several Buddhist monasteries—a simple brown outline on a surface of rough wood, marvellously suggesting movement and vitality. I did not feel, on the whole, that the break-away from traditional canons of taste had as yet justified itself in any really creative work, while, at its crudest, it showed a dependence upon European examples, without an understanding of their spirit. To this general rule, India provides notable exceptions.

The influence of Western and American types of architecture upon the buildings of Asia has, of course, been profound. Every great religion is very conservative in matters affecting ritual, and of these the form of the temple is among the most obvious. The very characteristic mosque has been reproduced throughout Asia, and has retained its essential character through many variations. The Christian church has been even more faithfully copied; in fact, one can generally tell as readily in India or in China as at home, to what particular denomination a church belongs. The same is, I imagine, in part true of Buddhist architecture; the introduction of the pagoda into Japan seems to be the most striking example.

The earliest European settlers in Asia seem to have attempted to reproduce the conditions of their homeland, at first with disastrous results. It was really extraordinary to find in Batavia so complete a reproduction of the essential features of a little Dutch town—even to the steam-tram and the canal. Dutch houses in Java, too, are much more nearly like their

European counterparts than, for instance, the houses erected by the British in India. Here, a fairly complete adaptation has taken place, and the resulting type is very attractive—wide, shady porticoes—large, lofty rooms opening off a central hall in such a way that the whole of the ground-floor can often be converted into one large apartment by opening doors or removing curtains. The demands of modern business have created in all the large towns—whether under European control or not—a type of building almost identical with the banks and stores of Europe or America. Tokyo itself—I saw it before the earthquake—possessed streets in the centre of the city which might equally well have been found in Calcutta or in Europe, so far as the type of building was concerned, and this was even more true of Yokohama. Saïgon possesses a main street which is more French than many towns in France itself. Even where the type of building has not been closely copied, the fittings of European houses have had a profound influence upon domestic arrangements. The result is often a hybrid type, most noticeable perhaps in India, though found also in China. Japan has admitted European furniture less readily to the interior of her houses, though in the large towns—in cafés, for instance—rooms furnished in “European style” can readily be found. True to her national genius, Japan does not often mix the two types; she places them side by side, and in many hotels rooms of either kind can be taken at will.

In matters of dress, the influence of Europe has been perhaps least of all fortunate. The European suit has an obvious advantage over the draperies worn by men

in the East, and it is perhaps inevitable that it should have displaced them for every-day wear in office and factory. In the case of women's dress, fashion rather than convenience has been the motive. In China, there seems at first to have been a wide-spread movement amongst women-students in the Universities for the adoption of Western modes, but a marked reaction has now set in in favour of a return to the national costume. It is very fortunate that the women of Japan have declared nearly unanimously for Japanese dress. The kimono is almost universally worn, and the wide robe seems to be the readiest way of expressing individuality and taste. On the other hand, the European method of dressing the hair is spreading—and somehow it does not seem to jar with the traditional costume. In India, it is of course impossible for an Englishman to meet Hindoo women of high caste, unless they are members of the Brahmo Somaj or of some other liberal movement. I had the good fortune, however, to be introduced to several of these ladies, and I certainly came to the conclusion that for gracefulness the saree is unsurpassed; it is pleasant to know that there is no likelihood of its being displaced in favour of European dress.

With the somewhat remarkable exception of the Dutch in Java where, as I have already said, the women often wear the sarong until evening—European communities in Asia seem to cling very rigidly to their own manners and customs, so far as climatic conditions will allow. In fact, one feels that what seems at first sight a somewhat pedantic correctness may have been a very valuable asset in the struggle to maintain

European standards under difficult conditions. In an outpost station in Ceylon, my host and I—two lone men—dined tête-à-tête by the light of a lamp filled with mosquitoes, under a slightly swaying punkah pulled by a “boy” behind a screen—but in boiled shirts! No other nation surely on the face of the earth would carry custom so far, for I am sure that my host, had he dined alone, would have been dressed with equal correctness. But such customs must be read in conjunction with the standards of probity and impartial dealing upon which (whatever their faults) the strength of the British Services in Asia has been founded. The circumstance provides an interesting commentary upon the whole question of the relation between manners and morals.

III

RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN ASIA

(IX) THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OF THE EAST

So far as I can judge, in Asia religious groupings are more fundamental than political groupings. India is the only clear case I have met where the claims of religion and nationality clash—though other cases, such as the position of the Copts in Egypt, illustrate the problem from another angle. The intensity of the religious group-consciousness varies widely, from land to land and time to time. It may be focussed upon some person, whether Pope or Caliph, or upon Holy Places (as in the time of the Crusades); or it may be diffuse and little directed.

There may be a close or a nominal bond between adherents of different races or political systems. A religion may claim as its sphere the whole field of social institutions, including marriage and property, or it may make few claims outside the performance of a ritual or the prescription of religious duties, and the direction of personal piety; it may even decline into a system of magic, little related to thought or morality. These different views of the function of religion are directly reflected in its social and political relationships. The closely-knit group may become either a powerful

element in nationalism, or the most dangerous solvent of the idea of the State. National unity may be menaced either by a religious group within the nation, which urges a withdrawal of obedience to enforce its own claims, or by an international movement which empties national sentiment of all meaning. All these phases of religious development could be illustrated from the history of Europe; in Asia they are of supreme importance.

The closest identification of religion and nationalism appears to be in Japan, where Shinto is almost co-extensive with the nation. Shinto, on the other hand, seems to have little cohesion, apart from its connection with the State. I could discover no body of doctrine, and no priestly order with common interests. It seems a contradiction in terms to think of Shinto ever claiming "autonomy," or seeking a "relationship" with the State, which would deny its essential identity with the nation. Shinto *is* Japan; the nation is its embodiment, its motive; the Imperial cult is the summit of its devotion.

Hindooism is national, in a very intimate sense; it cannot accept converts except from those of Indian descent, and it has very powerfully supported the movement for autonomy. Hindooism gives a spiritual sanction to the whole basis of social organisation, and regulates it in minute detail. It thus brings to the support of the national idea a strong corporate sentiment, though its unity is "agglutinative" rather than organic. On the other hand, while Hindooism is the majority religion in India, it is faced with the keen rivalry of a considerable minority of Mohammedans, and these

include many ruling princes. Mohammedan rivalry is apt to be most active when Hindooism is most conscious of itself and its mission.

Hindooism has great powers of absorption; in the opinion of most scholars, it reabsorbed, in India, the Buddhism which had sprung from it, and which, for a time, threatened to supersede it. The relation of Hindooism to Indian nationalism is thus very complicated. It is inconceivable that national unity could be based upon foundations which ignored or outraged Hindoo sentiment; on the other hand, the Indian Mohammedan is not merely a religious minority, he is also a member of a World Society whose claims upon his devotion are limitless.

Buddhism seems also to possess, in a high degree, the power to absorb or assimilate material from outside; in Ceylon, it contains many Hindoo elements; in China, it is (to the casual observer) inextricably blended with Taoism and Confucianism; in Japan, although, at the Restoration, Buddhist elements were excluded from the more important Shinto shrines, there is apparently no kind of conflict, and what seem to be "mixed" shrines exist in large numbers. Unlike Hindooism, Buddhism as I have seen it holds no brief for any particular social organisation; in its "orthodox" form, its philosophy is anarchic and pacific. In no country that I saw does Buddhism seem to support a political or economic system, though the remains at Anuradhapura suggest that there, at least, it was once the basis of a theocracy.

Mohammedanism is fiercely intolerant of alien elements, especially of anything savouring of idolatry,

but it fuses readily with militant nationalism, provided that its leadership is unquestioned. Both Buddhism and Mohammedanism are "universalist" in the sense that all races may become converts, and that the aim is the conversion of the World.

I found it impossible during my short stay in China to gain any clear idea of Confucianism or Taoism. Ancestor-worship and the ceremonial connected with it are certainly powerful factors in Chinese life; their chief practical effect seems to be conservatism, and a strong impulse towards national fertility. Taoism I met only in the form of magical practices.

If, ignoring the content of these various religious systems, one regards them simply from the point of view of their relation to the structure of society and the growth of national spirit, they seem to fall naturally into this order. Shinto is identical with the nation; Hindooism is the great formative influence in Indian nationalism; Buddhism as I saw it at least opposes no obstacle to national movements, though sitting loosely to a doctrine of society; Mohammedanism is capable of fusing with national sentiment, and inspiring it with fanatical zeal, but Islam is also a World Society, and its aims may readily conflict with those of the nation, either as (from the national point of view) narrower, as in India, or as wider, in its international aspects.

The position of Christianity as a world-religion in Asia is largely governed by its European attachments. The prestige suggestion which formerly made for its acceptance has been replaced by a revival of national influences, which are distinctly hostile to conversion.

On the other hand, the importance of the penetration of Eastern thought—especially social thought—by Christian influences can hardly be exaggerated.

It is perhaps worth noting that, since most Eastern religions have not shed the many functions which the West now regards as secular, it follows that, to the Asiatic, the whole fabric of Western civilisation, as he sees it, is Christian ; industrialism is an integral part of Christianity. This is hardly surprising, if one remembers that, in India, any attempt to tamper with the laws of inheritance or land settlement would generally be regarded as an invasion of the sphere of religion. This fact is, in itself, important in its influence upon the attitude of Asia to Christian propaganda.

Wherever possible, I have discussed the social and political bearing of the great religions with those who profess them, and also seen something at least of the society which they animate. But I am well aware that, in so arbitrary a summing-up, I must of necessity have ridden rough-shod over many vital distinctions. In particular, I imagine that my impression of Buddhism might have been profoundly modified if I had found an opportunity to visit Burmah—to say nothing of Tibet. However inadequate my study has been, I have come from it deeply convinced of the value which this line of approach might have, if followed by specialists. A comparative study of the religions of Asia, which should have regard less to their metaphysic than to their bearing upon social and political groupings and especially upon the burning question of nationhood, would be of immense importance.

In the same spirit, it may perhaps be worth while to

raise the question of the great religions as avenues of intercourse between races and lands. The ebb and flow of their influence has worn channels of communication whose significance is deeper even than their importance for the history of religion would suggest. The development of a great religion is never for long unrelated to the racial and social milieu in which it is born. The study of origins always reveals a wealth of material ready to the hand of the prophet, whose genius often consists less in the power to originate new conceptions than in the ability to seize upon fundamental trends, to free them from the tangle of associated elements, and to combine them in a new synthesis. The attempt to dissolve all creative thought and inspiration into pre-existing elements is as futile as it is ungenerous ; but it is only upon this background that the true genius of the prophet stands out. Nor can his constructions, however ideal or original, long remain in isolation ; their power lies in the ability of the new to permeate and transform society, to revalue its standards, reinterpret its traditions, and remould its structure. Between a great creative movement and the society in and through which it works, there must be action and reaction, give and take ; and some measure of acceptance of the material to hand is a condition of success in remodelling it. It seems inevitable that every religion great enough to transcend the barriers of race must take with it, in its overflowing, many elements assimilated in the course of this primary interchange with the society in which it grew to organic self-consciousness. The more complete the process of identification, the more numerous these elements will be, and the more

closely they will seem to be bound up with its own essential life. In the rough-and-tumble of the struggle with a fresh environment, the outer layers of custom may fall off ; but no religion can safely cut itself loose from the circumstances of its origin. To understand the significance of this process, it is not necessary to go outside the history of Christianity, which has carried with it into Asia controversies and modes of thought whose importance for the development of Western religion is profound, but whose bearing upon the problem of Asia is far less obvious. Every great religion which has passed in this way into the life of a civilisation other than that in which it grew has taken with it elements irrelevant to its main purpose and message. Further, it has become a channel of communication between the two civilisations. The flow of life is often in one direction only, for religion looks with veneration to the land of its origins ; but this is no invariable rule.

In a season of dryness, there may be little to indicate that virtue has passed that way ; organic unity may be broken, communication may cease. But a revival always tends to flow along the paths of ancient habit, and, even in normal times, there is often a trickle of living water in the old river-bed, the coming and going of students and scholars, the play of literary curiosity upon legend and tradition, the waking of the popular imagination by some " find."

It is surprising how far the sediment of an ancient civilisation may be flung by an uprising which stirs it to its depths. The retreating tide of Hellenism left in the Indus valley a school of craftsmen who gave to

Buddhism its characteristic Figure—half saint, half hero. The symbol thus created was carried by the rising tide to the mountains of Tibet, across the plains of China to the Islands of Japan. The Saint may lose, in the course of his travels, all vestige of Greek pose or feature;* but the folds of his robe betray the origin of the conception.

Islam is, in many ways, the most intransigent of religions. For this reason among others it has been a powerful agent in the spread of ideas, manners and customs, and even architectural forms. The Mosque must at first have seemed as alien a construction in Hindoo India as once in Christian Spain. In spite of a wide liberty of interpretation, the central conception is everywhere adhered to with great faithfulness, and produces an identity of type which contrasts directly, for instance, with the wide variety of form found in Buddhist temples. The mosque has been faithfully reflected in the construction of the great Islamic tombs. If, as I understand, the strict seclusion of women in India is a direct result of the Mohammedan invasions, then the very form of Indian domestic architecture, Hindoo as well as Islamic, with its rigid separation of the women's quarters, is also in some sort a reflection of Mohammedan influence. I imagine that the enquiry might be pushed into all kinds of institutions which seem at first sight unrelated to Islam, had one the knowledge. Certainly, on the side of thought, Islamic influence has been profound; it was from Saracen Italy that the study of medicine and of mathematics alike invaded Christian Europe. The Pan-Islamic move-

*A. Foucher. *L'Origine Grecque de l'Image du Buddha.*

ment is reopening old channels of communication. It has taken as its symbol the tarbush (or "fez"), and if the spread of this head-dress may be taken as a symbol, a strong impetus to internationalism (of a specialised kind) is to be found in all lands where Islam has penetrated.

The close connection between China and Japan, at several periods of their history, has often been expressed in terms of religion. A strong influx of Chinese influence is clearly visible, even to the untrained observer, in the shrines of Nikko, when these are contrasted with the Japanese work of an earlier period at Nara. Japan has frequently reacted against the Chinese trend in her national life, just as, later, she reacted against the work of the Jesuits, or again, against the extreme tendency to imitate Europe in the 'nineties. In spite of her surprising power of assimilation (or perhaps because she knows she can trust herself to it) Japan is peculiarly open to such influences.

In the following sketch of five religions as I saw them in Asia, I have tried to bring out the three aspects which have here been sketched in even barer outline. I have considered each in turn, first, as a religious group, caught in the conflict of old and new, driven by the necessity of circumstances to find a way of reconciliation and harmony. I have then tried to see the group in its setting—the re-awakened national consciousness which is the outstanding feature of Asia, with all its implications for the structure of society and the relationship of the groups within it.

The third question here raised—the religious group as an avenue of communication between nations—has

also been touched on, though my material is not adequate to anything more than the slightest sketch.

In retrospect, I feel even more strongly than at the time that the future of religious groups is crucial even for Asiatic nationalism. If any proof of this were needed, it would be furnished by the importance of the Caliphate question at the moment of writing, when the possibility of Indian national unity seems to turn upon its solution.

(X) SHINTO

Shinto had its origin in the cult of ancestors and heroes, which goes back to the twilight of Japanese civilisation, when Gods walked with men. The origin of the Imperial House is not less ancient and mysterious, and so the Imperial Cult has naturally come to be the centre of Shinto devotion. Adherence is thus, in some sense, a test of loyalty ; but it carries with it no doctrinal implications. Shinto is in the highest degree a religion of the nation. It imposes no theology and requires no credal belief, while its ethic is simply that of loyalty and devotion to Japan, her traditions and her Emperor.

Shinto then is, from its own point of view, compatible with any other religious system which does not contradict this broad national basis. Where there has been conflict, it has always been over some concrete matter, such as property or observances ; for instance, the devotion to the Emperor, which is the core of modern Shinto, has been directly challenged by some Christians, who regard it as idolatrous—as parallel, in fact, with that other Imperial worship of the Romans, for refusing which many of the early martyrs met their deaths. In return, Shinto charges Christianity with inspiring anti-national sentiment. The question has been raised quite directly over the customary reverence paid to the Imperial portrait in schools. It was for political reasons that the Jesuits were excluded in the

17th Century, and their converts massacred ; to this was directly due the closing of Japan to foreigners, and the long period of isolation. Although recent events in Europe show only too plainly that the Churches exercise no effective check upon nationalism, the suspicion of the Japanese is easy to understand ; and some claim that the toleration of Christianity will continue to be a national danger until "its sting is drawn." In spite of this, however, adherence to Christianity carries with it no kind of disability, and in many centres the Christian communities are numerous and growing.

Buddhism, with its amazing power of syncretism, offers no kind of opposition. As in every Buddhist country I visited, indigenous symbolism and observances are readily absorbed. The division into Buddhist Temples and Shinto Shrines is a logical rather than a practical distinction. At the Restoration, Buddhist elements were excluded from the major shrines, which were put under Imperial protection. In recent years, a Buddhist revival has built many beautiful temples, which are naturally Buddhist in character. But, for the rest, in most shrines the two cults have amalgamated, and no-one seems to find any incongruity.

Some of the shrines are very beautiful. The site is carefully chosen—generally a wooded hill, near running water. The buildings often form a considerable group, for storehouses, repositories for "treasures," priests' quarters, and dancing and other halls, are often added, while shrines where Buddhist influence has been strong may include a bell-tower and a gong-tower, or even a pagoda.

The hill-shrines are approached by long, straight flights of steps, those on level ground by a broad avenue. At the entrance to either stands the first Torii, a sacred gateway shaped like the Greek letter "Pi" with a double bar across the top. Important shrines have three Torii, at intervals along the avenue of approach; in many cases they are covered with bright red lacquer. At intervals, and often within the precincts of the shrine, are stone lanterns on graceful shafts; within the last Torii is a cistern for lustrations, fed if possible by a spring. The shrine itself is a house for the commemorative tablet or other symbol; it may take any form from the little shed found in small villages to the noble perfection and simplicity of the Imperial Shrine at Tokyo, where sublimity of proportion and workmanship, and balanced symmetry, are wonderfully expressed in the plainest materials—bare wood, with roof of thatch.

At Nara, the shrines belonging to the 8th Century depend for their charm upon their general plan and graceful lines. They stand at the foot of the sacred hill of Kasugayama—a fairyland of green glades and waterfalls. This group of shrines is a work of unimaginable grace and fantasy. One long avenue of simple stone lanterns is of surpassing beauty; and there is a strange quality of unexpectedness, without the least trace of effort or *bizarrerie*, which is very alluring. Some of the group are Buddhist temples—notably the great Daibutsuden, with its giant bell. But it is Shinto which gives Nara its charm. At Nikko, the shrine of the Shoguns presents a wealth of gorgeous detail, including massive gatehouses of elaborate Chinese design

and workmanship. These shrines are, in their way, unsurpassed, and very imposing. They are the monument of an age which believed frankly in display, and spared no pains or cost to achieve its effects. There is a care in planning, an orderliness and symmetry which is quite deliberate. One passes from marvel to marvel, each of which would repay a detailed study; and one comes away almost oppressed by such a prodigality of beauty. Yet there lacks something of the *naïveté* and charm of the simpler shrines of Nara, which will always seem to me the supreme creation of the Japanese religious and artistic genius—without trace of self-consciousness, the natural expression of a spontaneous and joyful devotion to greatness and its memory.

Shinto shrines seem to be above all places of pilgrimage; apart from the festivals, no regular services are held, no litanies chanted. The major shrines are served by priests who have no other duty; for the rest, there is no Order of priests and monks separate from the people, and there is no rule of celibacy; the care of the shrines seems to belong to those who have the right to preside at festivals. The Shinto act of devotion is simple. The devotee must first wash his mouth with the water from the sacred cistern. He then approaches the shrine, in front of which hangs a cord; this, when pulled, rings a bell or gong. The hands are then clapped three times, a reverence is made, and a coin flung into the large wooden box, fitted with wooden laths, which stands below the bell.

But, apart from this essential rite, many other observances cluster round the shrine, which besides commemorating a Saint or hero, is the oracle of the

gods. For a small fee, paid in the shrine office, a lot may be shaken out of a wooden cylinder ; from the marks upon it, the waiting priest will select a “ fortune ” neatly printed on rice-paper. Or perhaps the object of the visit is healing. Outside many shrines sits the god Binzuru, in a little chair, for all the world like a child in the nursery : for he often wears round his neck a “ bib ” —the customary offering. He was excluded from the Council of the gods, and so from the shrine, for human frailty—an interest in womankind. But he is beloved of the people, for he takes their sicknesses upon himself. That is why his feet and his nose—it may be his head—are worn away ; for you have only to rub the place where you feel pain, and then the corresponding part of this little god’s anatomy, and the sickness will vanish.

It may be, however, that you are not sick, but you fear misfortune ; at Ikoma, you may hold your hat in the smoke of the incense rising from a sacred fire ; at Hakone (and many other places, I expect) you can purchase for a few sen little round cakes, which, if eaten, will fend off all ill. They are strangely remote, these little rites and ceremonies, from the ordinances and strivings through which the great ethical and spiritual religions of the world seek salvation. Yet there is something surprisingly attractive in their *naïveté* ; and, if they do little to lift men up, at least (so far as I could discover) they enjoin nothing that is cruel, and they imply a simple, kindly view of such divinity as they recognise.

The custom of pilgrimage is very popular. At its fullest, it enjoins the wearing of a special habit, and many details of conduct must be observed ; so, it

brings special virtues of healing or good fortune. But the impulse is widespread, and covers what may seem at first sight simply visits of curiosity to shrines near a place of holiday. A merchant from Tokyo, spending a few days in the hills, will visit the local shrines and make the customary reverence; neither his own conscience nor public opinion will require him to discover just how much is implied in this act of commemoration, which is the central idea of Shinto. The shrine is a place of memory and thanksgiving; and, since the hero commemorated is deified, the act of commemoration becomes a religious cult. The significance of this must vary greatly with the individual devotee, and also with the importance of the shrine and of the deified hero.

"We are funny people, we Japanese," a friend said to me on the occasion of one such visit: "we may think little of a man when he is alive—but when he is dead, we make a god of him"—and he proceeded to carry out the customary ritual. I was able to assure him that the same habit of mind can be found elsewhere than in Japan (one recalls a War-time saying current among the troops—that "all the heroes are dead.") But it is seldom that a nation will admit its inconsistencies with such frankness and good humour—both, by the way, entirely characteristic!

Nowhere else have I found a religious cult which has so completely identified itself with the idea of the nation. No doubt Shinto shades off imperceptibly into that wider code of manners and morals which is traditionally linked with the Samurai, for devotion implies an impulse to identify oneself with its object.

In Shinto, it is the nation which is commemorated in the persons of its great men and above all in the person of the Emperor. It was natural, then, that the national worship should have received a great impetus from the developments of the last fifty years. Its meaning must gain in content from everything which expands the idea of the nation. It remains to be seen whether the stirrings which seem to be beginning within Japanese religious life will find some way of enriching Shinto with new conceptions, or whether the new life will leave the ancient channels on one side, and Shinto become merely a repository of national memories, or a secular patriotism under the forms of a religious cult.

(XI) HINDOOISM

The contrast between the Shinto cult and the Hindoo religion seems at first sight so wide as to preclude any point of comparison. Japan takes its devotion very joyously, a little superficially, even. India is really obsessed with the importance of religion : for her, it is almost synonymous with life itself. Its values are not merely dominant, they have succeeded in emptying of real significance everything which cannot be expressed in these terms. India lives and thinks and feels under the great shadow of eternity.

Yet, from the point of view of a study of society, these extremes touch at one point : both Shinto and Hindooism are before all else religions of the nation. If Shinto is synonymous with Japan, it is at least impossible for anyone to become a Hindoo who has not a prescriptive right by birth—though of course, birth alone does not imply membership of the Hindoo community, and India includes large religious minorities. But, while Shinto has little to say upon the details of social relationships, and lends whatever authority it possesses to the policy of the nation's leaders, perhaps the most vivid impression left by Hindooism is the strength of its social sanctions. The whole structure of society depends upon it ; the most ordinary duties and necessities are ritual acts, fenced round with prohibitions : eating, drinking, washing, dress, walking

in public. Religion has never loosed its hold upon social relationships : marriage, the seclusion of women, parentage, inheritance, property, tenure, are all matters within its cognisance. The distinction between the religious and the secular has never emerged. Not only is authority vested in a hereditary priestly caste, but all social status is equally dependent upon heredity ; and within very narrow limits, occupation depends upon this inherited status. The result is a static, formalistic conception of society, which disbelieves in progress and is opposed to all change.

Yet Hindooism is the most tolerant of creeds ; it combines rigidity of custom with the utmost elasticity of doctrine, and even of religious practice. It has an inexhaustible power of absorption. It finds room for all types of piety, from the performance of formal "duties" to the most uncompromising poverty or mysticism. Within Hindooism can be found the inspiration to extreme self-negation, and at the same time the search for individual mental power, at whatever cost to the seeker or to his surroundings. There is at Benares a sect, distinguished by the yellow stain with which the faces of its devotees are daubed, that cultivates this power by the practice, not only of severe austerities, but of systematic exposure to horrors of an indescribable kind. In fact, Hindooism is full of the survivals of all the religious and superstitious observances which it has absorbed. This is the price which it pays for its amazing power of syncretism. I saw at Conjeeverum, within the same outer ring wall, a school of philosophy, a shrine, and an ant-heap where a cobra is worshipped. I came to feel that there is perhaps

nothing which can be stated of Hindooism, unless it be Caste, which is universally true ; and yet very little which is not true somewhere or in some measure.

I met in India men of noble character, real spirituality and keen intellect, whose life has been nourished in Hindoo traditions—men whose thought is less bound by foregone conclusions than that of many cultured occidentals, and whose faith is of a piece with their thought. Yet I found them strangely tolerant of crudities within Hindooism, unwilling, almost, to lay hands upon the smallest vestige of the sacred tradition. The keenest intellects have set themselves to show that there is no fundamental inconsistency between the traditional faith and the essentials of Western science. Once again Hindooism is showing its amazing power of absorption ; by its doctrine of the illusion of all material things, it cuts the ground from beneath the feet of detailed criticism, while reserving the right to make use of the teaching and conclusions of science on that illusory level on which everyday life must perforce be passed. Its doctrine of the essential unity of Nature opposes no such resistance to the “evolutionary” conception of development as was universally opposed to it in the pre-Colensian period of Western religious thought. At the same time, Hindooism, in the defence of its fundamental positions, is making use very largely (though in part unconsciously) of the apologetic of Western Theism, and even of Christianity. On the other hand, it still shrinks from the application of historical and comparative methods to the question of its origins and sacred writings ; and it has not yet shed the trammels of an exegesis which relies upon the

dexterous interpretation (often with great logical subtlety) of isolated "texts."

It follows that the very real if intangible unity of the Hindoo system cannot be expressed in terms of a closed circle of thought. The supremacy of the Brahmin Caste is almost universal (not quite, I am told); and this solidarity of its priestly families—social rather than intellectual, though rooted in a common intellectual tradition—is the keystone of the whole. Yet Hindooism seems to possess some odd power of cohesion which is difficult to explain. It is divided into fiercely opposed sects—in places, the rival followers of Siva and Vishnu wear the mark of their adherence upon the foreheads, and inhabit separate quarters of the town. In spite of all, Hindooism remains a very real emotional unity.

I felt on visiting India, and I have felt still more since leaving it, that there is an attitude towards life which is quite specifically Indian, and that it is Hindooism which represents this attitude most characteristically. The Indian has an astounding power of "living always in the presence of the Eternal." It is a quality which seems to have little direct connection with individual morality, as the West understands that word; in fact, in some odd way, it seems to reside in the nation as a whole rather than in individuals. I do not mean that Hindooism is incapable of training its followers in a high code of morals, though the set of values it inculcates may seem strange to European standards. But this sense of the reality of the Unseen, and of the consequent unreality of life on sensuous levels, is a powerful influence in all classes. A life of poverty and asceticism is genuinely revered, even by those who

have no intention of following it. The religious beggar is the Indian conception of the Saint.

In spite of its ancient and closely-knit organisation, Hindooism as a religion is essentially individualistic. On its lower levels, the reward of piety is the reception of material benefits, the turning aside of material ills. At its highest, the aim of the devotee is freedom from the ties of matter—including the whole complication of the life in society—and absorption into the Impersonal Divine.

This conception is reflected in the Hindoo Temples and in the Hindoo cults. There is, so far as I can make out, no idea of a "congregation." The Temple is the meeting-place of the god and the individual worshipper. The offering of food and flowers is an individual offering, not a corporate act of worship. The great festivals would seem to be an exception to this individualistic view; but I am not sure that this is so. I saw something of the Festival of the Sun at Jaipur. The car of the god was the central object in the procession, dwarfing even the importance of the young Maharajah and his bodyguard. The city turned out *en masse*: Hindooism on its social side is strongly corporate. But (though after so short a time in India, I say this with much diffidence) my impression was that even at the festival the individual character of the cult was preserved. The "group" brought together was, in the psychological sense, a "crowd."

So far as I could judge, the Temple is not nearly so central in Hindooism as the Church in Christianity or the Mosque in Mohammedanism. Hindooism delights in a multitude of sacred places, things and acts. Its

gods are numbered by the million. The less important deities are for the most part specialised, and by no means always benevolent. (At Benares, there is a Temple to the Goddess of Smallpox). The greater deities are often found in competition for the worship of their devotees. Hindoo mythology has woven them into legendary relationships; the temples are covered with representations of the stories connected with their names. These are the more difficult to follow since, by reincarnation, the same deity appears under different forms. These representations are of a thousand different types—from the personification of Divine attributes to the symbolism of fertility.

I feel deeply the sheer impossibility of giving any account of Hindooism which will express its essential quality to those who have not seen and felt it: the inhuman courage of the ascetic, the lovable puerility of many of the village ceremonies (the washing and feeding of the god in his little house decked with flowers and lights); the latent power of evoking unimaginable heroism or terrible cruelty; above all, the strange capacity for building the most diverse elements into an all-inclusive system, transcending contradictions, and evoking passionate loyalties.

My visit to Benares was, in its way, the most remarkable experience of the year. I rose early one morning, and taking one of the strange, clumsy boats which ply for hire on the Ganges, was rowed slowly up and down the long river-front. Of the hundreds of buildings which cover those two or three miles, there can be few indeed which are not in some way connected with religious observance. Between them, at intervals, a

road from the city comes down to the water's edge, and ends in a Ghat—an open space, often a small quay with steps leading down to the river. Here, in places, a few remnants of burnt flesh and calcined bones, sometimes with smoke still rising from them, showed that cremations had taken place. A little further along is the screened-in bathing-place for the women, so arranged that they may bathe in purdah. Along the whole shore was a vast crowd of humanity, each intent on some kind of ceremony; here, a band of gaunt figures, walking around the pilgrims' way; there, an old man, crouched on the ground, offering to the sun, with many genuflections, the water of the Ganges, held in his joined hands. Brahmins, book in hand, were squatting opposite their clients, and reciting prayers. Here and there, a penitent, or a devotee, could be seen maintaining some tortuous equilibrium, or some exercise of control—standing on one leg, or holding his breath, or sitting motionless in meditation. Everywhere, there were figures bathing, dipping the head in rapid succession in the waters. Temples of all sizes and proportions, in all variety of colourings, are crowded into this space by the riverside; there must be one at least to all the named deities in the Hindoo Pantheon, and to many strange interlopers—among whom is the Goddess of Smallpox! Beside this last there are small white stones which mark the site of "suttee"—the last sacrifice of wifely devotion! From this long bank there came to me, over the water, the low hum of a thousand prayers and incantations.

I visited on another day many of these Temples which fringe the shore. There is much beauty of detail

and symbolism—much that is true and touching in the way of devotion. There is Ganesh, the elephant-god of the farmers, with twisted trunk, painted bright crimson, and encircled with long garlands of yellow flowers; there is faith that should move mountains and ecstasy that must see Heaven opened. But there is also credulity to the point of nightmare, squalor and the stench of a thousand open drains, disease trading on its sores, and a mercenary piety, which seeks to sell or to buy freedom from the obsession of fear. Nowhere, surely, can be found so amazing a union of opposites as at Benares: squalid, crude, mercenary, pathetic—and yet somehow sublime, if only by reason of the sheer force of human need and human faith.

Perhaps the most attractive feature of Hindooism is its teaching that all life is sacred. This doctrine is closely related to the belief in reincarnation. The Jains, a sect whose origin and relation to orthodox Hindooism seems very obscure, have made the preservation of life in all its forms the centre of their religious observance, and have carried it to a pitch incredible outside India, where, within the traditional limits, the most pitiless logic reigns. It would seem that Hindooism should be among the foremost of religions in the power of its inspiration to social service. Yet I could not find that this is so. It has narrowed its conception of the duty of giving to meet the needs of the Brahmin and the religious beggar. For the rest, its closely organised social system must have made charity outside the limits of the Caste almost unnecessary, and India has not adapted herself to the changed conditions of a competitive society. Among individuals, especially

among the "effendi" class, the pressure of competition is already cruelly keen. But all that is best in Indian aspiration is doing its utmost to prevent the reproduction in India of this feature of Western life. To this absence of the idea of social service, there are some notable exceptions, among which the Servants of India (a society that I greatly regret not having visited, though I had the great pleasure of meeting one of its most distinguished members) hold first place. A group of citizens in Bombay, and a more recent but very keen group in Delhi, are doing useful work. But in India as a whole, the conception of social service can hardly be said to exist.

Revived group-consciousness within Hindooism has expressed itself in the Arya Somaj, a real stirring of new life, with the "return to the Vedas" as its intellectual basis. It is definitely propagandist, and engaged in a vigorous educational campaign. To my great regret, I was unable to see the college of the Movement, but I met Indians closely connected with the Somaj, and I hope that the impression I formed is not unfair. What would in Europe be a national movement is here expressed as a religious revival, with a strong political bias. The object is to build up an Indian nation upon the basis of Hindoo tradition and observance, purged of its grosser anomalies. These traditions give scope for the exercise of the keenest logical faculty, and are yet fundamentally indestructible, for, though clothed with tremendous authority, they can in the nature of things be only the partial and necessarily contradictory expression of what is so far beyond human thought that to every attempt to define

It must be added the words: "but (It is) not that." The leadership of Hindooism has passed to the Arya Somaj.

I met in India many members of the Brahmo Somaj, and found them men and women of keen intellect and fearless thought, with an intimate knowledge of the religion and philosophy of the West, combined with real loyalty to their own origins. I understand, however, that the group is now stationary if not actually declining in numbers; and perhaps it is in its very nature too intellectual to make a wide appeal.

Hindooism is faced with many problems of adjustment. While there seems to be no urgent demand for logical consistency, the impact of Western thought and especially Western science has been severe, and nowhere more so than in the schools and colleges where most of India's leaders have been trained. It is not, I think, the conclusions of Science which give most trouble—for Hindooism is not greatly troubled by contradictions, and views lack of conformity far more gravely than heterodoxy: (she has in her own tradition every variety of religious and philosophic thought, from atheism to pantheism). The real danger arises from the introduction of the scientific and historical method of approach, which must sooner or later be seen to conflict directly with the traditional exegesis, and even, one feels, with the theoretic approach of the Arya Somaj. Will Hindooism be driven to abandon the claim to the authenticity of her scriptures, and, relying on the tenets of her ancient philosophy rather than upon loyalty to their texts, face the West upon this new basis? So radical a change of front is difficult to imagine; yet,

in doing so, she might well reach a position of great strength, almost impregnable to logical attack. But she would run grave risk of a popular revolt, and the attempt would probably result, at this stage, simply in the formation of a new sect—as the experience of the Brahmo Somaj shows.

A more serious practical difficulty is the weakness of a society founded upon Caste in the face of the new demand for social reform. Caste seems as firmly rooted in the Hindoo system as the system itself is rooted in the Vedas. The custom of the seclusion of women, in its present form, is said to date only from the Mohammedan invasions. I have not taken the opinion of Hindoo scholars upon its necessity, but I gather that, while it is not in principle obligatory, it will be long before it is abandoned on grounds of expediency. It is obviously impossible to obtain the view of the women themselves, but one gathers that, in this matter, they are even more conservative than the men, and that the Zenana is far from being the instrument of masculine tyranny which the imagination of Europeans would like to think it.

Most difficult of all is the relation of a revived Hindooism to the national awakening. Here, one comes upon a paradox. It is from Hindooism itself that the demand for Swaraj comes with most force; for it is, in its essence, less a movement for autonomy than the expression of the desire of India to live her own life in her own way. It is not inefficiency that is charged against the British Government; on the contrary, I once heard it said that that Government was *too* efficient! Yet, to awake the national consciousness on the basis of Hindooism is simultaneously

to arouse the antagonism of the Mohammedans. Is this an impasse, or is there some way in which Mohammedan support can be won without the sacrifice of Hindoo principle? Such a union would almost imply the supremacy of political ideals over religious motives, and that in India seems unthinkable. It is no light problem which faces the leaders of modern Hindooism.

(XII) BUDDHISM

It is a very far cry from the legend of Gautama Buddha and its lesson to the worship of Amida Buddha in Japan; and the contrast is equally great between the hunt for "good joss," which seems to make up so much of the popular religion in China, and the lofty stoicism which Zen Buddhism has known how to inspire. It is only with great difficulty that I can feel Buddhism as in any sense a unity. The Buddha himself takes on nationality so easily. It is almost incredible that those different symbolic figures can have sprung from one root-conception. There is "The Ascetic" of the Lahore Museum: the flesh clinging to sunken ribs, the denial of life and its values in every line, death incarnate—except for the face, where shines the light of the Search. Contrast with this the Buddhas of Sarnath—physical balance and perfection, infinite repose, attainment and finality—and the Smile of beatitude. In the Buddhas which I saw in Indo-China, there is often real beauty, but one is somehow conscious of the effort of artistic creation. Then take the yellow, grinning Buddhas of China, replete with rice and good living; or the angular, elongated Buddhas which come down from Tibet; or Amida, with joined fingers—kindly, benevolent, paternal, but lacking the austere, remote beauty of the Indian types.

Buddhism as a whole is no organised system, social

or religious, but a great stream of experience, rising in the Plain of India, flowing irresistibly South and North and East, collecting materials from every part of its course, mingling them strangely, and depositing them at unexpected places along its banks. From the cradle of its art in N. W. India, it took up elements left by the flood-tide of Hellenism, and so carried the influence of Greece as far as Japan. More incongruous, somehow, seem the Hindoo deities imported into Japanese shrines, Brahma, Kwannon and the rest, who strike one as naturalised aliens.

Within Buddhism, apparently contradictory tendencies have grown and flourished. At one pole stands an atheistic philosophy of pessimism : pain and evil are the children of desire : so that desire is the strength of the prison-house of personality. The way of escape is through the death of desire, and each must win his own freedom, enlightened by the Buddha's example. At the other pole is the worship of Amida Buddha, symbol of beneficent divine power, requiring only acceptance of his merits and his vows, which thus assume the character of a "vicarious sacrifice." Buddhism displays all the Hindoo genius for syncretism and re-interpretation. But it differs fundamentally from Hindooism in two respects. It is universal in its appeal and in its claims ; true, there are the exponents of the Greater and the Lesser Vehicle, those who hold that all men may be saved, and those for whom full salvation is confined to men and women who have taken the complete vows ; but this is a personal and not a racial distinction. Again, Buddhism upholds no form of social organisation in the way that Hindooism

supports Caste. While it enjoins benevolence, its profoundly individualistic origins prevented it from developing a theory of general society, though belief in the Dharma (the living embodiment of Buddhism in the persons of its strict followers) is reckoned equally necessary with faith in the Buddha and in the Law. But, though Buddhism has its Orders and Degrees, and a precedence of honour, it seems to depend for its cohesion upon the existence of small corporate societies centring round some Temple or Brotherhood. Those under vows are monks (or nuns), not priests, and the monk can put off his habit and return to lay life.

I can find no common measure in which to express even my own cursory impressions of Buddhism as I saw it, for example, in Ceylon, in Cochin-China and Cambodge, in China, and in Japan. Perhaps the most striking general characteristic is the prohibition of any asceticism which would impair the health and balance of the body. Except in China, the monks seemed well-nourished. There are, however, fairly strict regulations as to the time and manner of eating, and the nature of the food. There seems also to be an absence of any "straining after" holiness, which contrasts strangely with the ascetic practices of Hindooism. At the same time, the demands made by Buddhism upon its professed members are sufficiently severe. Its history is full of the names of those who have passed through conflict within and persecution without on their way to sainthood. Upon the laity its demands are much less exigent, but Buddhism seems capable of inspiring and nourishing a balanced and cultured spiritual life of a high order. On the other hand, it is also singularly

tolerant of superstitious practices, and of alien elements from popular magic and religion. In a rest-house in Ceylon, I was once kept awake half the night by the wailing chants of devil-dancers, who had been called in to a house opposite to exorcise a woman lying sick of fever; I heard that the monks, though they did not practise these rites, often believed in their efficacy, and did nothing to check them.

In the inner shrine of the great Temple of the Tooth at Kandy, stands the golden reliquary which is the centre of Buddhistic devotion in Ceylon. Long vaulted corridors of stone, and many steps, form the approach to the shrine—a small chamber built in the very heart of the Temple. When we entered, and the doors were shut, it was lighted only by a few votive tapers, and the air was damp and heavy with the scent of flowers. The aged Chief Priest, a distinguished figure in flowing yellow robes, received the lights and the handful of white petals offered with due reverence by my host. The lighted tapers were placed in line behind the reliquary, and reflected in its golden sides and in the heavy ornament of the door; the flowers were spread thickly over the altar on which it stood, where, with those already offered, they formed a covering like a deep fall of snow. Outside, the litanies of priests and people echoed through the vaulted corridors, a music of strange pathos, full of the desire of the unutterable.

From its remains at Anuradhapura—some of them of singular beauty—the earliest civilisation of Ceylon must have been completely under Buddhist domination, a theocracy in the full sense. I understand that this was so, and that her written history itself has been

shaped and edited by Buddhist chroniclers. Most characteristic are the giant Dagobas—great bell-shaped masses of brickwork, built over some relic of Gautama Buddha. Around some of them still stand the pillars which supported the roof of a colonnade, intended to shelter pilgrims from the hot sun. Here, too, is the great Bo-tree, perhaps the oldest tree in the world, true child of that original Tree which sheltered the Master. A few gnarled and twisted branches still defy decay, and put out a thin covering of leaves.

Different again in their whole conception are the rock Temples of Dambulla, carved out of the living rock which crowns a slight hill. The figures—some stone, some wood—which line their walls are eerie in the hall lights : Buddhas of all sizes, from the giant at repose to the small figures in niches—all wearing that pale smile which becomes almost an obsession.

There is a curious and wide-spread tendency to glorify the Buddha, either by making of him an image of immense size, or by placing long rows of Buddhas side by side. Besides the recumbent Buddha of Dambulla, there are the Daibutsus of Kamakura and Nara, and the stupendous image in a Temple at Peking, whose name I have lost—a giant of terrifying proportions to whose head one can ascend by a winding stair. Nikko, in Japan, shows the most striking row of Buddha images, fringing a mossy path between a river and a wood. In Canton, there is a Temple where no less than three hundred grinning figures sit in rows ; but the purity of the conception is strangely debased by features which make of some of them beings monstrous and unthinkable. For in Chinese “ joss-houses ” the Buddha

shares the veneration of the people with a host of local deities, whose characteristics often modify the form of the Buddha image, and add to it oddly incongruous traits.

At Borobudur, in Java, there is an astonishing structure which seems to be a development of the Dagoba. The whole of a conical hill is built into a stone Temple, of which it forms the core. Round it run three terraces, their sides full of sculptured ornaments: groups and processions, whose subjects are taken from the Buddha legend. The Temple is, as it were, crowned with rings of bell-shaped projections, each of which proves on examination to be a perfect Dagoba, sheltering a Buddha in its cap-like canopy of interlacing stone. There must be hundreds of these bells, which look from a distance simply like spiked knobs rising from the terraces.

In Japan, many Buddhist temples approximate closely to Shinto shrines, though direct Chinese influence is often present. Here, a revived Buddhism knows how to create noble buildings. The Higashi Hongwan-ji in Kyoto is an intense expression of Buddhist piety. An ardent quietism inspires the pilgrims who come in numbers to kneel on a matted floor before the image of Amida. Nowhere in the East have I found a closer approach to the type of devotion which the West calls "Catholic." Japanese Buddhism knows how to inspire both heroism and sacrifice. In this very temple may be seen dozens of coils of rope, as thick as the hawsers with which ships are moored; but here made of women's tresses—the contribution of nameless thousands to the sacred building.

In China and in Japan, the pagoda is frequently

found in connection with Buddhist Temples—though sometimes apart from them. I could not discover how close is the connection (if any) between these pagodas and the Dagobas of Ceylon. In China, at least, the explanations popularly given have often no connection with Buddhism; there is a pagoda near Han-Yang, whose object, I was told, is to hold down certain water-springs which would otherwise cause floods; others exert similar pressure upon earth-dragons. Such explanations must often be vulgar rationalisations; but they show how the interpretation of a symbol may vary as well as its form.

The position of those who have taken the full vows seems to vary greatly from country to country. In Ceylon and in Indo-China, the monks are venerated, and the standard of physical development and discipline appears good. They wear robes of brown or yellow, their heads are closely shaven, and they often carry a palm-leaf fan—less, one is told, as a protection from the sun than as a screen from womankind. There is in no sense a “ministerial” priesthood, and the professed are attached to Temples, and not to villages or “parishes.” They are expected, however, to teach, but they have no other responsibility for the laity, but are simply those who are prepared to follow a stricter mode of life, with the object of reaching Nirvana sooner. In some cases, they inhabit separate villages, from which all women are excluded. These monks are recruited from those who wish to follow this way of life, often from boyhood. The neophytes attach themselves to a monk, live in his house, and do his work. It is possible to put off the robes at any time, and

return to lay life. The obligations which Buddhism imposes on the laity are easy to fulfil, especially for the rich, and there is a regular "scale of virtue," by which meritorious acts are graded. For the ordinary man, the "five precepts," a kind of shortened Decalogue, hold good. Even for enthusiasts there is the doctrine that the personality must not be strained in the struggle for self-mastery and harmony.

In China, the position of the professed is much lower, and many degraded types, clothed in rags, can be seen in the precincts of the Temples. In Japan, on the other hand, those under vows seem to be held in honour—for Buddhism has known how to inspire much that is best in the Japanese code of ethics.

The two outstanding features of Buddhist symbolism seem to be the lotus-motif and the Buddha-image. It is astonishing how, in endless combinations, these two, separately or combined, dominate Buddhist art, and yet what transformation they undergo! Behind both is the same idea: balance, symmetry, perfection; and however distorted at times the symbolism may be, Buddhism possesses, in her literary and artistic origins, a firm tradition to which she can always return for correction and inspiration. A missionary, who is also a profound student of Buddhism, expressed to me the opinion that the future struggle for world-supremacy in the sphere of religion lay between Buddhism and Christianity; and that the claims of Buddhism must be faced on the broad basis of their interpretation of the fundamental nature of existence, and could not be laughed out of court on the pretext of their perversions in popular art and devil-worship.

Yet, I find it quite impossible to discover how far a real community of feeling underlies the common term "Buddhism." Certainly the name covers no such emotional and spiritual group as is implied in "Islam." But the existence of Buddhism, the persistence of the common name, and the study of Buddhistic classics (whether Indian or Chinese in origin) implies that one is walking in the bed of a stream of past experience, along which many currents of life and faith have passed. Buddhism has been in the past a great channel of communication between India and the lands on its borders, and between China and Japan; and it marks the passage of a flood of Indian influences over into the Far East. There are stirrings within Buddhism, especially in Ceylon and Japan, though also in China. The existence of these old channels of communication cannot be without significance in a time of rising tides.

(XIII) MOHAMMEDANISM

Mohammedanism is a world-religion in the fullest sense : race is no bar to admission, and the impulse to convert all nations, by force if necessary, is very strong—great stress is laid upon it as the primary religious duty. Its buildings, religious and secular alike, leave upon one an impression of extraordinary power : I came to feel it as, above all others, the religion which had seized upon the impulse to power, and built all on this rock. Its God is a despot ; inscrutable, inflexible, omnipotent. The essence of religious duty is submission : the prize is the identification of Allah Himself with the Cause of the Faithful.

Islam, in fact, derives its strength from its very intransigency. It stands in direct contrast with every other Oriental religion that I came across : its power of absorption is practically nil, it rejects with contumely any approach from the side of pre-existing religions : their gods are idols, their light is darkness. Islam has succeeded to an almost incredible extent in isolating the Name of Allah as the sole object of worship. Its iconoclasm is ruthless ; with rigid and unquestioning Puritanism, Mohammedan invaders have often destroyed irreparably every kind of imagery in countries through which they pass : hence the mutilation of priceless works of art imbedded in the architecture of Hindoo India or ancient Egypt.

Politically and socially, perhaps the most important characteristic of Islam is the ease with which it allies itself with national sentiment. Its insistence on the Unity of God seems to be reflected naturally in a great power of bringing about the unity of the nation. Tribal deities, and the sanction they give to old feuds and divisions, often fall like ninepins before the onslaught of Islam; and it seems as if all the energies which are thus released from their attachment to those rival loyalties are poured into the mould of the new nationhood, and there arises from the fusion a people endowed with miraculous energy, who, within a few years of their conversion, burst through their traditional boundaries, and overwhelm their neighbours like an irresistible flood. It was the good fortune of Islam, in the first centuries of its life, to find ready to its hand a succession of races to swell the tide of its advance. So, first the Arabs, and then the Turks, threatened the young Christian civilisation of Europe, through Spain, through Italy, and through the Balkans; and then, turning East, conquered Central Asia, and penetrated India and the borderland of China itself. In modern times, it is Africa which is the scene of solid though less spectacular triumphs. Allied to this amazing source of strength, however, is a characteristic weakness: the staying power of Islam is in some way defective. She seems to depend for the renewal of her strength upon the continual absorption of new elements; failing these, she lacks the power even to conserve her conquests. This curious tendency to collapse has, however, sometimes been overstated; in India, for example, the Moghuls worked out an administrative system which

outlasted even their political power, and was to some extent taken up into the British system which superseded it.

At the height of its periods of progress, Islam has a power of creation which is perhaps unsurpassed for the wealth of its genius and the variety of its achievements. The mosques, tombs and palaces of Moghul India are among the richest products of any civilisation; Cairo has an almost legendary character and charm; and those who know it tell me that all that is most attractive in Spanish architecture is Moorish in origin. Europe forgets too readily her obligations to Arabic science and medicine, while it is difficult to exaggerate the stimulus which her imagination received, at the crucial time of the Renaissance, from Moslem literature and art.

In spite of her numerous sects, Islam remains a very real emotional unity. Perhaps any event of importance in the Moslem World is felt more quickly and more profoundly throughout Islam than (for instance) a similar occurrence would be throughout Christendom. This may be due in some measure to the union of the temporal and spiritual powers in the same person—a union whose recent dissolution has profoundly shaken the unity of the Moslem World; for political events had an immediate bearing upon religion for which Europe could find a parallel only by going back to the days of the Holy Roman Empire.

Islam shared the exhilaration which ran through the whole Oriental World at the victory of Japan over Russia. The logic of that event was taken to be, that an Asiatic as Asiatic was not inferior to a European as

European; colour-superiority was a fantasy, fostered by the Whites for their own ends. It is a conclusion which I met with in many parts of Asia: there has been no more powerful stimulus to Asiatic nationalism. In this atmosphere of optimism, Pan-Islamism flourished. It seems to be less a movement with a consistent programme than a "troubling of the waters." Its symbol is the wearing of the "tarbush" (or "fez"), by which Moslems are seeking to express a unity of sentiment which takes no heed of political boundaries; and I have seen the tarbush not only in Egypt, Palestine and India, but also in Java, and in the Malay Peninsula. Thanks to the real though indefinite connection between Islamic politics and religion, and the extent to which Islamic law regulates social usage, the new Western formula of self-determination has reinforced Moslem claims, though Mohammedans interpret it in their own sense—a sense which varies strangely in Cairo, in Delhi—and, one gathers, in Angora. The military recovery of Turkey has stirred Islam from its centre, though its sequel in the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers has spread bewilderment in many circles. Islam is thus passing through a time of greatly heightened group-consciousness. Perhaps the very variety and complication of the causes of this revival has contributed to its intensity: for though some of these currents of feeling seem incompatible with others, their conflict makes for self-consciousness, and the eyes of Moslems are turned with some anxiety upon themselves, seeking for an adjustment of rival tendencies.

In India, the uncertainty is reacting upon the political policy of the Mohammedan minority. There were

causes enough in past history and present circumstances why Hindoo and Moslem should find it difficult to maintain the union which the strange genius of Gandhi brought about for a time. Hindoo-Moslem rivalry has behind it the memory of conquest and subjugation, conversions and counter-conversions—it is consecrated by the visible antagonism of Mosque and Temple, imbedded in layer after layer of legal enactments, sealed with the blood of martyrs. Gandhi, by sheer force of personality and enthusiasm, brought about a miracle of healing, and united Hindoo and Mohammedan in support of Indian nationality and autonomy. It is difficult to imagine that the pact would have lasted, for in Asia, if I am not wholly wrong, political motives must always give way in the long run to religious impulse. But events in Turkey hastened its breakdown, and made its effective renewal well-nigh impossible. In India, Moslems had always been a minority; but they had been supported by the consciousness of their membership in a World-community whose dual basis—political as well as religious—was guaranteed by the existence of the Caliphate. Indian politics were thus in some sense a local affair, and their problems capable of adjustment upon a basis of compromise. But the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers within Islam seems in effect a declaration by the Young Turks that in future the national power and influence of Turkey will not be available in quarrels which do not touch her interests. The Turkish revival is a national revival in a sense new to Islam. The Indian Mohammedan, thrown back upon his own resources, finds himself compelled to face the Indian situation from the stand-

point of a religious minority. He has fallen back, not unnaturally, upon an effort to secure minority rights, and especially "communal constituencies."

I was present in the Legislative Assembly of Bengal during part of the discussion on the Calcutta Municipal Bill. Although the Bill itself provided for the guarantee of a certain number of seats to Mohammedans, an amendment that these members should be elected in communal (i.e. separate) constituencies was defeated only after a vigorous debate. The Moslem leader claimed that there could be no unity between the two communities; they were founded on radically different principles; they must live and grow side by side, each according to its own traditions. In a conversation which I had afterwards in the lobby with other Mohammedan members, this position was very strongly affirmed.

Islam knows how to invest every detail of its ordinances with the sacred fire of devotion; and its intolerance of symbolism has, as it were, compelled the impulses of adoration to attach themselves to every jot and tittle of the written tradition, and to the defence of relics and sacred places. Hence arises a kind of literalness and concentrated fervour which has great dynamic power. "God is great," "Submission to God" is the beginning and end of Man's duty; but also "Mohammed is His Prophet," through whom the revelation of the Divine Will has been made. Islam is not only the religion of a Book, but of a short book; to be able to recite the Koran from memory is the main object of the religious education of the Moslem. The Canon of Mohammedism is known as the Canon of no

other religion can be known by its adherents. Perhaps that in itself explains something of the intense character of Islamic scholarship. Through the good offices of a young Egyptian, I gained entrance to the Mosque of Al Azhar at Cairo at a time when admission was somewhat difficult to obtain. It is a microcosm of the Mohammedan World. In four Halls leading off the Great Court are housed the students of the Four Nations of the Faith; at the back stands the sanctuary—a vast, dimly-lighted hall, full of marble pillars. Round the Court—a great quadrangle—are seated on the pavement scores of groups of a dozen or so, some boys, the majority grown men, each round a Sheik, spelling out the words of the Book, learning its precepts by rote, or listening to the exposition of the Sheik. It is impossible to describe the tensivity of the effect produced. No young man could live for a year—the minimum period—in such an atmosphere without its entering his blood. And there are said to be ten thousand students at Al Azhar.

The library of this Mosque contains some priceless treasures of illuminated work—the Korans of many Sultans are kept here after their death, and the illumination of the Words of the Book can hardly be excelled in workmanship by the best efforts of Mediæval Europe.

This curious and almost terrifying tensivity of religious emotion can, of course, easily be paralleled in other parts of the East—but with a significant difference. There seems to be, in the faces of these Sheiks, little of that “turning of the eyes of the soul inward” which strikes even the most casual observer in the devotees of Hindoo or Buddhist cults; and there is certainly

nothing of their distrust of material values, or of the validity of concrete experience.

Of such a Faith, the Mosque is the perfect expression. Such symbolism as exists, denied the use of the figures of man or beast, resides in the whole conception of the building. The Mosque is the House for the Congregation of the Faithful, its inmost parts swept clean and bare of all symbol, except the pulpit for the reading of the Koran, and the texts from the same book, carved, often with a perfection of workmanship and chaste elaboration, upon its walls. It is the fortress of an uncompromising monotheism, standing four-square to the World, with minarets for towers, its very pavement a chess-board to guide the knees of the Faithful.

It is really extraordinary how Islam has reproduced these essential features of the Mosque in an infinite variety of materials and "styles" without ever losing the characteristic form. Even in Cairo itself, there is an amazing gap between the carpeted seclusion and richness of the Mosque of Sultan Hassan, and the bold, challenging lines of the Mosque of Mohammed Ali. In Delhi, the Pearl Mosque is certainly a perfect gem of its kind: the purity and unity of the whole conception, and of its expression in white marble, are almost pathetically beautiful: Islam can be royal without losing the remoteness of the ineffable. Outside the Fort, the Jami Masjid, in deep red sandstone, is an impressive study in spacial effects; the bare austerity of the Great Court throws into high relief that side to which the eyes of the Faithful must turn.

It was with great regret that I left the Six Delhis which lie outside the walls of the present Capital.

Perhaps the Kutb Minar, a gigantic tower of victory, best illustrates the success with which Islam has combined the combative impulses with the duties of piety : the whole of its immense height is surrounded with a scroll of texts from the Koran, cut deep into the fabric of the tower. The whole of the country between Delhi and this point is an inexhaustible mine of historical treasures, some of them buildings of great beauty. Among them are many noteworthy tombs, showing the characteristic approximation to the typical form of the Mosque.

Of the Taj Mahal, it is almost impossible to speak. As a sheer work of art, I think it surpasses anything I have seen in any land which I have visited. I came to it a little absurdly sceptical, and fully determined not to be persuaded to view it by the traditional moonlight. But the soft warmth of one of the loveliest of nights of an Indian " cold weather," and a ridiculously alluring three-quarter moon, easily led me to abandon such resolves. I can find no words to express the character of this building ; one is driven to futile comparisons with other forms of art : a dialogue of Plato, or the finest products of Greek sculpture. But there is nothing Greek in the Taj, except a perfection of symmetry and harmony, a unity and sublimity, in which the Ideal seems to have been for once set free from the limitations of material expression, and Beauty in its inmost nature revealed. Yet the Taj is a tomb. It is the supreme example of the power of Islam at its highest to transcend its own limits : out of the prohibition to represent the form of the Beloved Woman, it has created the perfect expression of her spirit. It is

just this odd sense of personality in the Taj which is the secret of its charm ; its unity is the organic unity of a living soul, not the synthetic unity of the builder's art. It comes as something of a shock that Islam, which allows and even in some circumstances encourages polygamy, should have produced the most perfect symbol of marital devotion. The discussions which have centred round the building of the Taj are really beside the point ; the whole conception is Islamic, and the inspiration is identical with that which has created hundreds of other tombs throughout India and the Mohammedan World ; only here it is raised to the power of infinity. The Taj, once seen, draws one back again and again, and each visit only serves to reveal new aspects of its beauty ; perhaps it is finest of all at sunset, when the great dome takes colour, and the shadows of the porch throw into relief the whiteness of the façade. But each new lighting brings out fresh charms.

Islam has very great claims to respectful study. Yet, in spite of so many elements of greatness, its weaknesses are also plain, and are closely allied to the sources of its strength. To cleanse the Temple and sweep Heaven itself clean is no small achievement. Yet one misses, somehow, the riot of imaginative detail in which other religions delight. A complete cleansing can hardly be obtained without sterilizing imagination and perhaps speculative thought. Capable of intense, if spasmodic effort for a time, Islam is subject to attacks of lethargy for which her doctrine of resignation is a ready excuse. Outbursts of fanaticism are compatible with complete apathy in face of social and physical

evils—a parody of the duty of submission which condemns thousands to avoidable suffering.

It seems as though, in her present efforts after reform, the Mohammedan World will have to look outside Islamic traditions for some at least of the elements of progress. It is interesting that Turkish opinion, and, one understands, even Turkish law, is moving in the direction of monogamy—a position difficult to reconcile both with the precepts and with the practice of the Prophet. Yet after so great a revolution as the separation of the religious and the secular powers, details of social organisation may seem of small account. It was interesting to hear in Egypt that the younger politicians have no wish to abolish the Code Napoléon, or to extend Moslem Law beyond the subjects of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like, where it already rules. It will be still more interesting to notice whether the new régime in Turkey can find the inspiration necessary for its programme of reform—involving as it does a much more democratic conception of government—in Islamic traditions; for it is noteworthy that there is apt to be a somewhat close correspondence between the development of a nation's Theology and its theories of political government.

In an age of manifold adjustments, Islam is faced with a set of problems perhaps as difficult of solution as those before any religious community. The direction in which she seeks for a new centre of stability must depend to some extent upon the political developments of the future, and not least upon the Indian situation. In a very intimate sense, Islam is called upon to adjust the potentially rival loyalties of Faith

and Nationhood. Can Pan-Islamism be reconciled with political self-determination? Can democracy in things secular be developed without affecting ecclesiastical organisation? Islam is a religion in whose history times of rapid development have alternated with periods of lethargy and stagnation. Is it possible that, in her internal policy, she is about to enter a period of movement as striking and important in its way as the recovery of Turkey? Her geographical position makes her, in some sense, the key to the problem of the relations of East and West. An Islam divided on vital questions of policy might well be outnumbered and overborne in detail, in all countries except those where she is undisputed mistress. But an Islam which had come to terms with herself, and liberated once again her great powers of enthusiasm for external action, would be a force to be seriously reckoned with. She has always in the past shown the greatest activity in periods immediately following the assimilation of new racial elements. If (as seems likely) she is even now in the midst of the process of assimilating new elements of thought and organisation, is it fanciful to suggest that these might conceivably play in her development the same rôle as was played in turn by Arab and Moor and Turk? If that is possible, then the character of this settlement with herself, and the direction of the movement when it comes, are of the first importance for the future World-polity.

(XIV) CHRISTIANITY AS A WORLD RELIGION

Christianity had been the dominant religion of the West for some fifteen hundred years when the Jesuits made the first organised attack upon the Far East. This long formative period is of the greatest importance for an understanding of its influence and difficulties to-day. The Church grew and developed as an integral part of the life of the West. True, there were from the earliest times Eastern communions, but with the rise of Mohammedanism, and the Turkish conquests, the Eastern Churches declined in influence at a time when the Church of the West was consolidating its position, and claiming universal dominion. When Christianity again challenged Asia, it was European missionaries who took the message, and their work was an extension of the Counter-Reformation, led by those who had re-won much of Central Europe for Catholic tradition. Protestant missions also took with them, of necessity, the orientation of the Home Churches. Thus, by a curious irony of circumstance, a religion which, in its origins, represented the East to the West, has come to stand for the West to the East of our own day. Imbedded in the Church in the East is two thousand years of Western history.

Christianity never absorbed Judaism, and it shed fairly easily the ritual observances to which even its Founder paid obedience. But it reached the Roman Empire through the liberal Judaism of the Dispersion, and took the Jewish scriptures in its hand.

At a later stage, Christianity expressed its basic faith in the Greek language, and, to an extent which is still a subject of dispute, in terms of Greek thought. Still later, the provinces of the Empire were built into the organisation of the Church. Local customs and folk-lore furnish numerous examples of the power of Christianity in the early ages to absorb and transform the relics of paganism. Starting with the great schism between East and West, the Christian Church suffered minute subdivision, and those sections of it which lost touch with the visible, international unity of the Church of Rome identified themselves the more readily into national, local or class sentiment. All this, or most of it, had occurred before Christianity made a serious attack upon Asia. European missionaries, from the Jesuit Fathers onwards, have taken with them to Asia a Faith deeply marked with the history of these and a hundred other struggles and vicissitudes—events of supreme importance for Western Christianity, but often wholly irrelevant to the problems of Asia.

This is true both in matters of organisation and in questions of Theology. The missionary Churches have made of their converts Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Wesleyans, Baptists, and the relations of these various groups are determined primarily by their European connections. The question of Christian unity is outside the scope of such a book as this. But it is important that the building of an Indian (or an African) Church cannot be discussed apart from its consequences for Europe. Further, by the side of such matters as the "Indianisation of the Services" stands the "Indianisation of the Churches." At the present time, political

autonomy in India is less remote from fact than ecclesiastical autonomy. In Japan, I understand that three Japanese bishops have recently been consecrated. This is an important step ; but Japan has always been independent and free, and tutelage to Europe in a matter of religion—however necessary or inevitable—is in a special sense an anomaly. It would be grossly unfair to those who are leading Christian effort in Asia with great insight and courage not to say that caution has been dictated by the ideal of ultimate World-unity ; it would be a doubtful gain to replace an international sectarianism by a series of Churches tied to national States (as Churches in the West have often been), and out of communion with each other.

There have been, from time to time, demands from Asiatic Christians that the form of their organisations should be determined by themselves. A movement like the Christo Somaj in India—a prophetic uprising—shows that new forms of life may spring from the Churches of Asia. On the other hand, a very liberal-minded missionary told me that when, in response to urgent requests, his Society gave him leave to ask his congregation to remodel their organisation on their own lines, the result was simply a republication of the traditions in which they had been educated. It is difficult to imagine any fundamental change in the immediate future. In China, where the forward movement is very strong, I attended a meeting when Chinese Christians were in a majority, and criticism was radical and outspoken. But I found no really concrete constructive idea. One cannot hurry these things, and to attempt to precipitate them would be to court disaster.

Theologically and philosophically, the situation is perhaps even more complex. In India, for example, Christians live in the midst of a religion whose powers of absorption they rightly fear. Hindooism could make terms with Christianity to-morrow without denying the validity *for Christians* of any point of Christian dogma or ethics. The figure of the Christ could be accepted as that of Buddha has been. For Christianity the danger is more threatening than for orthodox Mohammedanism; the Hindoo is familiar with the idea of incarnation, though his interpretation of it is fundamentally at variance with the Christian view—while for Islam, Allah is inexpressible in terms of human life or personality.

I have often been asked my view of Christian missions. It is quite impossible to generalise in this way. I have met this year missionaries for whom I have conceived the greatest admiration. For the white communities in the East it is of primary importance that standards of personal conduct should be upheld in this uncompromising way. Where Christianity is winning converts, I believe this personal witness to be the primary cause. There are few evidences of a widespread intellectual movement into Christianity, with the possible exception of China, and there seems little to show that any fundamental “re-interpretation” of Christianity is resulting from its spread even there.

But it would be altogether unsound to estimate the importance of Christianity for Asia in terms of Church membership. There is a very marked infiltration into Eastern thought from Christian sources. The text of the Gospel is read and revered outside the limits of organised Christianity. In particular, the social impli-

cations of Christian thought are being widely accepted, and even grafted on to other systems. If it were possible to dissociate the Church from all complicity in the exploitation of the personal and economic resources of Asia, the position might be different. In the case referred to in the Chapter on China, the moral effect of a reform which avowedly had its origin in the Christian conscience has been incalculable. American missionaries especially are pressing the social aspects of their faith upon Chinese students and organisers. In India, work for the depressed classes has caught the imagination of many outside the Church, and has thus become in some way a test of the vitality and sincerity of *any* movement for reform.

It is, I think, important that those of us who find difficulty in many of the dogmatic positions of Western Christianity should recognise the value of this new outlook, and its vital contribution to the re-making of Asia. If Christianity either in its present or in some different form ever wins its way to dominance in Asia—and more surprising things have happened in the history of Asiatic religion—it will be by virtue of its personal idealism and its social sanctions.

In the Yang-tze Valley, I saw an interesting attempt, by an American mission, to build up a co-operative community on the basis of a needlework society. This “cross-stitch” society provided whole-time work for a number of women and girls. The product was sold in America, through agents of the Society. The aim of the promoters was quite definitely training in industrial self-government and co-operation. At the time of my visit, the scheme was still in its early stages. But

questions of wages, hours and conditions were already being settled in a general meeting of the workers.

The educational policy of missions varies greatly. In a few cases, the aim is entirely religious in the narrower sense. But the majority of the Societies take a much wider view of their function. In some cases, the work of general education was frankly accepted as an end worth working for, and formal "conversions," though hoped for, were not taken as the measure of success. At its best, this educational work is of a high order. By its stress on the development of personality, it escapes the charge often levelled against secular colleges in the East (and especially in India) that they provide training and information, rather than education in the fuller sense.

The American colleges and schools in China provide the most striking example of a deliberately-planned, co-ordinated scheme. The motive is nearly always religious ; but in most cases students are encouraged to make a frank examination of the present situation, and there is no attempt to foreclose enquiry or impose conclusions. In particular, the social reference of education is being thought out in relation to Chinese conditions in this time of transition. American missions in China are sometimes charged with maintaining their workers in a standard of living which is above that required for effective work. But the raising of the standard of living is avowedly among the aims of these missions, and they cannot be charged with inconsistency on this score. Their work must be seen upon the background of the work of American Churches in the United States.

It is perhaps inevitable that the prestige of Europeans in Asia, in the sense in which it has been discussed

elsewhere in this book, should affect the position and progress of Christianity. The gods of a race of conquerors can hardly escape a part of the credit for their victories. In the 'nineties, Japan held an official enquiry into Christianity, with a view to its adoption as the national religion. I asked a Japanese friend, the editor of a newspaper, how far he considered Europe Christian. He said :—"Your art has been profoundly influenced, and your literature saturated with Christian sentiment; but I feel that, while your social and economic organisation has been modified in a Christian direction, it does not embody Christian values." With such a judgment, not a few European Christians would agree.

It is, I suppose, not surprising that the events of the War and the Peace should have awakened an intensely critical attitude towards the bases of European civilisation, not only in Europe itself, but throughout the world. In particular, it is not unnatural that those who have known Christian civilisation simply or mainly through its picked representatives in the East, should feel strongly the contrast between its ideals as presented to them, and "its practice," as revealed in the European crisis. I have sometimes heard a dilemma proposed to Europe by non-Christians in Asia : either the message of Christianity has been presented to Asia with undue stress upon the virtues of humility and charity, or Europe is seeking to spread in the East a religion and a social philosophy which she has no intention of adopting at home. I cannot help thinking that while, on the surface, there is something to be said for this dilemma, it is really somewhat unfair. Asia is perfectly familiar

with the distinction between the requirements which religion makes upon the "professed" and the standard it sets for the ordinary man. Buddhism, for example, lays many restrictions upon its monks, but requires much less of the laity. Looking at this question of standards as objectively as possible, one cannot help suggesting that it is just because many Christian Churches are impatient of any such distinction between two codes that Christian civilisation as a whole lays itself open to criticism of this kind. At the same time, the breakdown of which the War was a symptom could not fail to affect the attitude of Asia to the civilisation of Europe and the values upon which it professes to be based. In the long run, it may perhaps be a gain that Europe in the future will have to rely for her position in World-affairs upon something more than the prestige of selected Europeans.

Once an adjustment is made, a situation may arise which will be healthier than the old relationship, since it will be based upon a knowledge which has been stripped of its illusions. In the meantime, there must of necessity be a period when attention is fixed less upon the points where Europe has a real superiority than upon her failure to justify in practice the political and social idealism she has preached in Asia. The wide difference between the national characters of (say) India and China is very much to the point here. China has produced great mystics; but (so far as my observation goes) she sets a high value on external activity. The Chinese are essentially a busy people, and they admire men of affairs. In India, the religious beggar represents an ideal of conduct which has never lost its hold on the imagination.

Poverty and celibacy are valued for their own sake ; they represent the severance of the individual life from the entanglement of life in society, the condition of its progress towards inner freedom. China reveres its ancestors, and to have sons is the first duty imposed by filial piety. By most Indians, life itself seems to be regarded as the fruit of a desire which is the very root of evil. In its passage from India to China, Buddhism underwent a transformation which would be difficult for a religion which stresses corporate unity to achieve, and at the same time retain its character. It seems, then, in the nature of things that Christianity should be open to attack from two different angles : that India should criticise its acceptance of life, and (to take another example) Japan should fear its quietism. Perhaps this difference explains also the unwillingness of the European leaders of the Church in Asia to abdicate their control of policy.

It is, of course, impossible in practice to separate the study of the social implication of any religion from a consideration of its ethics and its theology. But it may perhaps be worth while to sketch a line of enquiry which has often occurred to me while travelling through Asia. The impact of Christian thought upon Caste in India or upon nationalism in Japan raises in a fresh form the old question as to how far there is a view of society which is specifically Christian. In the West, individualist and socialist alike have often claimed the support of Christian ethics. Certainly, Europe can show no complete working model of a Christian society whose arrangements could be transplanted and acclimatised in Asia. A more profitable enquiry might perhaps centre round the question :

“What, in fact, is the reaction of the social structure of Asiatic nations and communities to the impact of Christendom?” To this question, a partial answer at any rate can be found.

In old China, the primary virtues were filial piety and chastity. The coming of Western thought as a whole seems to have weakened the hold of both upon the allegiance of Young China. In the case of chastity, the result has been brought about by the acceptance of a “positive” way of thinking, reached by taking certain more or less “classical” Western books at their face-value (and often out of their setting), and applying their principles with all that directness and lack of qualification which is the glory and the weakness of Chinese reformers. Here, Christianity is clearly not in question; the Church has always fought such conclusions when they have appeared in the West, and in China her opposition is no less vigorous. With regard to filial piety, the case stands somewhat differently. Duty to parents, in old China, covered nearly all social relationships with its sanctions. But the family was the “big family,” in much the same sense as in Roman society. Its head had absolute claims over all its members, arranged their marriages and their occupations, and called as of right upon their resources. Only on the death of the head of the family did the several branches attain autonomy. On this conception of the family Christianity has acted as a solvent: “For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother.” Christianity is thus directly responsible for the splitting up of the big family, in thousands of cases, and the making of separate homes. With this change goes the postponement of marriage to years of

discretion, and the power to choose one's mate freely. Economic changes are tending strongly in the same direction, for the industrial group is replacing the big family as the unit of organisation.

In India, the slow sapping of the foundations of Caste is also in part due to Christian influences, though another powerful factor is the close contact which commerce, and especially railway travel, necessarily bring. Perhaps the same may be said of the new tendency to discuss purdah as a matter of expediency rather than a question of principle.

In Japan, I was once asked how far I thought that the position of women in the West had been raised directly as the result of Christian teaching ; (I wished it had been possible to give a quite unequivocal answer !)

In the industrial field, it is difficult to weigh the exploitation which has followed the introduction of factory civilisation against the humanitarianism which has in part been inspired directly by the Church. It can at least be said that the leaders of Christian thought are fully aware of their responsibility, and that concrete work is being done.

These are just examples of the kind of questions which are being raised by the closer contact of Asia with a civilisation which is regarded as Christian. It is perhaps too early to forecast the relations between the new national States of Asia and the Christian Churches ; but future developments will probably depend less upon the extension of formal Church membership than on the ability of Christians to capture and lead the constructive social idealism which is already widespread and powerful throughout the East.

IV

THE NEW NATIONHOOD

(XV) THE NEW NATION-GROUPS

I DID not feel that the ideal of nationhood in the Western sense is native to Asia—though perhaps Japan is an exception. Nationalism is, in the main, a reaction to the West and an instrument of freedom; the East must put its claim to live its own life in a form which the West understands. But in Asia the make-up of most States is far more complex than in Europe. Great size, and diversity of climate, make against unity. Racial differences are wider and are often perpetuated by religions and social sanctions of the strongest kind. In the following brief analysis of the factors at work in the re-making of Asiatic nations an attempt has been made to see them as widely different examples of the same fundamental problem. It is becoming increasingly clear that the basis of reconstruction must be found in the immemorial civilisation of Asia herself. I am not sure that this view would have been widely accepted in Europe until comparatively recently. The older policy was at once more limited in its aims, and more confident of the universal validity of its own standards. In India, for example, once the great Company emerged from the attempt to develop its power by a series of

alliances, and set itself the task of working out a system of direct government for large areas of the country, it found itself face to face with the problem of Indian custom and Indian religion. With the transfer of power from the Company to the Imperial Government which followed the Mutiny, a definite policy of non-interference was inaugurated; by the Queen's Proclamation, the British Raj disclaimed any attempt to modify religious usages. This Declaration was, however, made on grounds of political expediency, and not from any conviction that Indian custom in these matters was, even for India, ideally best. Towards the attempts of the various Missionary Societies to convert India to Christianity, Government maintained a kind of benevolent neutrality; for the rest, certain customs, such as suttee, were suppressed on general humanitarian grounds. At the root of this conception of the relation between the Government and social usage lay the conviction that the West could only touch the fringe of Indian civilisation, providing it, at best, with a frame-work within which its life could be lived, holding the balance between warring sects and keeping in hand tendencies which directly menaced its peace. I believe that there is a good deal in this view of Indian life which is fundamentally sound. The basic groupings in India are, and must remain, religious and not political, and Government must always concern itself, to an extent unknown in the modern West, with adjusting the relationship between these religious groups.

There has certainly been in recent years an important change of attitude; among other things, the new

political importance of the electors enfranchised by the Reform scheme has brought with it a new kind of relationship with Government. Whether it will or not, Government must in the future be much more nearly concerned with general public opinion. But this change has been brought about, not by any deep conviction of its reasonableness, but by the logic of circumstance. For a variety of reasons, Western civilisation has begun to affect the life of the East in a way undreamt of by Macaulay. If the policy of Government has changed, this change is at bottom due to a recognition of altered conditions. What is true in India is true, with differences, throughout Asia.

The arrangement I have adopted in this report implies the view that, in the new Asia, the religious group will retain its old importance. The West has, however, penetrated these Indian religious groups by three avenues of approach: the political, the economic and the cultural. The result has been to set up a ferment for which perhaps the Renaissance is the nearest parallel which history affords. Up to the present, the new knowledge has been more powerful as a solvent than as an element in reconstruction. There are not wanting signs that a reaction roughly parallel to the counter-Reformation in Europe is already widespread. Out of this parallel movement in Europe, modern European nationhood was born. It is possible that Asia may also find a solution along these lines; for the moment, political movements are running very strong, and are showing an amazing power of turning to account impulses which seem to have little in common with them. It is interesting that Turkey should be

seeking a solution which merges the Caliphate in the political unity, and Egyptian nationalism seems in the main to be political in character. But the instances of the communal constituency in India and in Ceylon, and the unusual strength of the opposition to any movement for its abandonment, should give pause to those who believe that the present shifting of interest from the religious to the political sphere will be permanent.

Failing any successful attempt to solve the problem as a whole by means of developed political machinery, the nations of Asia must fall back upon partial solutions which it will be for the future to unify. East and West come to grips, not only in the new Parliaments but in the schools, in the factories, and within the councils of the religious groups themselves. It may perhaps be that before the national life as a whole can work out a basis of self-consistency and harmony, these constituent problems will have to find their own solution.

Asia has had one serious disadvantage compared with Europe in this attempt to rebuild political unities. If an Asiatic people can look back to a time when the nation was unified, this unity was generally based either on conquest by an alien race or on the supremacy of a social caste—something less than the “will to live together.” This race or class domination has often given form to the economic structure of society, especially in the matter of land tenure. This culture-bearing class is generally a small minority, and the vast majority of the population are illiterate. It is small wonder if the cause of political reconstruction finds it difficult to make headway against such a mass of inherited obstacles. It is difficult enough, as the example

of Japan shows, to graft on Western constitutionalism to the most compact and unified of Asiatic States ; Parliamentary institutions must for a long time to come be regarded with some suspicion as naturalised aliens. But Japan is literate—she has a percentage of Elementary School attendance which is higher than that of most European countries. Further, she has never tolerated the power of any group, religious or other, which claimed a loyalty conflicting with obedience to the Imperial House. If representative institutions could succeed anywhere in Asia, it should surely be Japan ; yet recent events show that the era of transition is not being passed through without encountering very serious dangers. What in Japan is difficult can be achieved in India only by a species of miracle.

If India suffers from a closeness of religious grouping which is a serious obstacle to political unity, she has also very ancient provincial divisions. The Reform scheme applies only, of course, to those parts of India which are directly administered by the British Government, though many Indian princes have introduced modified schemes into their own dominions. While the problem of India lies in the existence of over-rigid groups (whether religious or geographical), in China it is the absence of any basis of organic unity which plays into the hands of the military leader or the “personal politician.” In this, as in many other respects, India and China are as the poles apart.

The earliest chapters of this book were concerned with the working-out of the consequences of the principles which united Europe against Germany. The modern problem of Asia is, in the main, the result of

the projection of these principles into a new set of circumstances. The studies in the re-making of Europe were therefore followed by an examination of the three great avenues along which European influences have travelled to the penetration of Asia. The existing religious groups were then dealt with. It remains to consider in turn some of the most important attempts to combine old and new, to build up ancient social and religious conceptions, purified by criticism, into the new concept of political nationhood, combining with them whatever new elements are found to have permanent value, and to be capable of assimilation.

Asia is seeking for a principle that will justify her rejection of alien control, and finding it in the claim to responsible Government—an institution for which her past provides no precedent, and to which her present social structure offers almost insuperable obstacles. When to these internal difficulties is added the problem of external relationships, it is clear that the question of Asiatic nationalism is immensely complex. It can admit of no general solution, for each of these factors varies from State to State. Stability and permanence must depend upon the success with which all these elements are given due weight: geography, race, national tradition, economic structure. Most of these problems have been met with in some measure in the history of European nations, but they exist in Asia in graver forms. It is in such circumstances as these that Asia is faced with the task of reconciling European science and organisation with her own traditional cultures. It seems probable that most of the Asiatic States of the future will be based far less closely upon European

models than seemed likely even a short time ago. In particular, the forms of responsible Government will probably differ widely from those of the West. Besides the "Communal Constituencies" in India and Ceylon, other features of the reformed Constitutions will probably leave permanent marks upon the political structure of Asiatic States.

If I am right in believing that the search for an intelligible, self-consistent ideal upon which to base national life is the main-spring of present developments in Asia, it will be best to consider how far geographical, racial and economic factors favour unity in the various States. It is no accident that the awakening should have gone furthest in Japan and Egypt—natural geographical unities; and that the problem should be gravest in the sub-continent of India and China. Perhaps a rapid survey can best begin with those lands which show the problem at its simplest.

The intrusion of Western elements has thrown the life of Asia out of focus. The supreme task before her statesmen is the recovery of perspective. The future of Western political ideas in Asia must surely depend upon their power to restore coherence and poise to her distracted civilisations, or at very least to maintain the fabric of social relationships in such repair as will enable the reconstruction to be carried out, to remove the obsession of insecurity which must always be present to the minds of those who live in an ancient house whose foundations have been sapped.

It may even be that the West has identified the underlying assumptions of its political life too closely with the institutions in which they have found expression. Especially, perhaps, is this true of the

British, whose distrust of general formulae of liberty has thrown them back upon the sanctions of precedent, with their stress upon continuity: "business as usual during alterations." It may be that Rousseau would have furnished more apposite texts than Mill for a discourse on Italian political liberty, that China might have learnt from Kropotkin what she seeks in vain in Herbert Spencer. But the character of the contacts of the different peoples of Asia with the civilisation of the West has been determined upon other considerations than the congruity of any trend of its thought with her own. The avenues along which contact has been established have been worn broad and deep by the feet of many pilgrims, and as they have been formed, so they must abide. Till recently, they were for the most part one-way roads; but already the political and social problems of Asia are having a direct influence upon the life of Europe. Perhaps in the future new conceptions of freedom and co-operation, born of the reaction of Asia to Western political institutions, will find a place in the political thought of Europe herself—where, for example, the problem of minority rights still awaits a satisfactory solution.

However that may be, and whatever future is in store for the great constitutional experiment and its champions, it is still one of the most splendid ventures of faith in the whole history of politics. When all allowance has been made for the pressure of circumstances, and the relation between virtue and necessity has been stated at its closest, that fact remains. The constitutional movement in Asia must be thought of as a whole, for the sources of its inspiration are identical,

whether its management rests in the hands of Europeans or of Asiatics. Among those who are working it most loyally are many who doubt in their hearts its wisdom and its possibilities, now and in any future within sight. Europe has given to Asia the principles upon which she believes that her own strength and power for growth have been founded. It is oddly ironical that, at this time of closest contact, Europe should herself be passing through the throes of re-birth. It is no unified conception of life that she has to offer; she contributes her own problems, along with such solutions and lines of advance as she has reached. Yet it is all to the good that her statesmen come to the problem of Asia with sympathies quickened by their own sufferings and failures. The European in Asia has lost something of the sublime self-confidence of his grandfathers; but he has gained other qualities through the interminable task of "exploring avenues"—feeling his way from point to point in a home situation which is still bewilderingly obscure.

There is, however, a limit to the extent to which help from outside can be effective. The constitutional experiment is a kind of effort which claims the very best that Europe can give, not only in the big posts of direction, but in the quiet routine of school and office. Work of this kind is being done as faithfully and ungrudgingly as ever, and (one gathers) with a far deeper realisation of its bearing upon the basic problem of reconstruction. But the shaping of the nations of Asia must rest more and more in the hands of their own citizens, and the possibility of building up a stable World-policy may depend upon how far, in the immediate future, they prove capable of taking the strain,

(XVI) EGYPT

Egypt was the first Eastern country which I visited. Many things which I saw there first, and which impressed me vividly, I found afterwards in many parts of Asia, but they have become associated in my mind with the circumstances in which I first met them. I was in Egypt just a fortnight ; a week of this time I spent in Cairo and the neighbourhood, a week between Port Said, Alexandria and Luxor. In Egypt, as perhaps nowhere else, I found my interests sharply divided. Nowhere else perhaps does one feel so wide a gap between the remains of an ancient civilisation and the problems of the present-day relationship of East and West.

I was surprised to find how completely Egyptian civilisation—whether ancient or modern—is based upon the Nile. For the greater part of the distance from Cairo (at the apex of the delta) to Luxor (the highest point I reached) the limits of the valley are plainly visible—an intensely fertile green strip, bounded by red sterile hills. Geographically, Egypt is a natural unity ; racially the only minority of any political importance are the Copts, who also represent the only considerable section of the population who are not Mohammedans. Egypt, then, presents the fundamental problem of the relation of East and West in perhaps its simplest form. It is no accident that of all Eastern countries into which Western methods of Government have been introduced by the European races, Egypt should have been the first to

win formal independence. For this reason, especially, the solution of Egyptian problems is of great importance ; if it is possible for any Eastern people to build up a modern State, as Europe understands that word, it should be possible for the Egyptians. Egypt lies so close to Europe that for many purposes she may be considered a part of the European system of States. I formed the impression that Egyptians themselves are very conscious of this difference in the situation with which they have to deal, as compared, for instance, with India, which takes about three times as long to reach from London or Paris by the quickest route. I was surprised to find that a keen young Egyptian nationalist, to whom I had an introduction, described Napoleon as one of the founders of Egypt. He disclaimed any desire that Egypt should break away from close contact with Europe, he had no wish to see the Code Napoléon replaced by a system of Islamic law. I understand that this attitude is fairly typical ; the ambition of the younger politicians is that the control of the country—political and economic—should pass into their hands, and that Egypt should raise herself to a position of equality with the other States which owe their national existence to the results of the War.

In Cairo, through the kindness of friends in the Ministry of Public Instruction, I had many opportunities of visiting colleges and schools, either established by the Government or under Government inspection and control. My first impression of these schools was astonishment that a system could have been established which reproduced so nearly European conditions. Some of the

more modern institutions reflected in all points the features of their English counterpart. The buildings were of course adapted to climatic conditions ; but the whole organisation of the school was European in conception. The staff were for the most part trained in an admirable college ; the curriculum and the time-table were drawn up in close imitation of those of an English school. The games side was strongly organised, and there was a good scheme of physical training. Many features of this school were to be found also in other schools controlled by the Ministry, and the standard set was a remarkably high one. At the same time, I found other schools carried on in most unsuitable buildings, which it was impossible to adapt to modern requirements. Some of the primary schools were excellent and were well-housed, others again were carried on under make-shift conditions. On the whole, the system of schools, as I saw it in and around Cairo, seemed to me a remarkable achievement, given the limitations of finance and other circumstances within which the work has had to be built up. Educational policy seems in many respects to have been liberal ; for example, there was a place in the time-table for the teaching of the religion of Islam, and every facility was given for the instruction of boys and girls in their own religion. Assuming that it is a sound educational ideal to reproduce in Eastern countries the type of school which has been developed in Europe, Egypt provides perhaps the most successful example of educational effort which I saw this year.

On the other hand, the Egyptian system of schools is not without its problems. Like most of the educational effort of European Governments in the East, its primary

object was to train clerks for the Government Services. In this it has certainly succeeded to a remarkable degree, and in seeking a solution of the grave problems with which her Government is faced, Egypt can draw upon a large body of trained administrators. If Egypt is to become a modern State in the European sense, it is perhaps not unreasonable that her schools should be framed on the same model. At the same time, once I had recovered from my surprise at finding schools to which European standards could be directly applied, not a few details struck me as somewhat incongruous. For instance, a laudable attempt had been made to provide pictures for the walls of the class-rooms ; but in many cases these represented scenes, not from Egypt, but from English life—I remember one picture entitled “Summer,” which showed a typical English farm-house and a laden hay-waggon. A glance through the syllabus of history showed that here again the system had its centre in Europe ; valuable as it certainly is that the constitutional struggles of English Parliamentarianism should be taught in a country which is building up its own political life, I could not help wondering whether, for instance, the history of Islam, or the development of the social life and political relationships of Egypt itself should not have figured more largely. Something the same might be said of the geography which, if I remember rightly, dealt with Great Britain in exaggerated detail. I learnt that only comparatively recently English and not Arabic had been the medium of instruction in secondary schools. This has now been changed ; in fact, a conflict is at the present time raging over the question as to whether Arabic should not be adopted as the sole medium of

instruction even in the higher colleges, where at present in many cases there are parallel courses in English and in Arabic. But this is a very modern change, and the alteration has left a deep mark upon the educational system. It is of course valuable, and even essential, that a thorough knowledge of English, or French, or both, should be given in secondary schools in Egypt, especially in view of the fact that the Egyptians wish for their country even closer contact with Europe, but the present practice of teaching European tongues as foreign languages surely represents a sounder point of view. While, as I have said, I consider the Egyptian system of schools as I saw them a really remarkable achievement in the face of immense difficulties. I cannot help feeling it unfortunate that the older point of view should have been adhered to long after it had been outgrown.

Cairo is very much more the Eastern city of one's dreams than I could have imagined possible. Once one leaves the main roads, there spreads out in every direction a network of tiny streets, of the strangest shape, full of corners. It was here that I first met the bazaar—open-fronted shops stretching back into dim recesses of indefinite extent, full of treasures from every country of Asia. I spent a whole morning looking at carpets, at perhaps six different places in the carpet bazaar (one of the first things which strikes the visitor is the way in which each trade has a street to itself; here then is a whole street with little else but carpets and other furnishings). It is very pleasant to sit and sip Turkish coffee or eat Turkish delight and see square after square spread out and its beauties explained in detail—rose-pinks from Persia, warm browns from Bokhara, and the

rest. The very spreading out of the carpets is itself almost a ceremony, and gives scope for the display of much graceful movement, as well as of the arts of persuasion in which the Egyptian is such a master.

It was in Cairo, too, that I first met a new type of architecture (for Port Said is too mixed in character to stand for anything.) From the citadel I first saw an Eastern city spread out in the sunlight—flat roofs, graceful minarets, domes and palm trees, and a strange absence of the guiding lines of great thoroughfares which one can always pick out in any bird's-eye view of a European city.

So much legend and fiction, too, has centred round Cairo that it is very pleasant to meet at first hand places about which one has read and heard so much. It is intriguing to sit on the terrace at Shepherd's on evenings just pleasantly warm, after the heat of mid-day has died down, and watch the traffic up and down the Sharia Kamel. Tall, lithe figures come up to the rails, and display their wares—the absurdly attractive cheap embroideries, with Egyptian figures, or brightly coloured rugs, or walking sticks. It is pleasant, too, to feel for the first time (and under such circumstances) the amazing sense of leisure which one can find nowhere as in the East—as if an hour, or a day or a week are of no moment, to-morrow is as good a day for doing things as to-day, and life itself so inscrutable that it is simply no good asking too many questions about it, and one might as well take it at its surface value—relax muscle and nerve and brain, and just enjoy warmth and colour and light—and being waited on, and the freedom from having to look after other people. It was in Egypt, too,

that I first felt that curiously different quality of the Eastern sun—a difference which does not depend upon mere temperature, or even moisture, or any other quality which I can analyse or explain ; and I knew for the first time that strange atmospheric effect (I suppose it is) which allows colours, which in Northern Europe would shriek at one another, to live side by side in harmony. I often wondered as I travelled through Asia wherein this curious difference lay—whether it was simply that if you mix enough colours you lose the jarring sense of mixture ; whether the colours which seem to be thrown together by chance are in reality somehow selected and owe their compatability to this, or if neither of these, why then is the miracle possible ? Perhaps after such sunsets as one gets over the Nile as I saw it from the Kasrel-Nil Bridge, any other colour is unremarkable. (The sunsets of Luxor I found still more surprising ; afterwards one wondered what curious set of circumstances, atmospheric or other, could produce so amazing a gradation of indescribable colour ; at the time one's senses were so drugged that thought about this or anything else was quite impossible. Time and again during this year, I have had to shake myself and make myself ask questions and try and find out causes ; and I have been amazed that Europeans whose work lies in the East do not succumb more readily to an influence which must in itself explain much that is puzzling about Asia. I mention this here, because it was the first time that it happened to me ; but it was an experience which recurred at intervals throughout the whole of my travel in Asia—in Ceylon, looking over the sea ; in Jaipur, at the Festival of the Sun ; and at a hundred other times and places).

It was outside Cairo at the Nile barrage that I first saw the engineering skill of the West at grips with the great natural forces of the East. I should imagine that nothing has counted for more in the estimation of Eastern peoples than the power of Europeans to dam up and control a great river like the Nile—just as nothing has contributed more to their radical pessimism than the realisation of how completely man is at the mercy of great natural forces. I believe that the first railway to be laid down in China was afterwards torn up because it was said to inconvenience the earth-dragons—an interesting symbol of the fact that it is in its dealing with the forces of nature that the European way of life first came into direct conflict with the Oriental. It is true that the East can show monuments which still stagger the European visitor ; but the peoples who built them have either passed away or their hand has somehow lost its cunning, and in the present day the monuments of antiquity seem to serve less as a symbol of the power of man over nature, than as a reinforcement of the claims of nature upon the awe and the humility of the men of the present day.

But in Egypt the remains of her most ancient civilisation dwarf everything else. I was surprised to find that in many cases far more of these ancient temples remains than there is left of all but the greatest English abbeys. Thebes and Karnak still present a mass of masonry, whose sheer weight is almost oppressive—it is really wonderful that any other civilisation could grow up in the shadow of such remains. But the most remarkable feature of these old temples is the remoteness of the ideas they express from anything one has ever

known or conceived possible. They must have been the creations of a people who feared even more deeply than they believed. It is really extraordinary that a religion of so long ago should have impressed itself so deeply upon the civilisation of a great people, that, without understanding it, the casual visitor still feels overwhelmingly the holy terror which lived in these ruins. The civilisation of ancient Egypt must have been entirely overshadowed by it. The suggestion of sheer power is really terrifying, and the central conception is always the complete domination of life by eternity. The massive boldness of design is never sacrificed to detail, marvellous though it is, and the art is seldom allowed to stray from the conventions by which it was early bound.

In the Valley of the Kings I was shown the entrance to a tomb which had just been found. It was to the casual glance indistinguishable from that of many other tombs which I saw there. It was not open—my guide told me that they were waiting for the experts, who were expected shortly. It was only when I reached India that I learnt that it was the tomb of Tut-ankh-amen, and that I had missed the opening by three weeks.

I did however see many of the finest tombs already open, including those of Rameses III, Sethos I, and Amenophis II. Here, again, as in the great temples, I was astonished by the quality of the workmanship and by the extent to which it had been preserved. I passed from tomb to tomb so rapidly, and my technical knowledge was so scanty, that I gained little more than a general impression. But the result was startling; in two days, my entire historical perspective was changed. It was one thing to know as a matter of historical fact

that the Nile Valley has been the home of a continuous civilisation for six thousand years ; it is quite another to experience at first hand the wealth of its architectural and artistic remains. No description or reproduction of the mural paintings in these tombs can give more than the slightest hint of their real nature. Here is colour more vivid after thousands of years than most of the relics of mediæval Europe ; here are art forms as mature in their symbolism as anything perhaps which the world can show. The remoteness of these conventions and of the ideas which they symbolise from anything of which present-day civilisation has experienced, only serves to heighten the effect. In India, and perhaps (though less nearly) in Japan, one felt a certain dim kinship with the impulses which have motivated even the most ancient art and culture. In Egypt, one gains an impression of an entirely different quality. These drawings and the tombs and temples of which they form a part are the expression of an experience as remote from one's own as the crudest remains of primitive cultures ; but they rouse in the visitor none of that pleasant sense of infinite superiority to his origins which he feels, for instance, on regarding the remnants of the first European civilisations. One feels that the path of human endeavour from its first crude beginnings to its maturity in a fully self-conscious and developed civilisation is no such simple and inevitable process as the text-books sometimes suggest, and that the difference between an ancient civilisation at the height of its power and our own cannot be stated simply in terms of superiority. This experience alone would have made my fortnight in Egypt amply worth while.

It was in Egypt, too, that I first met with that curiously specialised product of the contact between East and West—"the guide," and his entourage of hangers-on, who make a not inconsiderable living out of the European traveller, especially if he is not well-versed in local prices and standards of value. I found these Egyptian guides likeable and amusing fellows enough, though obviously spoilt by the nature of their relations with their clients. They have often a curious trick of trading upon their own apparent naïveté. Thus, a "boy" who showed me round the Pyramids of Gizeh, offered to do so for five piastres (a little more than a shilling), and when I paid him at the end of the afternoon, said blandly: "Well you see, we have to say five or nobody would hire us, but of course you could not expect me to do it for that." A guide in the Valley of the Kings, whom I had told to pay small out-of-pocket expenses, actually tried to charge me thirty piastres (about 6s.) for the "donkey-boy's lunch," when, as a matter of fact, we ate sandwiches which we had taken with us, in the shadow of a temple miles from any place where food could be bought. He must have thought me a very green hand!

It was during a few days in Palestine that I came across the most striking example I met with during the year, of the love of haggling for haggling's sake, without any obvious advantage to be gained. It was at Tiberias, and the subject was my attempt to hire a small motor-boat to cross to the site of Capernaum. I was told that this could be obtained at the wharf. On going down there, I met an Arab, who owned a motor-boat, and asked him if it was for hire. He said, "Yes, we have a

motor-boat," and showed me a miniature passenger steamer obviously laid up for repairs. I asked if this boat was ready to sail, and he said:—"Oh, no, the engine is broken." "But," I said, "you have a smaller boat, haven't you?" "Yes," he replied, "but there is something wrong with that," but agreed that it could perhaps be put in order for the afternoon, and he started talking about the price. He asked about three times as much as I was prepared to give, but I took this for the usual opening bid, and we proceeded to bargain at length. Finally, since he would not come down to a reasonable figure, I left him and went to hire a sailing-boat. Seeing that the negotiation was at an end, and that no more fun was to be had out of it, he came running after me and explained "I am very sorry, Sir, you could have had it, but you see it sailed this morning for the other side of the lake, and has not come back yet." I can see no motive behind the argument except the sheer love of bargaining, even when there was nothing to bargain about.

The three weeks between my disembarking at Port Said and my re-embarking from there for India were passed in this rather desultory but very pleasant way. I cannot say that I obtained any very clear light upon the fundamental problems of Egyptian politics or economics. But I did gain a multitude of impressions which remain with me very vividly. On the general situation I can only say that the Egyptian officials, with many of whom I came in contact, impressed me as much more nearly up to the standard of European efficiency than those of any other Eastern country which I visited except Japan. The ambitions of the Egyptian seem to

be cast in very much the same mould as those of the nations of Europe which have recently won their independence. I met many Egyptians of obviously great acuteness of mind and considerable grasp of the essentials of a modern state and its administration. It was impossible for me to say in so short a time how far Egypt now has ready to her hand reformers and administrators who can do really creative work, and whose conception of Egyptian nationhood is wide and concrete enough to bear the strain of actual working conditions. Certainly, the problem which faces them is a much simpler one than that with which Indians or Chinese have to deal, and for this reason among others, Egypt holds the key to the immediate political future of the Near and Middle East.

(XVII) JAPAN

(I)

I had looked forward to no part of my tour with greater pleasure than to the month I spent in Japan. My imagination has drawn two pictures : the first that of the Japan of the picture-books and legends—a land of surprising colour and graciousness, the home of strange customs and quaint courtesies, a kind of flower-decked playground. The second picture arose as the background to what I knew of Japanese industrial and fighting efficiency. I remembered the coming of the Japanese rifles in the early days of the War ; the light wood of their stocks suggested somehow a strange setting for familiar things. I had seen at some time, of which I have lost memory, Japanese naval officers and sailors, very trim in their neat uniforms, and I remembered the surprise with which Europe had heard of the account they gave of themselves against the Russians at Tsushima. I had heard of Japanese industries already seriously competing with our own for the trade of the East, and of the surprising way in which the Japanese had “ imitated ” the achievements of Western science and Western industry. I do not think that these two pictures of the imagination were in any way related in my mind. During my visit to Japan, I found that both were surprisingly true, and

yet in some ways essentially false ; I am still puzzled to discover the exact relation between them.

Among the phantasies which this year of travel has dispersed was one which classed together the "yellow races" and assigned them to a definite type. It was on the small Japanese boat which took me from Tientsin to Kobe that I first gained an idea of how far I was mistaken. I had left behind me in China a vast distracted country, a giant paralysed by some curious disorder of the nerves ; I found on board an organisation and precision which I had thought impossible except under European control. Among the first things which struck my notice was a curious kind of fly-trap in the saloon ; a clockwork motor rotated what I can only describe as a square wheel fitting into the top of a wooden box. With little obvious motive, the flies, of which the saloon was full when we started, settled in twos and threes upon this rotating wheel, and were borne silently but efficiently into oblivion. It is an ingenious invention, and it made an impression upon my mind which has somehow become confirmed by many things which I saw in Japan.

We ran into the edge of a cyclone, and put in to Tsushima Bay for shelter. I was glad to have a glimpse of this historic site. When the storm passed, and I felt better, I found a scene which recalled the most highly-coloured picture of Southern seas that was ever drawn by the pen of a lotus-eating novelist, or by the brush of the artists who design the covers for "best-sellers." We lay there half a day or more, sheltered by two great arms of the island, covered with luxurious grass and undergrowth, and sheltered by palm trees. Behind the

low-lying shore rows of huts could be seen, and behind them again the forest. The natives came out to us in strange, broad, unstable boats—odd-looking men, half-clothed, selling fish of curious shape with wide-open, staring eyes and covered with spines. By this time, sea and sky were intensely blue, and as calm as the Lagoon of Venice in its most kindly mood.

Our boat was met at Moji by courteous officials, passports were carefully examined and stamped, forms were filled in in duplicate. The voyage by the Inland Sea defies description. Through the delay of the cyclone we were considerably late, and perhaps the prettiest stretches were passed after midnight. But I sat up on deck until a late hour, watching the wooded islands pass under the full moon—the fourth moon, by the way, which I had seen from the deck of an ocean-going boat during the year. Japan is certainly fortunate in having as a gateway to her homeland so lovely and mysterious a piece of water. I had the greatest difficulty in restraining myself from disembarking and creeping up the coast by easy stages. When we reached Kobe, the Customs examination confirmed the impression I had received of the courtesy and efficiency of Japanese officials. The city of Kobe was, to some extent, a disillusionment. Let me say at once that Japan attracts me least, just in proportion as she reflects the less lovely aspects of Western civilisation. There is a certain pleasant surprise in finding the conveniences of European travel reproduced in a country at the other side of the world. The cities of Japan boast a tramway service which is in some ways unequalled in any other part of the world I have visited.

Trains run to time, and the public and municipal services have little to learn from the West in matters which concern the comfort and convenience of the traveller. The police worry one less than, for example, in Germany or in Poland. In all such externals as these, one is torn between a keen admiration for the national genius which has built up this surprising system in so short a space of time, and (it must be admitted) a certain regret that Japan should have found it possible so easily to put aside many features of Old Japan, as travellers' tales used to picture it.

The other large towns which I visited were Osaka, Yokohama, Tokio, Kyoto and Nagoya. Apart from the many old and beautiful things which all these cities can show, either within their limits or immediately outside, this new urban civilisation of Japan was a disappointment to me. All those who have felt to any degree the terrible drag which the mistakes of the Industrial Revolution in Europe have exercised upon such reforms as town-planning and housing schemes, must wonder that a nation so clear-eyed as the Japanese could have been blind to the possibilities of a blank sheet upon which to write their urban history. Here is over-crowding as bad in its way as anything which you could find in the great cities of Europe. Already, the life and health of the children and young people of Japan is menaced by the factory and the slum. There is a very high infant mortality rate, and the number of deaths from tuberculosis constitute a grave social problem. The houses of workpeople are often concentrated thickly around the new factories, which have grown up in the middle of the towns. Labour has

been attracted wholesale from the country-side, and has often been used quite regardless of the social and moral affects of the conditions of its employment. I did not find it easy in Japan to make any study of factory conditions ; but to anyone with the slightest experience of such things, it is obvious that Japan has in no way escaped the worst features attendant upon rapid industrialisation.

So far as I could make out, with all their genius for adaptation, the Japanese have not succeeded in devising any really new form of industrial organisation. Such methods of alleviation as exist have been directly copied from the Welfare work of Europe and America. Her industrial codes provide against the most obvious forms of exploitation, but I had no means of judging how far they are enforced in practice. The system of "living-in" at certain factories cannot be regarded as an improvement. I understand that in certain cases it has led to very grave abuses. Here, as throughout the East, the older sanctions of custom seem to have broken down almost completely in the face of the new conditions. I see no sign that Japan—any more than China or India—will avoid having to work through the whole cycle of industrial development, especially in matters affecting the relationship between employers and employed. From the point of view of the best interests of the country, the European War was little less than a calamity. It brought much prosperity of a superficial kind to a limited number of the population, but it caused a speeding up of the process of industrialisation which has greatly increased the difficulties of the Government in dealing with conditions which

were already sufficiently intractable. Japanese industrialists were encouraged to develop their businesses at all costs, and to capture the markets of Asia and even of America and Europe from their rivals crippled by the war. The recovery of these rivals, and the re-establishing of their peace industries, has of necessity brought about a rapid contraction of the markets open to Japanese enterprise. In China, the result has been an acute business rivalry which threatens seriously to affect the political situation, and will need handling with the utmost tact. When I was in Wuchang, a rather foolish and futile attack upon boats laden with Japanese goods was made by Chinese students, and there were other disturbances connected with anti-Japanese demonstrations, which led indirectly to a considerable loss of life.

The abnormal condition of War-time resulted in a very great rise in prices throughout Japan, and the inflation, which was the result of the same situation, is still one of the most difficult problems with which the Government is faced. On the other hand, the rapidity with which the recent loan was taken up clearly shows that the Japanese have won the confidence of the world in their ability to weather even such storms as the earthquake and the destruction of their capital cities. Once the problem has reached dimensions which constitute a national danger of which the Government is clearly cognizant, there is no shrinking from handling it. In fact, I heard of other instances of a kind of "interference" which would hardly be tolerated in any country in the West. In one case, where there was a panic fall in the price of a staple commodity, the

Government stepped in and made large purchases under emergency powers, and held the stocks until the market began to rise. The relation between Government and commerce seems to be much closer than in countries where industrialism is older-established ; it is sometimes alleged that certain economic groups are strong enough to bring pressure to bear upon policy ; I had no means of verifying this, but there are already in existence industrial corporations, whose influence is very wide-spread. As in every country directly affected by the War, there has arisen a class of " profiteers," and the Japanese Government does not seem to have dealt with them any more successfully than the Governments of Western countries. At the same time, Japan can call upon an intense loyalty to the interests of the nation and the commands of the Emperor, which is without parallel in any other country in the world, and I cannot believe that any economic interest could fight successfully against an impulse which is rooted in that will to power which has achieved such astonishing results during the last seventy years. The difficulty seems to be less that of devising a means for carrying out measures which are recognised as necessary in the national interest, than the more fundamental problem of working out a line of progress which will keep pace with the unparalleled rapidity of development, and harmonise the needs of the new industrial society with the traditional standards and values of Japanese social life and the demands of international opinion.

The Japanese have a pleasant custom of giving presents on any and every occasion. In every town and village of any size there are shops dedicated solely

to the sale of quaint figures and other small articles. The intrinsic worth of the present matters little ; but novelty and unexpectedness seem to be qualities much sought after. In Old Japan I imagine that these little presents must have been made by hand, and that the variety must have been even more striking than to-day. Now, one sees in such shops row after row of tiny figures, very attractive in their strangeness of form and gesture, but "standardized," dozens of them exactly alike. Doubtless, the price is lower and the workmanship is in itself perfect in most cases. But there is somehow a loss of just those qualities of individual care in selection which must have made the presents of Old Japan specially precious.

If I am not mistaken, there is a very real distinction between the way in which Western industry has been adopted by many of the nations of Asia, and the method of its adoption in Japan. This was not Japan's first reaction to contact with the West. In the sixteenth century, Jesuit missionaries took to Japan not only Christianity, but all kinds of contacts with the Europe of their own day. Japan proved herself an apt pupil ; many converts were made, and European friendships were welcomed. Then fear seized her—fear, not of the physical power of the West, but of the invasion of her national soul by elements which were alien to it. The result was a violent revulsion. The Jesuits were excluded, and the Christians were all but exterminated in massacres for which even the history of persecution in Europe could find no parallel. Japan retired into seclusion ; her ports were closed to foreigners, and though a surreptitious trade was still carried on by a

few of the bolder spirits, the Government of Japan set its face against all contact with the dangerous West.

It is impossible to say how long this state of isolation might not have lasted, if Commodore Perry had not seen fit to break open the treasure-house of Japanese national life. Henceforward it was clear that it did not rest with Japan whether or no she would enter into relations with the West; the West was clamouring at her doors, and would take no denial. In face of this new danger, Japanese policy made the most surprising turn-about in the whole of history: she determined to keep the West at bay by employing its own weapons. The amazing audacity and success of this policy are now commonplaces; though it is perhaps even yet not fully realised that it marks a turning-point in the whole history of Asia and its relations with the West. But in adopting in this way the weapons of her adversary Japan was not in the least abandoning her original purpose: she was only seeking to fulfil it in a different way. For a time, a certain degree of compromise was essential; and Japan had to admit the principle of extra-territoriality, and to see large foreign settlements established on her soil. But she successfully denied the right of foreigners to dictate to her a policy, either in external or in internal affairs. She rigorously excluded them from positions of control in the Government, and while seeking with marvellous tenacity the secrets of their skill and their strength, she never fell into bondage to them. If I am not wholly mistaken, Japan has adopted the trappings of Western civilisation as a screen behind which she may keep secure her political independence and the integrity of her national soul.

The readiness with which Japan has adopted the mechanism of Western civilisation is apt to blind one to her profound conservatism in matters which touch her most deeply. The Westernisation of Japan has not been the willing adoption of a culture recognised as superior, but the deliberate meeting of a potential foe with his own weapons. It is difficult, however, to adopt the trappings of another way of life and to escape the contagion of its spirit.

(XVIII) JAPAN

(2)

A curious speculation often occurred to me while travelling in Japan. So many of the things which one finds most admirable and most attractive in her national life are closely allied to what in other peoples or nations would be a source of weakness. For example, her people are very small; they live in a country where everything seems on a very small scale compared, for instance, with the vast plains of China; they are not remarkable for beauty of form or feature. All these points are met with also in the case of Java—in fact, there is more than a superficial likeness between the general circumstances of the two countries. Yet Java remains an interesting and valuable part of the Dutch Colonial Empire with little or no political significance for Asia or the world. By virtue of what have the Japanese raised themselves to the position of a first-class Power? The answer which occurs to me is that Japan has shown how natural disadvantages may be off-set—even counterbalanced—by the development of compensatory characteristics. Because her people are small, they have developed a high standard of physical fitness and endurance, fostered by all kinds of sport and by a code of hardship which is the basis of her

national ethics. The quality of minuteness has been frankly accepted and converted into a positive element in her civilisation—hence comes much which is admirable in art and construction and a refinement of taste which, within its limits, is perhaps unsurpassed. The Japanese have developed a mode of dress which is in my opinion the most graceful of any—its only rival is the Indian sareh. Courtesy, one of their most striking national characteristics, has known how to express itself, not only in graceful costume and gesture, but in a language which is, I understand, a most perfect instrument for indicating the lights and shades of social intercourse. Graciousness and ease of movement are everywhere seen in those of any culture; and culture in this sense is perhaps more widely spread in Japan than in any European nation which I know, except France. I cannot think that it is altogether fanciful to say that the explanation of Japanese greatness lies in this wonderful power of drawing strength out of the very heart of natural weakness.

The Japanese have stood to the West as the supreme example of the imitative power of Asia. It is true that no Asiatic race has copied so faithfully; but this in itself seems to me to explain only a part of her success. The Japanese genius consists not so much in her power of imitation as in her capacity to absorb and assimilate alien materials, while eliminating elements dangerous to the unity of her own life. So far, she has shown a singular success in robbing innovations of their sting. Materials which cannot be absorbed are ruthlessly rejected or rooted out. The most striking example of this was certainly the massacre of the Christians, and

the complete isolation of Japan in the seventeenth century. But at other periods of her history she has shown the same power of moulding to her needs materials supplied by Chinese culture and philosophy.

The flood of Western influences in recent years has provided her with a supreme chance of exercising this power of assimilation. But never in her history has she been faced with the task of making her selection from such a wealth of material. Japan seems to have approached the task of dealing with it in something of the spirit of a dilettante, in the best sense of that word. Her taste has been catholic, and she has cared more for the intrinsic worth of her acquisitions than for their fitness to stand cheek by jowl with one another. At present it cannot be said that she has succeeded in setting her house completely in order ; but it is nevertheless true that she has in a high degree the capacity of some connoisseurs to collect a miscellany of "pieces," and to make them seem at home with one another. The foreigner can identify with considerable accuracy the sources of her innovations. I was walking up one of the mountain roads leading out of Nara, when I came across a Japanese youth and maiden, sitting side by side contemplating a waterfall—a picture in the best style of Old Japan. But I saw when I came nearer that although the little lady was wearing a pleasant kimono with its broad silk obe, the young man wore the peaked cap of a German student, and the horn-rimmed glasses of an American. America has also contributed ice-cream, and something of the public hygiene system. Switzerland has supplied the model for the system of electric railways which radiate from the large towns,

and often provide a frequent service even to up-country villages. The electricity plant, with its careful use of all available water-power, might have been imitated from Switzerland or from Norway—and so on. All these things have been copied with admirable faithfulness of detail from the original sources ; but they have been taken curiously out of their setting, and although in most cases the Japanese have known how to establish and maintain them with great efficiency, the resulting effect is often that of a patch-work to which the most critical minds in Japan itself are not blind. The standard of the public services is, on the whole, high, but it is very uneven. The railways are specially good and trains keep excellent time. The Post Office is uncertain ; I was told that it may take anything from two to five days for a letter to reach Tokio from Miyanoshita—a distance for which one full day would certainly suffice most European Post Offices. I found it difficult to get letters forwarded even when they were addressed to me by Japanese in Japanese characters. Yet the surprising thing is, after all, not that Japan should have found a difficulty in rapidly unifying innovations which she has selected from so wide a field, but that she should have succeeded at all in grafting them on to her own ancient civilisation. Her great asset has been an insular position and a fairly homogeneous people. She could rely, too, upon two strong elements in the national traditions ; a warrior caste with an ethic of hardness, simplicity and self-control, and an ancient nobility which were the repository of what was best in her customs and her culture. On the other hand, she was divided by the provincialism of a

decadent feudal system. It is really surprising that after many hundred years of internecine struggle, during which the Imperial power was often reduced to a mere shadow, it should have been possible for the Japanese nation to retain so strongly the sentiment of national unity rooted in veneration for her ancient dynasty. The Imperial House was the one institution common to all Japan, and in the abolition of the Shogunate, and the restoration of the Imperial power, the Japanese have seen a return behind the period of corrupt political government to the pure tradition of a Golden Age. The Restoration, then, was at once a symbol and the sanction of national unity. The dynasty was hedged round afresh with the sanctities of Shintoism; the major shrines were cleansed of Buddhistic elements, and the worship of the Emperor became the test and the inspiration of citizenship. The strength and loyalty of this veneration can hardly be exaggerated. It has been the instrument of the transformation of Japan.

To the Japanese, the relation between the Emperor and his people is in every sense unique, without parallel in any country in the world. In a book by the Mayor of Tokio, recently published,* this relationship is described in the following terms: "We cannot regard our Imperial Family as the symbol of the people, nor can we regard the relations between the Imperial Family and the people as those between the colours and the army. Because the symbol and the colours presuppose something independent, whereas the

* "*A Simplified Treatise on the Imperial House of Japan*," by Hidejiro Nagata, page 113.

Japanese nation are to the Imperial what a circle is to its centre. The Emperors of this country have based their administration upon the people, regarding them as their first and foremost concern; just in the same way as there could be no centre at all unless there were a circle. But this does not mean that there is a relative difference in importance between the two. But, on the contrary, no relative importance could be attached to the relations between the circle and the centre. They forbid any attempt at their separation or at their relative importance.

“It may be said that Russia may exist without the Romanoff family, or that the army without the colours; but it is preposterous and meaningless to hold that there could be a circle without its centre. . . . It is the firm belief of the Japanese people that so long as Japan exists, so long will exist the Imperial Family, and that so long as the Yamato race exist, so long will exist the Imperial Family. Cut any part of a tree cross-wise, and you will find the pith.”

It is claimed that the Japanese conception of Empire is fundamentally different from, for example, the British idea of loyalty. This difference is said to depend upon the unbroken line of the Imperial Family from time immemorial: “The origin of the Imperial Family is shrouded in myths, and its dignity is heightened by a firm conviction on the part of the people that it is a fact established since time immemorial that the Imperial Throne should be coeval with heaven and earth, being handed down from generation to generation to the Emperors of one unbroken lineage. This has no parallel in other countries. Therefore, the

Japanese nation may well be proud of it. . . . It is beyond our conception that there should be an interruption in the line of our Emperors. It often happens in foreign countries that the lines of their sovereigns are interrupted, and that many are ruled by Kings or Emperors who have come from outside. But such a thing is impossible in this country. . . . The Imperial Family stands or falls with the people of Japan, their relations being absolutely inseparable. . . . It is not an accidental affair, nor a matter of mere formality, devoid of any meaning or substance. On the contrary, however, it is the natural outcome of great causes, which are nothing but the hearty co-operation and unity existing between the Ruler and the people. Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue ; while the people, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof, so as to guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. This harmonious unity between the Ruler and his ruled has given birth to a beautiful fruit in the form of the unbroken line of the Emperor, which is, therefore, the crystallisation of substantial desserts in the organisation of the country. This is the reason why we are absolute admirers of the unbroken line of our Emperors.”*

The worship of the Imperial House is said to be directly analogous with the devotion which religion enjoins :—“ Man’s body and mind can be theoretically kept separate and distinct, but practically it is

**Ibid.* Pages 47 to 51.

impossible to separate them, and yet make his existence real and natural. I am not sure if this comparison of our own feeling and conception of the unbroken lineage of our Imperial Family with the forms of religious adoration bears the test of a rigid criticism, but the fact itself is one that really commands our respect and adoration as something at once unique and exalted. To give it praise is just as natural as the believer's attitude towards his object of worship.”*

Such sentences show clearly how deeply the Japanese conception of the Empire is related to the springs of the national life. The writer is deeply conscious of the fact that the Imperial worship alone has made possible the transition from the mediæval condition of society to a modern State of the first class.

“The work of governing a country concerns its exterior, but cannot control the minds of the people. The administration may be rationally conducted, but cannot sway the emotions. Inasmuch as men are sentimental creatures, their social harmony cannot be realised by any formalities and reasonings alone. In this country, the presence of the Imperial Family is an invaluable contribution to the harmonisation of social life.”†

In fact, it may be said that without this unique institution, the very diverse borrowings of Japan from all the countries of the West and from America could never have held together at all in any kind of unity. As it is, the Japanese sentiment of loyalty, which is concentrated in their attitude to the Throne, will probably succeed in assimilating these innovations ; and

* *Ibid.* Page 55.

† *Ibid.* Page 98.

it must be added that the Japanese are themselves very conscious of the work which remains to be done.

The book from which I have already taken several quotations gives as an example of the need for assimilation the present position of Christianity in Japan, and describes it in so quaint and vigorous a metaphor that the passage is worth citing:—"Christianity in this country may be compared to a somewhat green banana which has not yet ripened enough to be eaten without the risk of its disagreeing with us." Another interesting passage suggests that the special need of the Japanese for an Emperor is an outcome of their national character: "The Japanese people are sentimental and passionate, so much so that they often fail to be guided by calm and sound judgment. This is the reason why they are guilty of abnormal actions . . . accordingly when they are seized with political frenzy, and are given to fanatical action, they are not easily kept under control. This accounts for the necessity for the Imperial Family, which always stands aloof from political interests by treating the people on an equal and impartial basis; thus qualifying itself to be their rallying centre, moral and otherwise."

I myself experienced several examples of this temperament, which to an Anglo-Saxon, at any rate, is very difficult to understand. On one or two occasions a situation which seemed to me trivial provoked a storm of anger which even the Japanese courtesy could not entirely hide. In particular, I discovered that an unintentional slight might be read into one's ignorance of the more important points of Japanese tradition or history. Let me add at once that my Japanese friends

were very ready to make generous amends for such temperamental outbursts. Nowhere in the world have I found a franker confession of the "difficult" side of a national character, and nowhere else have those who had a short time before been complete strangers gone to such amazing trouble to do all in their power to help me to see and understand the things for which I was seeking. Let me give just one example of this: I was travelling in a second-class carriage from Tokio to Nikko. At a country station a Japanese schoolboy got in, and said to me in broken English: "Good-morning. I am travelling second-class to-day, because I want to speak with a European." He showed me his school-books, including an English Grammar. A few stations later he got out, and I afterwards discovered that he had left this book behind. I posted it to him from my hotel in Nikko, and received a card in acknowledgment. I thought the incident closed, but the day before I was to sail from Yokohama—I had happened to mention the boat on which I was going—I found him waiting to say "Good-bye" and wish me good luck. He had travelled for the six hours or so which separate Nikko from Yokohama, and waited another three or four hours to see me! He was one of the last things I saw in Japan—a small and diminishing figure, holding on to the other end of a green "streamer" which I threw out to him as the boat was leaving. Among the very many examples of kindness and generous hospitality which I met with during my visit this village boy must stand as a small but significant symbol.

The Japanese habit of mind is realistic. They are quick to size up the possibilities of a situation, and able

and ruthless in dealing with it. It is universally recognised that "The safety of the people is the supreme law," and although that principle admits of widely different interpretations, I doubt if any privilege or exemption or interest could stand long against the realisation that it was a menace to national existence or prosperity. It was in this spirit that the Japanese Government set out upon its great task of modernization. The ideal of the reformers was a rapid but controlled series of changes, fostered and protected at all points by the Imperial Government. The Government entered upon a deliberate policy of industrialisation, in order to win economic independence, and to supply the materials necessary for the re-organised Services. The plan included a complete system of education in common schools, which could be made the medium of social instruction. Nowhere, I think, has the possibility of making the school and college the formative influence in national progress been more fully recognised. The developing life of Japan was thus deliberately directed into the three channels of industrial, political and educational activity. In all these branches it was necessary to invite the co-operation of teachers from the West ; but the control of all departments of the national life was kept in Japanese hands. After a period of somewhat acute Westernisation, a deliberate reaction set in towards the retention and development of the national tradition, its essential customs and beliefs. Japanese art forms and architecture were revived and adapted, and the (controlled) study of national origins became wide-spread. For a time, there was even a rather self-conscious hostility to Westernising ten-

dencies, born, no doubt, of the fear that they would inflict harm upon that autonomy of the national soul which they were in fact (if I see them aright) devised to protect.

In Japan to-day, I felt that this fear had been substantially outgrown. Japan has long been undisputed mistress of herself; her position is universally recognised; her alliance or her co-operation has been courted by the other great Powers of the World. She has then less reason to fear the insidious sapping of her national standards by the "superior" civilisation of the West.

At the same time, owing in part, I imagine, to the dislocation caused by the War, the movement in the direction of Western institutions—whether political, economic or educational—has gathered tremendous momentum, and it would appear that control is becoming more and more difficult. In spite of the utmost watchfulness, economic development, education and a measure of constitutional Government bring with them an attitude of mind, and even a form of organisation, which is difficult to reconcile with the traditional Japanese standards. To take an example—in Old Japan, the merchant ranked below the cultivator and the craftsman. In a commercial college which I visited, there was a definite course of lectures on "business morality." Japan has had to face the necessity of revising her estimate of the function of commerce.

Other problems arise directly out of the Japanese conception of life; for example, the veneration of ancestors and the desire for descendants are in part responsible for the rapid increase in population, which

in its turn creates the necessity for expansion. The modern franchise has given a liberal suffrage, but the Executive is still largely independent of the vote of the Legislature, and it retains control of a large and active body of secret police. This dual Police Force is, in itself, rather typical of the way in which old and new may meet without joining forces. The friend in whose company I visited a large wrestling-hall in Tokio, pointed out a man dressed in the smock of a country yokel, sitting on a box, and chatting with one or two acquaintances: "That man," he said, "is a member of the secret police, and has the power to 'throw' offenders against public order." It is possible that Japan is entering upon another crisis in her history; the very diverse elements in her national life have not yet made peace with one another. At the same time, I did not feel (with some American editors) that the change is likely to establish a modern democracy of the Western type; and I have enough admiration for the Japanese genius (and appreciation of the defects of Western civilisation) to hope that it may not be so.

It is noteworthy that Japan is the only country in Asia which has succeeded in establishing a thorough-going system of universal elementary education. I understand that over ninety per cent. of her population are already literate. Her people have a marked capacity for picking up information of every sort and kind. Rickshaw coolies, waiting for fares, sit in their rickshaws by the side of the road and read books. In a village some way up-country, which I visited, I had hardly been in my inn half an hour before I was surrounded by a crowd of perhaps a dozen boys and girls,

provided for the most part with pencils and note-books, who came to ask me to pronounce for them certain English words which they had learnt in school. They taught me the Japanese names for almost everything in the room, and I taught them the English names in exchange. They were very curious, too, over such scraps of information about English ways and houses as I could make them understand; my hostess was surprised to hear that in England we have nothing corresponding to the "hibachi," the pan of live charcoal, which serves as heater and pipe-lighter. I gathered that a great deal still remains to be done to improve these schools and to raise the standard of education generally. But, on the whole, the attempt to combine what is essential to the efficiency of Western systems of education with the national ethics and social customs of Japan has been remarkably successful. The number of secondary schools and colleges is still inadequate, but already the spread of higher education is awakening a new critical spirit, which is by no means the least of the difficulties with which the Government is called upon to deal. The attitude of some University students towards military service, and their interest in radical politics, have led to measures of precaution.

I was conscious in Japan, as perhaps nowhere else in Asia, of a civilisation of great antiquity, almost untouched in its fundamental social values by Western ethics or Western standards. Take, for example, the Japanese attitude towards suicide; General Nogi's house had been acquired for the nation and is a place of pilgrimage; and, during my month's stay, two double suicides of the "love-pact" variety were widely

approved or half-heartedly condemned. In one of these cases, where the parties were a literary man of high standing and a lady known for her social activities, the suicide was, to Western standards, inexplicable. The "wronged husband" and the "erring wife" were apparently in complete confidence, the husband was willing to grant a divorce, there was no legal impediment, and the lover was unmarried. I quote this case simply to illustrate the gulf which separates Japan from the West in such matters. Equally startling (to take an example at random) are the attitude towards ancestors, the disbelief in the rights of the individual, and the absence of bodily "shames."

(XIX) JAPAN

(3)

I spent two or three very pleasant days walking up-country. I was unfortunate in striking a year when the rainy season was prolonged some time after the usual date, and heavy rains made me abandon my walk sooner than I had intended. I saw enough, however, to leave upon my mind a very vivid impression of rural Japan. I found in the villages a life as mature as that of the towns, and perhaps more whole-hearted and complete in itself. Japan is a land of small valleys, almost invariably watered by a considerable stream. In the parts which I visited (for the most part the country around Sakurai) the life of the village seemed to be based upon the cultivation of rice. The foothills were covered with intensely cultivated fields, which showed signs of great care and gave the appearance of having been in much their present condition for an indefinitely long period. The houses were generally crowded fairly closely together and were thickest along the main street and in some cases one or two roads leading off it. They corresponded to the type of house which I had seen in the towns, and though they were, of course, less elaborate in construction, they reproduced most of its characteristic features. They were built of lath and tough paper, stretched across sliding screens which formed the walls. The floors were covered with matting, the famous tatami,

and the level of the ground-floor was raised perhaps a couple of feet, except for one small space at the door, where one could stand and take off one's shoes, in accordance with invariable custom before proceeding further. It is very remarkable how even the poorest house seems to preserve this general type, and to receive this token of respect from all who enter. The fittings of the houses were very simple ; I looked into several and I stayed in one or two of the inns—institutions which can be found in every village of any size. Windows in the European sense are almost entirely absent ; at night the whole house is shut up, and the only way of securing ventilation is to leave the sliding screen open a chink or so. The rooms are separated from each other by screens of the same manufacture, which slide in a groove. At one inn where I stayed, I was surprised to find that, on my arrival, the whole of the upper floor was open, throwing all the rooms into one large hall. However, screens were rapidly drawn across and a perfect little room was thus created. This inn was among the best-equipped which I found in these villages. It was spotlessly, almost alarmingly, clean. As everywhere in Japan, there was electric light in each room, but this was the only sign of European influence which I found. A couple of hooks were on the wall, on which one could hang one's clothes ; for the rest, the room when I entered it was quite empty. When I asked for a meal, a small table about four inches high was brought in—a delicately-made piece of furniture—fashioned, like everything else in this house, with an eye as much to beauty as to use. A thin padded mat was also brought, and this formed my seat. I was provided with a clean kimono, and it was

explained to me that the custom was for guests to wear this in place of their ordinary clothes while staying in the inn. One of the ladies of the household poured out tea for me, and I found myself treated in every way as the guest of my hosts ; this little lady even peeled the hard-boiled eggs which I had ordered—she had provided twelve—and popped them into a basin of salt, making one ready for me while I was eating the last ! I found rice cooked in the Japanese fashion quite pleasant—they seem to use neither salt nor sugar with it, and the mystery as to how one could possibly eat it with chopsticks was solved when I found that it was moist enough for the grains to stick together, but not so moist as to become liquid. Fish was often served with it as a kind of relish, and it was easy to obtain eggs. Eggs were the occasion of one of the most embarrassing moments which I experienced. I had with some difficulty made my hostess at one inn understand that I wished for them hard-boiled ; at the next inn I repeated what I imagined was the same phrase, but I must have omitted a word, for when I broke the first egg, expecting to find the contents solid, both white and yolk were spilled over the neat little tray and on the sacred tatami with lamentable results. It was, perhaps, just as well that the few words of Japanese I had picked up were insufficient to enable me to understand the lady's comments, though I gathered that they were not favourable ! In one village I obtained also a kind of bread—small rolls, containing a curious kind of paste not wholly unlike almond—pleasant at first, but somewhat sickly if eaten in greater quantities.

In all these inns I was received with the greatest

courtesy and kindness. It was when sitting in my room in one of them that the children of the village came with their note-books to learn English from me. Everyone, from the smallest boy to the village policeman, received me in a way which would bear very favourable comparison indeed with the attitude of the country folk in any rural village of Europe which I know towards a visitor of a different colour from themselves, who was almost wholly ignorant of their customs. I gained the impression that rural Japan has not really been very profoundly changed by the coming of Western ideas; a good many country men and women must have drifted into the towns and been absorbed into the new factories, but those who remain seem to cultivate the land in much the same way as their forefathers did, and to have made little or no difference in their manner of life or social customs. In one case, the friendliness of these Japanese villagers extended so far as to give me one guide to show me the local temple and another to put me on my road—a kindness which enabled me to use the ridge-paths through a very lovely piece of country, and to arrive without misadventure or delay at the end of the day's journey.

I cannot be too grateful for the good fortune which allowed me to visit Japan before the earthquake. I left Yokohama almost five weeks to the day before that great disaster, and I understand that most of the larger buildings in Tokio and Yokohama are now in ruins. It seems almost incredible that cities which I came to know so well, thanks to the hospitality and kindness of many friends, although my stay there was short, should have been devastated in a way for which perhaps the

destruction of French towns on the Western Front is the only recent parallel. At first sight, both Tokio and Yokohama were disappointingly like great towns of the West; their banks and business houses in the main thoroughfares were constructed on Western or American models, they were served by efficient tramways, and the two cities were connected by no less than three or four alternative systems of railways, steam or electric.

I imagine that if I had visited these cities merely as a stranger without introductions, my knowledge of them might almost have ceased at this point. But, thanks to the good offices of friends, both Japanese and British, I was able to see much which would have been quite inaccessible to those who were less fortunate. In particular, I owe to my Japanese friends the discovery that, hidden away among buildings in streets of no special attractiveness, there are still wonderful houses and gardens, which preserve the spirit and culture of Old Japan untouched. I have in my mind the picture of one such house, where I learnt perhaps more about the real Japan than anywhere else during my month's stay. I will not attempt to describe it in detail; it included one pleasant room furnished in a style with which Europeans could feel at home—there were chairs and tables of the height to which Westerners are accustomed. But the rest of the house would, I imagine, have been exactly the same—except for the electric light—if Commodore Perry and his American ships had never insisted that Japan should again belong to the great World. The garden which surrounded the house was full of delights—a great stone lantern, a miniature house perfect in its fittings, used for the “tea ceremony,” a

small rockery arranged as for a waterfall, a tiny lake filled with bright coloured fish ; these things were set in perfect lawns, surrounded by trees which made this house in the centre of Tokio as remote from the outside world as if it had been in the heart of the country. This curious sense of remoteness and the power of getting an " atmosphere " is one of the most surprising things about Japanese architecture. Perhaps the most striking example of it was a house some little way outside Kyoto. This house and its garden altogether can hardly have covered an area of more than five hundred square yards. Yet the garden contained a lake of great carp, as brightly coloured as the " gold-fish " which one sees sometimes in Europe imprisoned in small glass bowls—said to be two or three hundred years old. It was perhaps less surprising to find a similar effect in the cloistered seclusion of the Buddhist monasteries, whose charming guest-rooms are as remote from European standards of taste as anything I have seen during my travels, and at the same time as perfect an example of a culture based upon different standards, with its own completeness and symmetry.

It is curious, too, how even in the great cities one comes across bits of Old Japan which have been quite untouched by the changes of the last seventy years. My friends took me to a great fair-ground in Tokio. For the most part, it was the kind of pleasure park which one might have found in any European city ; there were round-about, multitudinous stalls, a few wild animals in large cages, and all the gimcrack delights of such a place. But, in a kind of cavern under-ground, tiny skeleton marionnettes still danced the *danse macabre* to the

accompaniment of weird, shuddering music ; they met in grinning combat, their bones came apart from one another and danced a devil's tattoo by themselves ; sometimes the entire skeleton would come to pieces, but the bones retained their relative positions, waltzing around as one strange, disconnected whole. They fought and fooled like this by the hour, now playing leap-frog, now floating through the air on invisible wires ; finally, the music became a wail, the pale light changed to a ruddy glow, and the skeletons completed their dance as demons, gyrating, as it seemed, through the flames of Hell. This performance was watched by a large group, for whom apparently it had lost none of its attractiveness. The delicate manipulation of these marionnettes showed at its best that finesse which is seen in more subtle forms in all the art and culture of Old Japan ; it is a striking example of the way in which, behind its surprising adaptability, and its adoption of the forms of Western civilisation and its amusements, the Japanese people is still at heart true to its old traditional humour and popular art.

I was surprised, too, to find how such a modern institution as the great wrestling-hall in Tokio could attract to its service the talents of real artists. The hall was surrounded by a great canvas scene, reproducing the country round Kyoto. This was painted, I was told, by an artist of repute : it was certainly no showman's daub, but a finished piece of work, admirably adapted to its purpose as a background for the hall in which the ancient arts and sports of Japan are cultivated with fervour. The stage upon which I saw a dance by girls brought from Kyoto was itself a marvel of mechanical

art. When closed, it was a reproduction of a famous temple, its wooden façade giving no indication of the mysterious mechanism which lay behind it. When the performance took place, the front opened by some mechanical means : and the stage rose into position. On either hand, there was a kind of box into which a movable platform was fitted. These platforms also rose into their place, carrying with them on the one side a party of geisha girls, who sang accompaniments to the dance, on the other a second party of girls who played a kind of banjo, whose surface was covered with paper like a drum. The dance itself was formal and very graceful in a peculiarly Japanese way (the sandals which the Japanese wear impart to their gait a curious kind of lilt which in any other nation would be ungainly, but which has somehow with them become at once the most graceful and characteristic thing about their carriage).

From a small stage in another part of the hall, a well-known singer gave a performance. I was told that he had been a barrister, but that he had given up the Law for love of his art. He was followed by a conjuror ; certainly, for sleight of hand, the Japanese are truly remarkable. The table on which he worked, and some of his apparatus, were constructed on the same curious collapsible models as the stage ; they rose from behind a screen and spread themselves out into position, without apparent human agency. I was interested in comparing this Japanese conjuror with displays I have seen in India and in China. It depended less upon " patter " than the Chinese variety, and, I think, it relied less upon the curious kind of *rapport* with the audience, which is a feature of most displays of this kind, than the Indian

conjuring ; nothing was passed down to the audience, for instance.

In the Theatre at the Peers' Club, I saw a very clever conjuring display of a different kind. This depended for its attraction upon the marvellously clever manipulation of a very primitive interest. A jet of water was apparently caught on the conjuror's wand, and then made to spout out from anything that he touched—from the table in front of him, from the end of a stick or from the heads or the hands of his colleagues. This went on until the whole of the stage was apparently covered with springing jets of water. Two of the conjurors engaged in a fight, and when one touched the other, the water ceased to spring from the first and started to spring from the arm or shoulder of the second. As a sheer piece of legerdemain, it was one of the most surprising performances I have ever witnessed.

It would be easy to give many examples to show how little the Japanese have at heart forsaken their national standards even in such trivial things as these ; and such indications are not unimportant in any attempt to estimate how far the process of Westernization has damaged anything essential to the national soul. But such glimpses as the kindness of my friends obtained for me into aspects of Japanese life which touch more nearly questions of ethical or aesthetic standards, led me strongly to the conclusion which I have already suggested ; the Westernization of Japan has not been the willing adoption of a culture recognised as superior, but the deliberate meeting of a potential foe with its own weapons. I cannot help feeling that the thoroughness with which Japan has adopted much of the mechanism

of Western civilisation is apt to blind one to her profound conservatism in matters which concern the national soul.

This love of Japan for her own traditional culture has been strongly supported by her Emperors. It was my privilege to see the gardens of the late Emperor Meiji, and the rest-house which stands in them. The charm of this whole place lies in its simplicity. It holds in a high degree that curious quality of remoteness which seems somehow to cling to all that is most attractive in the life of Old Japan—a kind of harmony and rest in whose essential quality there is something almost austere. There is in some lands a belief that reverence depends upon the surrounding of the beloved object with a wealth of gorgeous detail and blinding colour. The Japanese have known how to reach it in another way; they have, as it were, isolated from everything which is adventitious the qualities which they believe to be most essential to their national soul. It is these qualities which they see enshrined in the person of the Emperor and in the practice of the Imperial cult. Such things as this are difficult for the foreigner to seize, and impossible for him to describe; but the Japanese people have known how to embody them in the shrine which has been erected at Tokio to the memory of the Emperor Meiji.

Japan is faced with a problem of reconstruction as difficult of solution perhaps as that which confronts any nation in Asia. She is free from the entanglements of any kind of political subjection, mistress in her own house, a powerful friend, and a dangerous enemy. But, while the traditions to which she is attached are perhaps more remote from the life of Europe than those of any other Asiatic people which I visited, the process of

Westernization has (on the surface) gone further in Japan than elsewhere. At the time when the War broke in upon her orderly development, she was already sufficiently organised to be able to rise to the emergency in a way which has resulted in intensifying the difficulties of her own development. Her people have great courage, great clearness of intellect and a patriotism which amounts to religion. Without these assets, her problem would be insoluble ; even with them, she must of necessity pass through a long and difficult period, before the acute disharmonies which are only too apparent can be reconciled. It is impossible to predict the form of organisation, industrial and political, which she will ultimately work out for herself ; but one is driven to believe and to hope that whatever adjustments she may find it necessary to make, she will be able to preserve, for general civilisation, whatever in her own life is essential and characteristic.

(XX) CHINA

(I)

About half-way between Hankow and Peking the railway crosses the Hwang-Ho River, a stretch of country several miles wide, where shallow, turgid streams make their way between low sand-hills—a country neither wet nor dry, of uncertain limits (since the river alters its course perpetually and its height varies with the season and from year to year)—a region which, with the Valley of the Hwai River, presents an almost insoluble problem to those concerned with the economic reconstruction of China. At this point, the railway is carried over the river by a steel bridge. The train moves very slowly, for the period for which the safety of the bridge was guaranteed has long since expired and no one can say what strains it can stand. It is from districts like these that famine spreads in times of scarcity. The villages along the river-bank are perpetually menaced with floods; the whole region has an air of precariousness; a triple dyke built against the rising river, like the bridge across it, is of uncertain stability.


It is perhaps hardly fanciful to say that these rivers are in some way a picture of the present condition of China as a whole. A former Chinese Prime Minister recently described the country as “a tray of sand”; it

is so easy for anyone who wishes to make his mark upon the life of China ; but there is little basis of organic unity, and it is difficult to write anything upon Chinese life at the present day which a few strokes will not at once obliterate.

It is quite impossible in five weeks to gain anything more than a sweeping and generalised impression of such a country as China. Two facts, however, must be supremely important : its vast size and the almost incredible numbers and density of its population. Equally important is the extraordinary success with which a large measure of unity of culture and institutions has been imposed upon local differences. The Manchus succeeded in the almost impossible task of controlling from Peking even the out-lying provinces of China proper, but their policy seems to have been one of obliterating differences as far as possible, and establishing at any rate a superficial unity of administration. It is thus, perhaps, no accident that there is in modern China little upon which a solid federalism could be based. In spite of marked racial and other differences between North and South, a very short stay in the country—spent largely in conversations with Chinese of very different types—is enough to convince one of the personal character of such local and party unity as does exist. There seems to be no one man in China big enough to unite the country. The provincial Governments, such as they are, centre round some leader of local reputation, backed by a few divisions of troops. The attempt at Parliamentary government has failed for the same reason ; it is just as difficult to find any marked difference of policy as to find any basis of provincial unity. China

lacks, above all, just those distinctions which can become parts of an organic whole. In this way, the problem of China is in the most direct contrast with the problem of India—for India suffers from group-loyalties so intense and so inveterate that they resist any attempt at re-grouping, and from provincialisms so marked that it is difficult to hold them together in any economic, social or political system.

In spite of the notices which have appeared from time to time in English papers, I imagine that it is very difficult to realise from the home stand-point the pitch which general insecurity in China has reached. The train which took me from Hankow to Peking included an armoured car containing a guard of twelve men, and, I was told, a machine-gun. Every time the train stopped, this guard detrained and patrolled the platform. It is now apparently impossible to run more than two fast trains from Hankow to Peking in any one week. The Lincheng outrages received a good deal of publicity, since it involved so many Europeans. It was not, however, in any sense exceptional. Banditry and brigandage are very wide-spread, and thousands of Chinese must disappear annually, as a result of these outrages, without the outside world being any the wiser. Indeed the "armies" and "the brigands" often seem to be a little more distinct than the "Reds" and "Blues" of a field-day. The men who compose them frequently change sides; their loyalty seems to depend in many cases upon whether they have a better chance of subsistence, if they draw their rations and their infrequent pay from the Authorities, or if they frankly take the law into their own hands and live by pillage and forced



levies. This condition of uncertainty affects the European in two ways; it is a menace to his personal safety, for nowhere, perhaps, outside the Concessions, is life and property really safe; it also hits very hard those who depend upon European credit in China. I gained the impression that such reports upon Chinese conditions as reach Europe are orientated entirely to their bearing upon these two questions. For this very reason, they give no real indication of the condition of China as a whole, since they regard the Chinese problem chiefly in its relation to European interests.

As a matter of fact, I was astonished to find how very little these disturbances affect, or even interest, the life of every-day, outside the large towns. To begin with, I do not think that the average Chinese regards the present condition of affairs as in any degree exceptional. It is the European who is always asking "Whether China will settle down?" I put this question to a Chinese friend. His reply was:—"Yes. Our history is always like this: a few hundred years of settled government, and then a hundred years or so of disorder. We seem now to be entering upon one of these disorderly periods. When the cycle has run its course, settled government will come back." I visited from Shanghai, and on my journey up the Yang-tze, villages which might never have heard of a Revolution—except perhaps that the queues, which were the sign of Manchu supremacy, had almost everywhere disappeared. Doubtless a more intensive study would have revealed the bearing of political events even upon the village economy. But the disturbance was not at all obvious. I gained the impression of a society of great antiquity, leaning

upon its habits in substantial indifference to happenings in the wider world outside. Perhaps, in obedience to the general spirit of criticism, fewer devotees than formerly visit the temples, to light their joss-sticks in front of the strangely acclimatised statues of the Buddha, and his entourage of local deities, or to seek their fortune by shaking a numbered lot out of a wooden cylinder, or to stand and clap the hands, or bow the head, in front of the shrine. But in its essentials life seems to go on as it must have done for hundreds of years. The vast majority of the families of China still owe the old obedience to their head. Most articles for every-day use are still made by hand in full sight of passers-by, on each side of the narrow streets, where rickshaws jostle one another, and burdens of immense size are carried miraculously round corners, slung on a pole, supported on the shoulders of two men, who give a strange warning cry on different notes; the vendor of cakes with his swinging lamp may still be seen up to two and three o'clock in the morning. Fields are still tilled, as they have always been, mostly by hand. True, an increasing stream of young men and women finds its way from the village to the town: some to the college, some to the mill—a few even over-seas. These come back doubtless with fresh ideas, which will gradually penetrate the life of the country-side, and bring untold changes. But the casual traveller certainly sees little in the picture to indicate that the West is making headway. Time did not permit me to travel far up-country, but I am told that once one leaves the great highways, life moves still more in its old channels, and with the notable exceptions of the disappearance of the queue and the abandonment

of foot-binding, one might almost wonder whether the Revolution had not been a dream.

I have dealt with this impression of the changeless background of Chinese life at such length because I feel sure that it is not sufficiently present to the minds of those Europeans who, like myself, pass rapidly through the great country of China, and are apt to generalise from their observations. A traveller limited by his ignorance of the language must naturally approach his study of Chinese conditions either through Europeans or through those Chinese who can speak European languages. It is very difficult for him to get any first-hand contact with the China of every-day. He naturally directs his attention to the growing-points—to those centres where Western life and institutions have penetrated sufficiently far to make it possible for him to approach China through them. Thus he gains of necessity an exaggerated view of the importance of such change as has occurred. I was fortunate in meeting in Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, Peking and elsewhere many members of the “Young Chinese” schools of thought, as well as some representatives of the older China. I found that they, like the European resident of goodwill, were often apt to interpret the future through their hopes and fears, and to speak of China in relation to their knowledge of the West. I had to remind myself continually that although these were the people in whose hands the present and future leadership of China must rest, still they represented only one side of Chinese life, and behind them and their thought I was always catching glimpses of a vast unknown China, a China whose standards and habits and ways of life must be so far out of touch with the thought and

hopes of "enlightened" leaders in Peking or in the Concession Towns that it is almost impossible to interpret one in terms of the other. I cannot help feeling that it is this gap which constitutes the greatest difficulty, not only in understanding China and its problems, but in working out any kind of policy. It must be almost impossible to express the ideals of these leaders in any terms which will be at once acceptable to themselves and to their European friends and teachers, and to the great mass of the Chinese people. I spent just long enough in the country to realise a little the depth of this gulf and the difficulty of bridging it. It would require many years' study to understand the nature of the material in which these reformers and idealists must perforce work.

Even in the every-day ups and downs of travel, one comes across things which may perhaps be an indication of these difficulties. There is, for instance, the local character of all currency except the silver dollar. When I was in Shanghai, the Mexican dollar could be changed on an average for 110 cents 7 coppers—though the number of coppers varied from shop to shop and from day to day. I found in Canton that a different small coinage was required from that in use in Hong-kong. In villages up the Yang-tze I received coppers only in exchange for the silver dollar—large heavy rolls of paper filled with coins about the size of a half-penny, nearly 200 of them for each Dollar Mex. In Hankow the coppers were "double"—that is to say, a rickshaw fare of twelve coppers would be paid in six coins about the size of a penny. Of course, in all large towns, money from another district can be changed at a discount.

This variety, and the trouble it causes, seemed to me very typical of a side of Chinese life—the Chinese delight in what might be called “a policy of margins” and have a genius for inexactitude. The curious fact seems to me that while such variations abound, none of them has any real significance—the monetary system brings no advantage to anyone except the money-changers.

I found a somewhat similar dislike of precision in my attempts to secure any kind of figures about Chinese life, and I am told that this is a grave difficulty in the way of any concrete study of conditions, such as is being made by Societies interested in public health or in economic reform. One meets simply with such expressions as “A great many”; “A long time ago”; “Very old”; and it is often quite impossible to obtain any more exact information. There are curious traces of this mentality even in the educated Chinese, who seems to me to find mathematical accuracy a difficult virtue.

It is quite customary, I am told, for retail merchants and shopkeepers in China to keep two pairs of scales, one to buy with and the other to sell. This is simply one example of the great system of “squeeze”—a custom which allows any Chinese through whose hands money or goods pass to take a portion for his own use. This system extends very widely. To some extent it is justified as a charge for services rendered, and though there is no accepted percentage (as one might expect) custom sets bounds to the amount of “squeeze” which may be exacted. It is none the less a very annoying and a deep-rooted custom which stands in the way of uniformity in matters of trade, and introduces an element of uncertainty into all business relationships.

The Chinese love of "face" is proverbial by now, and once this characteristic has been pointed out, the traveller comes across instances of it on every hand. He calls for a rickshaw : two or three coolies immediately race with one another to secure the fare ; those who come last laugh off their disappointment as if it were a matter of no consequence, and they had merely joined in the race for the fun of the thing. To take a more striking example : I was told that when the Revolution succeeded, its leaders were invited to Peking by the Empress, fêted at the Palace and publicly thanked for their patriotism in taking on the burden of Government. Between such a trivial and an important example of "face" the whole of social custom and usage seems to be founded on this desire to avoid hurting one another's feelings. In practice, the effect is often to blur real distinctions. In the field of politics especially, open differences of policy are transformed in this way into personal feuds, masked by an elaborate politeness, and this is probably a very serious hindrance in the way of the development of a real political system. Incidentally, this charming politeness, which is so pleasant a trait in the Chinese character, makes it more difficult than ever for a traveller with little time at his disposal to arrive at true conclusions. The Chinese shrinks from saying or even implying what is unpleasant ; and courtesy tends to become an end in itself—a fact which certainly helps to make life go smoothly and pleasantly, though it has obvious disadvantages from the point of view of the enquirer.

My stay in Peking was made very pleasant by a group of young Chinese professors and students, who not only entertained me and helped me in every possible way, but

also let me understand something of the difficulties with which a Chinese reformer of to-day is faced. They were, for the most part, men and women who had been trained in English or American Colleges. They represented many sides of life: there was a sociologist, a poet, a Buddhist theologian, a student of *Æsthetics*, a lady interested in social reform. Under their guidance I saw something of Chinese drama, and visited restaurants and other places of social intercourse which I could never have seen otherwise. I found them very full of plans and ideals, though rather sad at heart. In company with many others of the younger Chinese, they had come back to the Mother Country, feeling that all things were possible, and that an age of enlightenment and reform was about to begin. They confessed that they had hardly realised the difference between "knowing" and "doing," or the extent to which the democratic systems of Europe and America rest upon an enlightened and educated public opinion. After a period of vigorous activity, in which Young China tried to take the leadership into its own hands, there had followed a period of disillusionment. The difficulties of the present position and the limitations of their own training had been frankly faced, and they had put themselves back to school, each in his own subject—the poet had returned to his poetry, the sociologist to his study of concrete social conditions, the literary man to the development of modern Chinese, and especially the Mandarin dialect, into an instrument of reform. "We may seem cheerful," they said, "but our hearts are sad, for we realise the immensity of the task which lies before us, and how little has been already done."

Nowhere in the countries I visited this year did I find a more concrete and realistic habit of mind than among these Chinese. Their outlook is almost entirely free from that emotional bias which one finds inevitably in India. They are genuinely ready to test at the bar of reason everything presented to them, and to select and combine the elements which can be made a part of the life of the New China. They are amazingly and almost pathetically ready to experiment in their own persons with the latest and most revolutionary theories of Western thought and social organisation. The effect of their interventions in practical politics has not, I understand, always been happy ; they have met with a great deal of criticism, some of it justified no doubt, but some merely cruel, sweeping and unintelligent. I formed the very strong impression that when this new period of probation was over, the Young Chinese intellectuals would play a leading and constructive rôle in the building up of New China. If honesty, courage, and a power of endurance are among the most necessary qualities in the work of nation-building, then China, when she comes to herself, will find admirable material ready to her hand.

(XXI) CHINA

(2)

In spite of the very practical bent of the majority of Chinese minds, I found a very real interest in problems of social and psychological theory. The visit of Mr. Bertrand Russell had made a profound impression upon the thinking members of Young China. I gathered that there had even sprung up a kind of hero-worship which was ready to accept some of his opinions, and the conclusions based upon them, without a very critical examination. Both in Peking, in Nanking, and in Shanghai, the interest taken in Mr. Russell's visit showed clearly that China is genuinely ready to accept and follow out such aspects of Western thought as seem to fit in with her life and to answer her present needs. On the other hand, I came across indications of an incipient return to Confucianism, with which the somewhat positive modern outlook must make its peace. As an example of this return to the origins of her civilisation, there is, in certain quarters, a very strong resistance to any interference with the traditional script, cumbrous as it appears. In Shanghai, I saw the printing works of a well-known Press, and found that no less than seven thousand different characters are needed for the printing of a daily newspaper. It is surely a surprising evidence of the strength of China's

attachment to her origins that it should be possible for what seems such an obviously necessary attempt at simplification to meet with such a strong resistance.

I asked my Chinese friends what, in their opinion, China needed most from Western civilisation. I was somewhat surprised at their reply : they said that her greatest need was Western scientific method, and especially historical method. China seems to be rapidly outgrowing the stage when Western ideas and institutions are accepted uncritically by the force of prestige suggestion. It is, I suppose, inevitable, and even desirable, that Chinese students in Western and American Universities should learn to use the historical method first upon the material provided by the history of the countries in which they are being educated. It is also, no doubt, to the good that they should take back with them to China a fairly clear idea of the institutions of these countries, as well as of the social values upon which they are based. But the best minds among them are trying to do a new thing : they are trying to separate in idea the method by which their studies in Europe and America were guided from the content of their courses, and then to apply the method thus learnt to the history and institutions of their own country. There is, for instance, a very definite attempt being made to reconstruct the history of China, and to rewrite it in the sense in which history is understood in the West. Such an attempt implies a far greater measure of courage than is easily understood from the standpoint of Europe ; it means making hay of the traditional origins of things whose value is still sacred to the best minds of China ; it means, in fact, just the

same kind of problem as was raised when the origins of Christianity were first subjected by Western scholars to literary and historical criticism. There is a definite school of thinkers and writers at work upon this reconstruction. Some of the best-known literary men and women of China have already staked their reputation and their future upon an alliance with the new movement. There is also quite a definite attempt at the popularisation of the results which they are reaching, especially through the writing of school books, and the permeation of the educational system with the new critical and historical ideas. It is too early yet, I imagine, to say with any certainty what the result of this movement will be, and my contact with it was too short to enable me to form a just estimate of its possibilities. But it is, in its way, a new thing in Asia : it contrasts quite directly not only (to take an example at random) with the spirit in which the scholars of the Araya Somaj are examining the Vedas, but also with the attitude of the Japanese towards their own national origins. Nowhere, perhaps, in the world is criticism held back less by motives of fear than in China.

The work of this new literary and historical school is unfortunately known to me only through the accounts of those in touch with it, for my ignorance of the language gave me no opportunity for closer contact. There is, however, in the Universities of China, a spirit of freedom and enquiry, and a willingness to experiment which cannot be hid from the most casual foreign observer. It is difficult perhaps for a European to realise what a revolution in social thought is implied by the coming of co-education in the colleges. Interest

in economics, and to some extent in psychology, is very wide-spread, and is being prosecuted with a fearlessness and a willingness to accept conclusions which are entirely characteristic of the Chinese scholar at his best.

Side by side with so much that is modern and Western, and in no sense unified with it, one comes across examples of an older Chinese art and drama. I was much interested in my visit to a theatre in the outskirts of Peking, where I saw two or three plays of a traditional character. I understand that a somewhat sharp distinction has grown up between these old dramas and the works of the modern school. The older plays are clearly more formal in type and expression, both in the matter of writing and action, and in the manner of acting. Some interesting conventions of the art were explained to me by my Chinese friends, and well illustrated by the plays I saw. For instance, there seems to be a great difficulty in selecting incident. For this reason, the "unity of time" is strangely exaggerated and the play is also lengthened to meet the impossibility of "skipping" anything which occurs during the time of action. The most trivial incidents seem, from the Western standpoint, to interfere with the main interest. There is also a fairly obvious use of symbolism, with which the very slight stage properties are eked out. For instance, a doorway is indicated by stepping high over an imaginary block of wood, which would, if it were real, lie between the door-posts. A wall between two rooms is implied by the actors on each side of it pointedly ignoring the possibility of any communication between them. The gesture of the actors is very formal, and, in its way, graceful. Each new character,

when introduced, pirouettes round the stage in a manner grave or gay, according to the characterisation, and makes elaborate bows to the audience—the action of the play being meanwhile interrupted. The musical accompaniment is very strident to Western ears; gongs play a large part, and are strenuously beaten at every moment of crisis. The theatre itself is in a state of continual turmoil. Conversations are carried on in no measured tones. Friends use the performance freely to exchange calls upon each other, and to entertain one another to tea and fruit. In short, the drama seems to the Westerner to have become even more an excuse for a social occasion than with us; and in the case of the traditional plays, there would, I imagine, be no loss of the thread of the action through this continual interruption, for everyone knows the plays almost by heart.

During my short visit to Canton, I saw in a roof-garden, on the top of a large store, some of the old puppet plays. Large dolls—almost life-size, in fact—are worked from behind a large wooden screen. There is in the mechanism nothing so delicate as I saw, for instance, in the Japanese marionettes; but every part of the doll is controlled by wires and levers, and the formally graceful gesture of the Chinese stage is very cleverly reproduced. The subject of these plays seems always to be traditional, and to deal for the most part with such topics as social customs and family quarrels. Here, too, the most strident music was played, and during the whole of the performance tea was served at small tables. The large room was filled with a continual clamour,—conversation, laughter, the clatter of

the serving-boys who filled up the tea-bowls with hot water, and passed round scalding hot towels with which the guests wiped the perspiration from face and hands. Such a scene is very typical of the strange mixture of old and new to be found in China. The store on the top of which I saw this performance was an obvious imitation of American models. The view of Canton which could be obtained from the roof-garden showed few traces of modernity: pagodas rising up on the horizon, and the whole of the foreground covered with narrow streets, somewhat decrepit temples, and oddly graceful tiled roofs; in the middle distance one could see the river, where modern steam-boats and ancient junks lay side by side. An even more striking contrast of the same kind is provided by the places of entertainment known as "The New World" in Shanghai and in Hankow—huge blocks, given over to a strange medley of bazaar and theatre, eating-house and shooting-gallery, where plays possibly as old as anything in China are given in surroundings which recall the cheaper stores of some American city.

In Peking I had the great good fortune one evening to see a representation of shadow plays. These were given in the garden of the house of a Manchu lady doctor. At one end an impromptu theatre was built, something like a Punch and Judy show, but larger, and with a paper screen in place of the stage. Behind this screen lamps were lighted. The figures used were made, I am told, of donkeys' hide, so prepared as to be transparent, and brightly coloured. They were provided with a mechanism similar to that of the puppets, arms, legs and heads all being capable of rapid movement.

These figures were inserted between the lamps and the screen, thus forming a kind of inverted cinema. Some of the figures were human ; others represented animals of various kinds, including dragons. The subjects of the plays were generally of a moral character ; for instance, I saw a play which represented the struggle of a spider—the symbol of evil—with dragons—the symbol of good. In the course of this play both spider and dragons underwent odd changes. The play ended in a terrific fight, at the conclusion of which the spider was burnt to ashes. At this point I peeped behind the screen, and saw wisps of burning paper being violently agitated. The rapidity of the movement of the play at times was almost incredible, and the delicate manipulation of the miniature figures was very charming. The setting in which these plays were given was most attractive. The performance started about eight o'clock on the evening of a hot summer day. The pleasant garden in which it was held was lighted only by two paper lanterns, one of the ordinary " Chinese " shape, the other representing a huge fish. Few things during this year of travel left upon me a deeper impression of the graceful use of symbolism, and at the same time of great remoteness from anything one had ever dreamt of.

During my stay in China, I saw a good many schools and colleges, some under the control of the Chinese Government, others maintained by foreigners, for the most part Americans. Nowhere perhaps was formalism more universal or powerful than in the old system of Chinese schools. As is well-known, the access to all posts of importance in the Government was through an

examination. The last of the old Examination Halls in which these tests were held are now being pulled down. It is difficult, however, to destroy as easily the tradition of formalism which is so deep-rooted. For instance, the teaching of history or of literature is still, I gather, carried on to a great extent on the old lines, and must be so until a supply of suitable books, and, still more important, of teachers trained in modern methods, is available. The present standards are very uneven ; in many schools which I saw, the teaching of English, for instance, was done in accordance with the best modern methods, and I am told that the same is true of the attempt to make the Mandarin dialect the national language of China. But side by side with such classes are others in which the history of China is still taught by a master in just the same way as he himself learnt it in his youth, both as regards the content and the method of teaching. There are already in existence several Training Colleges of somewhat varying quality, but they in turn are dependent upon the Secondary Schools, and here improvement is bound to be slow. The most hopeful sign in Chinese education is the serious attempt which is now being made to think out a definite policy, in which the best modern methods of Europe and America will be adapted to the needs of China, and especially to the relation of education in school to the whole task of reconstructing the national tradition. It is upon this side of the educational problem that the greatest stress is laid in the report of the recent Commission, and serious attempts are being made to bring about a close co-operation between educationalists and students of social problems.

In one college in Peking, I found that social education has an accepted place in the syllabus, and throughout China groups of men and women are engaged upon the study of social conditions. Undoubtedly the strongest influence in educational circles is that of America. The universities and schools founded by Americans in China naturally follow fairly closely the lines of their parent institutions. For instance, one finds the buildings situated round a "campus," and the student in his or her second year is known as a "sophomore." Nor is this merely a question of terminology; the courses are organised for the most part on American models, great stress is laid upon the lecture system, and from the English standpoint the system of "options" is fairly wide. For sheer efficiency along their own lines, the best of these universities and colleges will compare very favourably with similar institutions in any country in the world. The natural link between America and China is provided by the "returned students"—that is, Chinese who have studied in America—from whose ranks a proportion of the staff of the "American" universities and colleges is drawn, though posts of direction are generally held by Americans.

The educational work of America in China is not confined to schools and colleges; it includes also very valuable pioneer work in such matters as public health. The Rockefeller Foundation in Peking is a magnificent example of this kind of work at its best. It includes a large hospital, with medical and nursing schools attached. It is thus directly responsible for the training of the personnel of the public health movement, but its function is much wider than this, for it is intended to

be a research centre, and it is already doing valuable work upon some of the maladies to which the Chinese seem peculiarly subject.

The Council of Health Education, with headquarters in Shanghai, is also doing very valuable work. Perhaps the most striking of its activities is the fight against cholera, which has been waged with much initiative and imagination. As an example of this kind of work, it may be mentioned that the Dragon-boat Festival was used as an occasion for propaganda. Figures representing the cholera germ were introduced into the procession customary at such times, public lectures of a very simple type were given, and a great deal of intensive personal work was done. The result was a measurable decrease in the number of deaths from cholera in this area, and the method is one capable of wide extension, for it bases modern scientific propaganda upon the popular rule of pageantry and symbolism. This is only one example of the kind of work which is being done by such Societies under American direction.

It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the peaceful penetration of China by America. The Americans, as a race, are notoriously self-confident and firm in their belief in themselves and their standards. Such a mentality cannot fail to influence very deeply a developing nation like China, and there is in progress nothing less than the permeation of Chinese thought, at its point of contact with modern studies, by the American outlook and method. It is a curious speculation what might have happened if the contact of England had been with China rather than with India, and that of America with India. The Chinese are a

people intensely interested in activity, and so, one would think, specially receptive of the kind of civilisation for which America stands. They do not seem to re-act against "efficiency" in the way that one finds in large sections of Indian society, where the machine is dreaded as subversive of the standards upon which all that is most characteristic in Indian life depends. I imagine, too, that American influence is the more acceptable because its spread depends in no sense upon direct political or military power; it must win its way by sheer superiority as a thing in itself. When to this intellectual penetration is added a very definite bid for the markets of China, it is clear that the cultural influence of America is bound to be a determining factor in the building of the modern Chinese nation.

Perhaps it is easy to over-rate the importance of superficial signs. Yet it is extraordinary how easily the Young Chinese takes on the trappings of American civilisation. You may see him in any office you like in Shanghai or Hankow or Peking, sitting at a broad-topped American desk, surrounded by filing cases and card indexes. American business texts may often be seen hanging upon the walls, and he himself is often clothed in a suit of American cut, American-made boots, and the inevitable horn-rimmed glasses. To all this is generally added a distinct American accent. It is only fair to say that he has generally also absorbed a considerable amount of American efficiency, and once one has accustomed oneself to the phenomenon, one realises very clearly the great value such a type may have for a country at the stage of development of modern China—for one of her supreme needs is a body of men in touch

with both worlds : near enough to the origins of Chinese civilisation and yet close enough to the methods of modern education and modern business to be able to work out some kind of synthesis between them.

The industrial development of China is one of the most astonishing performances of modern time. The two features which strike the observation of the casual visitor are the rapidity of the movement and its unevenness. Factories of a most modern type can be seen side by side with small domestic workshops in which hand-looms are worked without even a mechanical device for passing the shuttle across. Factories in which the very latest machinery from Europe and America has been installed, with "saw-roofs" to mitigate the violence of the summer sun, and fans for extracting all fluff from the air—such buildings as these may stand side by side with others in which boys and girls from eight years up work incredibly long hours in surroundings so crowded and filthy that it is impossible to describe them in detail. I found this contrast not only in the rapidly-growing industrial towns of Hankow and Wu-chang, but also in Shanghai on the very borders of the European Concessions. Shanghai, in fact, has recently been the scene of a struggle, which both in its light and shade is the most striking example I have come across of the industrial re-making of Asia. I was shown round the cotton-mills owned by a British firm. I found that children—boys and girls together—of eight or nine upwards, were working eleven to thirteen hour shifts, day and night alternately. The member of the firm who showed me round spoke with much pride of the

achievements of these children. He pointed out some who, he said, were doing work which in Europe would be undertaken by a skilled craftsman. On the conditions under which they worked he made no comment.

I had later an opportunity of discussing this appalling situation with a very gallant lady, an Englishwoman, who was even then in the midst of a great fight to remove this blot from the history of British commercial enterprise in the East. She told me of a strange contrast with which her work had brought her in touch. Those responsible for these factories were, from the social and commercial point of view, gentlemen in every way worthy of the traditions of British commerce. They were, individually, very ready to recognise the scandal of the existence of such conditions in workshops owned by Christian shareholders. At the same time, it was very difficult indeed to persuade them that the situation was one for which any solution could be found. They said that no firm which introduced more humane conditions could hope to keep its works running in the face of Chinese competition. Chinese manufacturers were then approached, and it was found that exactly the same excuse was given from their side: they said that it was impossible for Chinese managers to improve conditions, as they were already fighting for the market in which British firms had the upper hand. It is greatly to the honour of all concerned, and not least to that of this energetic and resourceful worker in a very difficult field, that a way of advance has been found. An appeal was first made to the Chinese Government in Peking, which passed a fairly satisfactory industrial code limiting hours and the age of employment, and requiring a

higher standard of conditions in factories and workshops. This code, however, was really not worth the paper upon which it was printed, as an effective measure. It is one of the difficulties in all Asiatic countries that the part played by administration is not sufficiently realised. There was in China no staff of trained inspectors who could be relied upon to report breaches of this new law. There was also a graver difficulty : even in serious criminal or political matters, the writ of Peking does not run outside the city and its immediate surroundings. Laws passed, then, by the Peking legislature have little value outside this area. At most they are the expression of a public conscience which has not yet found a means of bringing its standards to bear upon the details of industrial life.

How, then, could this code be made effective ? It was still open to both sides to say that, while they would obey the national regulations as soon as they became effective in the case of their rivals, they were in no better position than before in a competitive market, since the enforcement of the new laws was impossible.

Conferences were again resorted to. Ultimately, after many negotiations, an agreement was reached by consent ; and Shanghai can now show a very striking example of what is almost a new method of regulating industrial conditions—progress by means of treaties between the rivals concerned in a struggle for markets.

Another feature of this situation and its outcome is worthy of notice : the lady in question approached the problem from the standpoint of a training in economics, but the office she held in Shanghai at this time was that

of a secretary of the Y.M.C.A., and the force which was brought to bear upon the situation was quite definitely that of Christian public opinion. As I have suggested elsewhere, it is by its social implications, if at all, that the progress of Christianity in the East can be looked for; and the success of this movement in Shanghai is certainly a very striking example of the effectiveness of the method employed.

It is perhaps worth while to stress one point: it would be quite unfair to the more enlightened Chinese industrialists, whether Christian or not, to imply that the struggle was one between well-run mills owned by European Christians and badly-run mills owned by non-Christian Chinese. No such clear-cut division could be made; the fact is, that both Chinese and European show the same diversity of standard. On the other hand, it was quite definitely and specifically Christian public opinion in Shanghai which achieved a remarkable change, which one hopes is only just beginning; for although hours and ages of employment have now been definitely curtailed, the standard is still far below that which the most backward employer would be allowed to maintain in an English mill at home. The importance of the change lies rather in the method by which it has been brought about than in the absolute results reached up to date, though these are considerable, and of the greatest moment for the whole future of European methods of industry as applied to Asia.

The economic problem in China, while it covers only a portion of the field of reconstruction, is crucial to it; economic re-organisation cuts right across the ancient sanctions upon which the civilisation and coherence of

China have been based, and notably across the organisation of the "big family."

Further, the vast size and great population of China, as well as her geographical position, make the solution of the Chinese puzzle the most important question now at issue in the Far East. The five weeks I spent in China were very happy. It may be that a casual traveller, like myself, passing rapidly from one circle of friends to another, and receiving everywhere the kindest of welcomes, and the most generous hospitality, gains a view which would not be borne out by a longer residence and closer study, but the impression I carried away was certainly one of great hopefulness. I find in China elements of real stability, coupled with a sense of adventure and a willingness to take risks, and no nation which possesses this may long despair of its future.

I have had enough personal experience of the discomforts of the present disorder to feel sympathy with those "foreigners" resident in China who have suffered by it. At the same time, one hopes that whatever is done by the Powers to help forward the work of pacification and order, will have a single eye to the future unity and strength of Chinese civilisation.

(XXII) INDIA

(I)

Although (or perhaps because) I stayed nearly three months in India, I find that part of my tour the most difficult to write about. Several Englishmen who have lived for many years in different parts of the country, and know it well, have told me that, in their experience, the more one knows of India, the less one feels competent to speak with authority upon its many problems. I stayed just long enough, and saw just enough, to feel how complex the life of that great country is. India is essentially a "community of communities"; her ancient civilisation was built up on the relation of highly-organised groups, each with its own rights, customs and observances. The marked stratification of Hindoo society into Castes has always been its most obvious feature—so that the primary unit of organisation is not really local, but personal. Almost everywhere the Brahmin Caste is supreme, and performs priestly functions; and there is an out-caste class of "untouchables," who are the scavengers of the community. The Indian social ideal was static; development in the Western sense had little part in it. There is progress for the individual soul, but not for society. The Caste system admits of great local variations. Further, there are districts where the indigenous tribes survive in

considerable numbers ; in some cases (such as the Bhils I saw in Rajputana) these tribes live in most primitive conditions, in jungle clearings ; they hunt the jungle with bows and arrows, and for the rest live on wild fruits and herbs—for they have no settled agriculture. One theory of the much discussed origin of Caste sees in it a protective device against racial admixture with such peoples, a danger most obvious in the extreme South. The extent of the penetration of Hindoo society by the Mohammedan conquerors also varies greatly. The Hindoo social organisation had been fitted into a Moghul administrative system before it came under the observation of Europeans, upon the fall of that Empire.

The Indian peoples have also lived through an intense religious history, perhaps the most interesting phase of which was the triumph of Buddhism under Asoka, and the absorption of Buddhism into Hindooism—itself modified in the process—during the centuries which followed.

It is obvious that such an ancient and complex society, spread over so wide an area, must present many features which perplex even the specialist, and entirely baffle the more superficial observer. Nowhere have I had so many questions to ask, such conflicting answers, and such difficulty in coming to any conclusion as to the explanation even of simple things ; nowhere has the search been more fascinating ; and nowhere have I found friends of all races and faiths more ready to give me their time, to offer me hospitality, and to help me to understand something of their traditions or beliefs or policies. Whatever problems lie before the Indian peoples and those who are working with them, there can be no more

hopeful augury for their solution than the fund of goodwill and good fellowship upon which I have been privileged to draw so largely.

By reason of its geographical position, its racial origins, the age and continuity of its traditions, and its close contact with (may one say ?) perhaps the greatest of colonising peoples, India seems peculiarly fitted to work towards a solution of that crucial problem of the present day—the relation between the civilisations of Europe and traditional oriental cultures. England has long been represented in India by the very best that her manhood can offer, in physique, intellect and tradition of public service. Their numbers, though ludicrously small in relation to the modern conception of their task, were perhaps sufficient for the work of government as it was envisaged at the time when the Service was designed. The fact is that the work has grown in the doing out of all recognition. The Civil Service was never intended to be—what it has perforce become—the interpreter of the mind of Europe to the mind of India. It is a stupendous task to impose upon a body of men already overburdened with administrative duties.

“What does India want of Europe ?” or, “What does Europe feel that she has to give India ?” I asked that question many times, and got many different replies ; yet I did not feel at the end that I had reached an answer, nor did I feel that those who gave me their views were completely satisfied with their own solution. Another line of approach gave more concrete results : “What is there in European culture, as expressed in India, which is alien to fundamental Indian ideals ?” Here again, the answers varied ; but among Indians at

any rate there was some approach to a concensus of opinion, and not a few Englishmen expressed the same view. Perhaps I can best summarise this by giving in its general sense the reply of one of the greatest workers in the field of cultural understanding. At a time of much strain and some bitterness, he spoke simply and frankly, and with much hopefulness. He told me that the West had brought the East an ideal which was not natural to it. India could never compete with Europe in European modes of life : the climate and many discomforts made it impossible for her to have the boundless energy of the West ; and in trying to imitate she had lost her faith in herself and in her own different powers. Organisation would never be her strong point ; her own approach to life was intuitive rather than rational ; her strength lay in her power of living in the presence of the Eternal—a power which even simple, uneducated men sometimes possessed in great measure, but which she was losing through a vain attempt to imitate Western standards and criteria of success. The West had come to India at a time when she had lost her own faith, and so had weakened the faith of India. The East must find some way of keeping and reviving her own modes of self-expression—as shown for instance in the beauty of the things she makes for every-day use : “ To-day, alas, for water pots one sees kerosene tins—and they have no shame.” She must recover her spontaneous devotion to great men and their memories, her faith in the supreme power of personality as the means and the aim of education. She must learn again how to set free creative energy for literature and art and life ; and she must win back her power of living in the presence of the Eternal.

In these ways India could find her soul and her mission. She must fulfil herself, not by retiring into isolation, or by rejecting the overtures of the West—for the West has much that she lacks ; but by seeking in equal partnership with Westerners the synthesis which the World needs, giving as well as taking, teaching as well as learning ; and this, not through the adjustment of political systems, but by the personal contact and collaboration of the best minds of East and West.

As an illustration of this, it is interesting that while non-co-operation seems quite definitely to have broken down, the name of Gandhi is still a power in the land, less as the leader of a political policy than as the embodiment of a personal ideal. Acutely conscious as she is of her inability to compete with the West under conditions set by the West itself, India finds in such a personality a justification of her faith in her own power to give to the World achievements of a different and not a lower order.

The elements to be reconciled in the case of India are even more complex than in China. The geographical area is immense, though time-distances are shortened by a good system of trunk railways. The race-map of India is a patch-work. The marked difference between Northern and Southern types is a factor of small difficulty compared with local variations ; races are inextricably mingled so far as their geographical distribution goes, but there is little inter-marriage. Language follows race, and, to some extent, religion. In a Secondary School in Hyderabad (Deccan) no less than five modern Indian languages are taught as vernaculars.

Economic variations are equally marked, and are often supported by religions and social sanctions. I

happened to be in Lahore at the time of the Economic Conference, and I was fortunate in being able to meet a number of those who are working at Indian problems. There seems to be greater diversity of conditions even than the great distances would lead one to expect. The one generally true fact is the rural character of Indian life. Upon the prosperity of the village all depends, including the resources available for the upkeep of the Government, and for the work of development. It is very difficult to find any satisfactory index of prosperity, but it was suggested to me that the amount of the indebtedness of the cultivator to the local moneylender is a better guide than, for instance, the produce of any form of taxation : for the distribution of wealth, and the extent to which resources are mortgaged, are the most important factors. Systems of land tenure vary greatly, for the most part as the result of local custom, but also to some extent for historical reasons, for which the most famous is perhaps the establishment of the Zemindars of Bengal as landowners. Acute sub-division of holdings seems to be general, though there is much variation in size ; the system of division is consecrated by Hindoo law and custom, and Indians seemed agreed that no direct change is possible. In the Punjab, especially, a successful movement for the consolidation of strips is in progress, and in many villages the map has been entirely altered.

The Co-operative movement has also made good progress here, chiefly in the form of credit societies, controlled as far as possible by local groups of villagers. The aim is to provide capital to free the villager from the money-lender, and to develop the power of common

action and responsibility. Although the value of such societies is admitted on all hands, there is a division of opinion as to how far their development should be the first aim of the movement, some holding that success in handling credit cannot be expected until the power of corporate action has been developed by simpler forms of effort.

In connection with Dr. Tagore's Asram at Santiniketan, interesting experiments in village reconstruction are being carried out. The problem in this part of Bengal is somewhat specialised, owing to its nearness to Calcutta, which is playing the inevitable rôle of a big city in converting the countryside into a source of supply for its own needs. The training of boys as Scouts has been made the starting point; village fire-brigades have followed; tanks have been cleared and repaired; and the way has been opened for experiments in improved methods of cultivation: communal effort being encouraged in each case. In many centres, the Joint Boards set up by the Reform Scheme are actually taking a grip of local affairs; but progress is necessarily slow.

Only a very small proportion of the population of India is employed in factories. In certain centres, however, and notably in Bombay and Calcutta, large mills and workshops exist. They are, for the most part, a reproduction of European industries, with little adaptation to Indian conditions: the most noticeable differences are that the shops are less specialised and more self-contained, and that the lower grades of labour are often hired through an Indian foreman who is responsible for these workers. Machine-industry forms

no real part of Indian life as yet, though the influence of machine-made goods, mostly imported, in hastening the decay of hand-industry and craftsmanship, is already marked. But the development has already gone far enough to create a slum problem in a few large towns. Non-co-operators attempted to expel machinery from Indian life ; but short of such a radical reversion, there has been little constructive thinking on the subject. India is not awake to the danger of a reproduction of the worst features of Western industrialism, and though here and there admirable welfare work of a Western type is being done, there is no attempt to face the question as a whole.

In Bombay, and also in Delhi, definite schemes of social service have been inaugurated. I did not see the work in Bombay, though I came across its results and influence indirectly through friends of the Delhi movement. I understand that there are in Bombay some fifteen paid workers living in the poorest quarters, and giving their whole time to social welfare of a pioneer type. These workers are trained at Poona, by the Servants of India, the course lasts five years, and they pledge themselves to serve for twenty years.

At Delhi, the " Central Social Service " body consists of a few leading citizens who do the work themselves. This society was formed at the time of the great influenza epidemic, when the religious social service leagues, which usually confine themselves to the organisation of festivals and the like, all assisted in relief, and worked at the clinics which were set up, and at the task of burying the victims of the outbreak. An attempt was made to perpetuate this organisation, and to direct it towards the

work of general social service ; but the old divisions proved too strong. The Society was reconstituted upon a narrower basis ; it now consists of some eighteen members, whose activities often meet with vigorous opposition ; in fact, there is more than a spice of physical danger in work of this kind.

War has been waged upon the cocaine traffic in Delhi. Through the activities of the Society, the existing regulations have been more stringently enforced. Members of the Society have visited suspected houses, in the guise of purchasers, and have thus obtained evidence on which prosecutions can be based.

The sale of alcoholic drink has also been regulated. Only restaurants and hotels can now sell drink " open " : shops must retail it in bottles, and must close on festivals.

Another activity of the Society which throws a curious side-light upon Indian conditions is the protection of third-class passengers. It is not possible for the Society to secure for these passengers better accommodation on trains, and they continue to be herded together in the carriages provided for them in a way which is without parallel on any other railway by which I travelled. It has, however, extended to them a much-needed protection. In a country where only a fraction of the population can read, the clerk has a social and economic ascendancy which goes far towards explaining the exaggerated veneration with which his office is regarded. It is said that it is by no means uncommon for illiterate peasants and workmen to be given a ticket for a station other than that to which they have paid the fare, and subsequently to be turned off the train when the destination to which they have been booked is reached. It

is alleged that the police are unable or unwilling to prevent such frauds. Members of the Society attend at the stations, and help the passengers to buy tickets.

Such work often implies real heroism on the part of those who undertake it, for it is naturally opposed by every means, on the part of those whose illicit gains are interfered with. From the Indian standpoint, the activities of the Society have a further significance, for they are undertaken by men often of high caste on behalf of those who may belong to the "untouchable" classes. The implications of such work, then, are even more important than its concrete results, valuable as these are.

The variety of Indian political systems is very confusing. Besides the fundamental division into British and Native States, the latter form a carefully graded system, differing in size (from a few square miles to the huge State of Hyderabad), in power, and in internal economy. Their constitutions are, in most cases, protected by treaty rights, and the new "diarchy" does not apply to them, though it has inspired many changes in a constitutional direction. In British India, it has been my privilege to see at work some of the councils set up under the Reform scheme. Whatever may be the merits or faults of their composition, or of the constitution of which they form a part, they are performing a work of political education which is of great importance, though also of unprecedented difficulty: the work of grafting the tradition and method of British Parliamentary government upon a society whose history (so far as I know) provides no kind of basis for such developments. The maturity to which some of these bodies have already

grown is amazing : their sense of Order, and of their own young tradition ; their respect for precedent ; their power of restraint, even at moments of strain. Their debating power, though remarkable, is less surprising, for India has a long legal tradition, which she has known how to turn to account. Yet, in spite of all, it remains to be proved that Parliamentaryism is one of the very few institutions suited to all humanity, or that it is a mode of expression in which India can find herself. A grave difficulty is that the House is apt to be divided along lines of cleavage representing social and religious groups outside, whose proportions are more or less fixed. Perhaps the future of the Indian conciliar system depends upon its power to evolve a party system in the Western sense. There is little sign of that at present ; though, at Madras, the electoral success of a Hindoo non-Brahmin party is interesting and perhaps significant.

It is not only in India that the Law is a great school of politics. European countries, and not least England herself, can show a great number of leading politicians trained in legal studies. From several points of view, the lawyer comes to politics well-equipped. Modern psychological theory throws some doubt upon the extent to which the older view of " mental training " was sound, so that it is perhaps unsafe to insist upon the mental discipline which the study of Law provides. But, after all, much of the work of a Legislature is bound up with legal conceptions, and law-making is an intricate and delicate business, in which the advice of those who administer Law in one way or another must of necessity be taken ; and from advice to control is often an easy stage in such matters, especially in a country whose

democratic political tradition is young, and its legal tradition long and of high standing. Besides the inherent difficulties of law-making, there are in India grave questions of a technical kind, especially the conflicts between the different systems of Law—civil and religious—which various strands in her history have contributed. In particular, questions arising out of the laws of inheritance, and out of land tenure, are peculiarly complicated; and it is important that there are, in Hindooism and Mohammedanism, two great systems, both of which have retained their hold upon a range of human activity as wide as that regulated by ecclesiastical law in Europe in its palmyest days.

Through the courtesy of friends, I had several opportunities of being present in Court when cases were being heard. I was greatly impressed by the atmosphere of these Courts: the simple dignity of much of the proceedings, the great public interest which attracted even to highly technical cases a large attendance of the general public, the accumulation of precedent which speaks of a very ancient and highly-organised civilisation. The Indian nation seems to be vastly interested in litigation, and my enquiries tended to confirm this impression. I understand that the amount of litigation which goes on is a curse, and a severe drain upon the resources of the country. On the other hand, it is undoubted that the practice of Law has been invaluable in providing India with trained minds, bringing acute intellects to bear upon the concrete facts of her economic and social structure, and giving a priceless opportunity to her abler citizens for the exercise of their gifts. It is perhaps inevitable that, in India as elsewhere, a large proportion of the

members of the new Councils should be lawyers ; by profession and practice they are well qualified to advise her upon matters of grave moment which must inevitably arise at this crisis of her history. It is in part owing to this large legal element that the powers of debate of the new assemblies have already reached the surprising level of efficiency which they show. Yet perhaps this very ability in debate tends in some sort to conceal the importance of Administration, and to hide even from their members the gap which in all countries separates knowing from doing—political idealism from its concrete expression in institutions. A Chinese analogy suggests to me that one of the most serious obstacles to the attainment of efficient self-government will lie here.

(XXIII) INDIA

(2)

It is, perhaps, natural to look in the educational system for some deliberate attempt to reconcile East and West ; the result is disappointing. By a curious fatality, Indian education received its form at a time when education at home was passing through its most unlovely phase—payment by “results” measured statistically. The new University of London, then a purely examining body, was taken as the model for the Indian Universities. Examinations dominated everything. Instruction took place wholly in the colleges, and was of the lecture type ; there was little discussion, little personal touch between students and staff, and no individual teaching. To this general rule, there were some noble exceptions, but too few to change the type of instruction : the mass-production of interchangeable parts. If, to-day, Indian opinion under-rates the importance laid upon the development of personality in Western education, it is because the Western type of college in India did not, as a rule, train personality : it trained clerks. The criticism of that system is a commonplace in India to-day ; it has been enshrined in the voluminous report of a university commission, and its justice is almost universally recognised by those engaged in the educational service. There is, however, a more fundamental criticism levied against Western

education in the name of Indian tradition. The basis of the training of classical times was not an organised "college," but personal attachment to a beloved teacher; the student was primarily a disciple. The acquisition of formal knowledge was less considered than the unconscious imitation of an attitude of mind, a posture of the soul in its relation to things human and divine. Most of the teaching was incidental, its material provided by the common life of the "guru" and his followers. Such formal instruction as existed aimed at familiarising the pupil with the sacred traditions, and the books in which they were enshrined. Literacy was almost a by-product of this study, a training in logical thought resulted from the exposition of personal commentaries; the whole conception was rooted in the idea of the personal service of the teacher and the common life of the little community. It goes without saying that there were no recognised formal tests, no reports or statistics with regard to the schools, and no administrative machinery.

I was greatly interested in the criticisms and suggestions of a small group of teachers at Benares. Hindoos for the most part, they were engaged in elementary teaching in a mission school. They told me that India could not bear a wide extension of the present system (a conclusion borne out by recent budgets). The schools were producing a "middle-class," separated from the home life of their community and without prospects outside it. India was an agricultural country, but the present system was built upon urban models; it should be based upon the village. The object of education should be to fit the children for a normal,

healthy life within the community of which they form a part.

It is only fair to set against these criticisms the view of a member of the Servants of India of wide experience and great independence of mind. In his opinion, Indian education must follow the lines already laid down; these were, in the main, right. Alternative suggestions were vague; the open-air school had been tried and had failed. The old system of the residential group could not be revived, for parents would not consent. Even where, as in the new Hindoo University of Benares, the Government had given a free hand, the customary lines had been in the main followed.

A lady of long practice in educational work in the country told me that Western educationalists could never evolve a system suited to India. They had done their part, and, with examples of Western methods before them, Indians must themselves shape a policy to meet their own needs. It is to be noted that since education is one of the subjects now "transferred" to Indian control through a minister, there is ample scope for the modification of policy in the desired direction.

Within the Government system of education there is a wide-spread reform movement, though it labours under great handicaps, especially the demands of economy. The recommendations of the Sadler Commission have already borne fruit. The older type of university, an examining body as the centre of a group of affiliated colleges, is being broken up. The new "unitary" type of university aims at concentrating the higher teaching in its own hands, strengthening its control over the colleges, and enforcing residence. In

some places (notably at Lucknow) a serious attempt is being made to supplement lectures by tutorial work in small groups. The main difficulty (besides that of finance) is the strongly entrenched position of the affiliated colleges, which are perhaps naturally unwilling, in many cases, to abandon a practical autonomy, and to resign their higher teaching functions.

In view of such a variety of opinion, and practice, I was specially interested in a community which is based upon an attempt to bring together what is most valuable in East and West. I was fortunate in being able to spend two days in a visit to the "Asram" of Dr. Rabindranath Tagore at Santiniketan in Bengal. The central idea is to bring together a group of enthusiasts from East and West who have grasped the ideal of an international culture. The community is based upon the traditional ideal of personal discipleship and common life. There is a fairly large school, leading up to work of university standard. Perhaps the art teaching may best be taken as an example of method. Students attend no formal lectures. They observe and copy under guidance, and then pass on to creative work. For this, no model is used, and the pictures are thus, in a special sense, works of imagination. The results seemed admirable. I gather that the same kind of method is used in literary work. Atmosphere is everything, and the poet encourages selected men and women to come and live at the Asram, even if they are not teaching there, so long as they are pursuing some definite work of their own. In fact, the educational idea is essentially this: that moral and religious and æsthetic training is best done indirectly by unconscious

imitation. There seems to be little in the way of a fixed time-table or a regular system of study. I gathered that such subjects as geography and arithmetic were not formally taught to any great extent. The underlying idea that education should consist in the inspiration and setting free of creative impulses is fine and true.

I found it difficult to decide how far such a community and ideal could continue to exist apart from the power of a great personality. In that lies its strength, and perhaps also its weakness, and the difficulty of taking it as a model. There is, unfortunately, a limit to the number of students who can be directly inspired by personal contact with one man. Training through discipleship is a method whose very intensity and character must set bounds to the extent to which it can be used. But, as a protest against the faith in mere educational machinery, the value of Santiniketan can hardly be exaggerated.

There are undoubtedly many new creative forces stirring in India to-day, though it is difficult to estimate their significance, and impossible to forecast their future. It is only when one realises how deep is the Indian distrust of material values, bred in the bone through centuries of experience and teaching, that the full meaning of the modern movement appears. It is half-articulate, unsure of itself, disunited, often fantastic, from a Western standpoint. But all this is because its very existence is a radical break with the age-long tradition of repudiation and acquiescence, which has always turned the best minds of India in upon themselves, and withdrawn her creative impulses

from the effort to change environment to the task of freeing the individual soul from the chains of matter. The modern movement is based upon the *acceptance* of life : a call to be up and doing, to express, to create. In art, and perhaps also in literature, it is already becoming conscious. The modern school of painting admittedly draws its inspiration from classical Indian models. But if its content is for the most part traditional, it is re-interpreting the old symbolism, and in some cases taking present-day themes as its subject. One such picture, "The Call of the World," shows a woman leaving the Zenana ; timorous, almost groping, bewildered by the light, love of the old and fear and hope of the new, struggling for expression in her face. Another, "The Flame," is the picture of a young girl in the pride of the first consciousness of womanhood, carrying a lighted lamp on her head—a delightful study in warm browns and reds. In "The Wooing of Shiva," the consecration of human desires and fertility to the divine purposes is expressed in a traditional symbolism which has been robbed of its crudity. The real meaning of such a renaissance can be felt only by contrast with the very sources from which it draws its life—the traditional attitude to woman, for instance, as expressed in the very form of the greatest Indian architecture : the separation of public and private life, the zenana screen in priceless marble, in the fort at Agra, or its Hindoo counterpart at Ambère : the perfection of craftsmanship consecrated to the making of an impassable barrier.

It is in such a welter of movement and activity that India is faced with the task of reconstructing a national

ideal in which she can find and respect herself. The very wealth of material makes the work of selection difficult ; like the wise householder of the parable, she is seeking to bring out of her treasure-house things new and old. Thanks to the British connection, she can call directly and of right upon a fund of Western experience and ability. It is difficult, too, at the present time, to imagine any alternative basis of internal unity, to the British Raj. Yet, from another point of view, the political character of the connection is itself a complication ; for while, not so very long ago, it was leading India to accept uncritically anything put before her as Western, to-day it is in danger of causing just as uncritical a rejection of Western forms of expression.

It is no accident that India should be the scene of the most typical clash of ideals which Asia can show. If two developed national cultures were to be selected to stand for the old antitheses of action and meditation, America and India would justly fill the parts. The gap between Europe and India is less profound.

An Indian once told me that, in his view, while America was still in the stage of youthful optimism and an obsession with material and external values, the aftermath of the War marked the emergence of Europe into a new phase of growth, of which the marks were a certain disillusion and searching of heart. He confidently expected that with a further lapse of time Europe would come to recognise " Indian " values, and accept in full her message of the illusory character of material things. However that may be, I left India profoundly convinced that, for India herself, the

acceptance of Western values and criteria would be a disaster. For nations, no less than for individuals, who set themselves a task which contradicts their nature, there must be a nemesis.

Japan, and perhaps China, are moving rapidly (though not without protest) in the direction of the values of activity. India cannot follow them without selling her soul, and all that is best in her national life is in full revolt against even that measure of acceptance which has been made. This revolt finds its counterpart in the political sphere; but its roots lie deeper. The fullest measure of political independence would still leave India face to face with substantially the same problem. I have been driven, at times, to think it possible that, in some future age—perhaps nearer than one imagines—India alone in Asia may stand for the values which the West has thought of as “Eastern,” but which, even now, are specifically Indian.

There can be no richer field for the study of social, economic, and even æsthetic problems than modern India. But it would be untrue to suggest that it is in such problems that its chief interest and attraction lies. The modern movement is wide-spread, but it scarcely appears on the surface: it must be sought out, and the surface is so seductive that one has to rouse oneself to the effort of search and analysis. One’s impulse is rather to browse round the bazaars, to linger in the shady corners of mosques and temples, and to enjoy the ceaseless coming and going, the play of gesture, the hundred and one happenings, slight in themselves, but fascinating in their very strangeness. Such days at Jaipur, or Peshawar, or Benares, were among the

pleasantest I remember. Jaipur is a feast of unimaginable colour. Peshawar has all the charm of the gateways of the world—I have never turned back with such regret as I did from the Khyber, in full view of the blue mountains of Afghanistan, with the great Road at one's feet, and the wind of the hills in one's face. Benares is the strangest, saddest and most baffling thing I have ever known.

(XXIV) NORTH AMERICA

The following brief and superficial account of the United States and Canada, as I saw them, demands some sort of apology. I divided between the two countries one short month—of which a week was spent in the train. The reason for this was simply my fixed determination to re-visit North America at more leisure. It is a far cry to Asia, and I can hardly hope that I shall be so fortunate as to be able to repeat my visit, at least for many years to come ; but America is fairly accessible within the limits of a University vacation. It was this consideration in the main which led me to prolong my stay in Asia until the last moment which would leave me time for a short visit to some parts of Canada and the United States.

I am not sure whether I was more impressed by the unity of North American civilisation or by the differences which separate Canada and the States, or East and West. From the point of view of Europe, they have much in common, both in circumstances and in social habits and organisation. One's impression of any country must depend to some extent upon the experience from which one approaches it, and I imagine that, if I had sailed to North America from Southampton, instead of from Yokohama, the contrasts it presented would have appeared in a somewhat different light. I landed at Victoria, and then passed along the Canadian Pacific

Railway from Vancouver to the Rockies, "stopping off" for a night to visit some friends on a ranch in the "Dry Belt." After a few very pleasant days at Lake Louise and Banff, I ran straight across to Winnipeg. From this point, I first entered the United States, and made a short stay at Chicago, then crossed the border again to Toronto. From here, I travelled to New York, visiting Niagara on the way. I took ship from New York to Providence, and so reached Boston, and finally travelled by rail to Montreal, whence I sailed for Home.

In so rapid a journey, I could only catch glimpses of a way of life which seems, oddly enough, as remote in some ways from that of Europe as it is surprisingly like in others. Yet, thanks to the help of many friends—some old, some new, and many whose friendship I owe to that camaraderie of the Road which is nowhere more readily given than here—the month was among the most crowded I passed, and I left behind me with real regret that part of America which did not accompany me across the Atlantic. Without further apology, I will try and set down what can only be at best my very cursory (though vivid) impressions.

Perhaps no country I visited—not even China—gave the sense of sheer space which one gets on crossing the prairie. For thirty-six hours, the train runs through a great belt which begins by striking one as very definitely characterised, and ends by impressing one as featureless through sheer monotony—plains broken by the slightest of undulations, miles of dead-straight, dead-level track, tapering imperceptibly to a vanishing-point on the horizon. The lights of Regina were clearly visible for thirty miles after we passed the city. It was early

August in a year which then promised almost a record harvest, and the limitless fields of green were in striking contrast both with the bold, rugged outlines of the Rockies I had left a day behind, and with my memory of certain desolate wastes both in the West and the East of Europe. In spite of what I learnt later of the serious economic difficulties through which Canada was passing, and the pessimism of a Montreal newspaper, then publishing articles under the lurid title of "the Whisper of Death," the prairie left an abiding impression of prosperity.

From another point of view, one realised that between East and West there is a great gulf fixed. In contrast with the variety of industrial and social development found in so small an area as Great Britain, it is unity, rather than diversity, which is surprising in Canada—the existence of a strong national sentiment, and a growing community of interest and ideal. Yet the Pacific coast-strip and its ports, the prairie, the great cities of Winnipeg and Toronto, and the maturer civilisation of the East, with its large French population, present very distant social and economic types. I was astonished to find that in Canada the "draw" of the town is already felt, even to an extent which is realised as a problem. Winnipeg and Toronto are fine cities, with lofty blocks of offices and many noble buildings, broad streets, well-kept parks, and a developed civic sense. The "pioneer" spirit survives, but it expresses itself in schemes of welfare and public health, and social betterment. There is no slum area, and destitution is (rightly) regarded as a strange and exceptional anomaly. Even in Montreal, I was told with more surprise than anger of the case of a man, down on

his luck and out-at-elbow, who had traded on his condition to obtain a suit of clothes and a meal which he accepted at their market value, and not as a means to a "job." It is a clean, robust, confident civilisation ; but the town is already just beginning to play the part which it has always taken in older countries, and to claim many of the keener and younger men and women—in short, to become an end in itself, and not merely the focus of the economic and social life of the countryside. With this change has gone a tendency to Americanisation : the super-Cinema, the drug-store, the soda-fountain, the "Quick Lunch" counter, open all night, the "cafeteria," the shoe-shine, the beauty-shop, and the prevalence of ice-cream, peanuts, and chewing-gum, are symbols. In some cases, American enterprise is responsible for the spread of these customs and institutions ; in others, a parallel development has no doubt taken place. Most of these things are admirable ; none the less, they represent the coming of an urban element into Canadian life, and the inspiration of the American city can be directly traced.

On the other hand, Canada is almost entirely free from the kind of officialdom which is rapidly growing in the United States. There is apparently in the States a tolerance of regimentation which is quite alien to the Canadian spirit. Americans seem to me to expect from many of their officials a curious kind of brusqueness and even a certain deliberate superiority to the personal convenience (for instance) of those passing through Customs or any other official gateway. I believe that, in a sense, this official manner is felt to be a bulwark of democracy, and a symbol of its war on privilege. This

probably accounts for the ease with which even such vexatious inquisitions as are implied in the enforcement of Prohibition are accepted by the American citizen. On the other hand, it is widely admitted that the sanctity of law has been undermined by the widespread evasion which has followed. Even in England, a breach of the speed regulations is no disgrace. In New York (though not, I understand, in all parts of the States) it is really a matter of honour to provide drinks for one's friends. In an office not a hundred miles from Broadway, I was given some excellent Scotch whisky—with formalities which might have fittingly surrounded the ceremony of initiation into some secret political club. I was asked:—"Do you drink water?" On replying "Sometimes," I was led into the inner office, and water was sent for. The door was then carefully closed; a glance through the window showed that the only "cop" in sight was copping the traffic. A large safe, made to contain precious documents and fastened by an elaborate combination of keys was then opened, and disclosed a complete wine-cellar in miniature! Its owner gazed upon the bottles with proper pride, and delivered a short lecture on the contents and their history, with excursions into the wider aspects of boot-legging, whisky-analysis and the like. Finally a "medicine glass" was produced; a short way from the bottom a frosted ring was labelled "ladies." I received the more generous portion indicated by the higher ring, labelled "gentlemen." . . It was excellent whisky.

Throughout North America, but especially in the United States, I found a fear of infection, almost amounting to "bug-phobia." In Toronto, the fines for spitting

on the street are really enforced, and even the American is making desperate, though not entirely successful, attempts to overcome the habit. A casual acquaintance on a boat offered me a "life-preserver," which proved to be a super-strong peppermint, encased in "silver-paper" to keep the strength in. A pleasant product of the admirable health campaign is the Druggist, who is no longer, as with us, merely a source of medicaments and tooth-paste, but also (at the other side) a vendor of ice-cream in its infinite variety, and even, in places, of coffee and "club breakfasts." In the jargon of the day, he has been "dissociated" from disease, and "re-associated" with health.

The regulations governing public hygiene seem more stringent than with us: for instance, no club may provide its members with individual cloth towels; these must be made of paper and stored in a distributing machine. Public drinking fountains "bubble up" only when pressed, and then emit a jet of water which can be drunk without touching the cup with one's lips. In the Pullman, "dixie cups" of pasteboard can be obtained from a machine. The movement for physical welfare is running very strongly, and seems, to a great extent, spontaneous and independent of the fashion-motive. I met many young American town-dwellers as far afield as Lake Louise, intent upon various forms of the "wild life"—riding, climbing, "hiking" and ready for any form of sport. They certainly take their pleasures strenuously, and set themselves a high standard of activity. A young American with whom I climbed a small mountain said on our return: "Wal, I reckon you're some hiker if you can keep up with me": a

“boomerang” compliment of a pleasantly naïve variety.

In Chicago and New York, I was surprised to find that the speed of life approximates much more closely to the cinema caricature than I could have thought possible. When I was in Chicago, the Press was celebrating the first two days for many months when no-one had been killed in a street accident. Not only the “automobiles,” but the foot-passengers, are held up by the restraining dam of the “traffic cop” at the crossings, and the stream, when released, surges across the road in a formation for which a Rugby scrum provides the only known analogy. Express lifts really do drop with terrifying rapidity from the twentieth floor ; and even so, the interval is long enough for the lift humorist among the passengers to “get across” a volley of jokes, or for the irrepressible to indulge in a half-minute flirtation.

New York City is a gigantic card-index, a whole-scale map of itself. Fifth Avenue bisects it into East and West, and the numbered Streets have block-numbers, symmetrically under one another—so that all the 2,000’s, for instance, are in line. The “subway” stations carry the same numbers as the streets. It is thus the easiest city in the world to find one’s way about.

The typical New York hotel is itself an American city in miniature—its box-like rooms, in which three times the conveniences of an English hotel are fitted into one-third the space, are indistinguishable except by the numbers on the doors, and the carefully-chosen “individual pictures” (in identical frames) which adorn its walls. There is really no need to go outside the hotel for any, even of the luxuries of life, and within the same building it is possible to follow widely different

standards of living. As a clearly-worded statement on the dressing-table informs guests, they can dine formally in the Dining Room (appointments indicated), less formally in the Fountain Room, tête-à-tête in the Roof Garden, or quietly in the bedroom itself (supplement \$1). The breakfast-menu (also under glass) is on the bedside table. A newspaper "with the compliments of the hotel," is thrown under the door at an early hour; to its first page is affixed a coloured strip of paper, with some cheerful greeting or snappy advice: for instance: "Good morning!" "Say it with flowers: (Roses sent by telegram to any part of the World: Store No. 17 in the basement)"; or "Send Her your photograph," followed by the address of the photographer. Hot, cold and ice-water are laid on to the miniature bathroom, whose shower-bath has four "speeds"—hot, warm, cold and stop, controlled by a simple switch. A single pull on a small brass chain over the bed-head lights a reading-lamp; a second pull turns it out. The door of the room is a "servidor": hollow, furnished with coat-hangers. The guest opens his side, and places within his suit, boots, etc. A ring on the inevitable 'phone summons a bell-boy—or, for all I know, a full-blown tailor—who removes the clothes from the outside (without entering the room or in any way disturbing its occupant). Each floor of the hotel is a postal district, with its sorting office for incoming letters (all room numbers on the sixth floor begin with a 6, as in duty bound). Outgoing letters descend by a shute (glass-fronted) to invisible depths. But the greatest marvel is a kind of super tape-machine, which reproduces the guest's signature simultaneously to the Hall Porter, the Chief Laundress, the Chief

Accountant, and other super-genii of this amazing fairy palace.

Space, speed and a love of mechanism seem to me the most characteristic traits of American civilisation. Americans are always setting themselves problems for the sheer joy of solving them. Their love of abbreviations, for example, cannot find satisfaction in the demands of everyday language : therefore, they call a " lift " an " elevator," in order, later, to abbreviate the word to " El," or the single letter " L " which does duty also for the overhead railway. In the same way, stenographer becomes " steno " and automobile " auto." In matters of organisation, the same tendency is seen in the constant urge to find simpler ways of doing things which grow continually more complicated.

I was greatly interested in the methods by which both the States and Canada deliberately set at work the process of assimilating their immigrants. At Hull House in Chicago and other centres, I had some opportunity of appreciating the difficulties of the problem, and of seeing how devoted workers have made it an opportunity for special study and service. Apart from such efforts, it seemed to me that the United States deliberately uses the economic motive to fashion national unity. It seems to be made obvious that the more rapidly the recruit becomes Americanised, the swifter will be his economic progress. Perhaps this is the only way in which to reach rapidly the springs of conduct in her strangely assorted immigrants ; and the measure of her success is really astonishing. The manner of it has given to American civilisation its characteristic quality of " pep," as well as its monetary measure of all values.

It is just possible that this wonderful power of assimilation is on the wane, and that an increasing sensitiveness on race-questions is the index of this decline. On the other hand, I was surprised to find how very distinctly Americans are marked off from other nations, not only by their manner and bearing, but also (unless my observation is at fault) by physical characteristics almost as definite as those which separate some European races from each other. There seems to me, for instance, to be merging an American type of beauty, accentuated no doubt by the "beauty parlor," but based upon inbred differences. If this should prove to be so, is it possible that the "hardening-off" of the American race is in some way connected with the markedly heightened resistances against "aliens" which have inspired the recent policy of the United States in regard to immigration?

In Canada, development has been greatly influenced by the War. Canada took, if anything, more than her full share in its burdens, and lost heavily, both in men and money. These losses have certainly increased the economic "draw" of the United States, less burdened by debt and taxation. It is nevertheless true that Canada had developed and is maintaining a truly national civilisation, distinct in its social values—intense in its loyalty to the basis of its own life. The community idea is deliberately fostered, there is a real democratic spirit, and Canadian civilisation is marked by a freshness and an absence of officialdom which is perhaps in growing contrast to the regimentation of the United States.

In both countries, but especially in the States, the expression of nearly all values in dollars goes much further than I had believed. In many cases, the manner

of the clerk in the office of a hotel varies directly with the price at which one asks for a room. In one hotel, my enquiry was met by a very polite "Yes, Sir!! \$9, \$8, \$7"; but when I said: "Have you nothing cheaper?" his very tone changed with the price: "5, 4, with shower bath"; and on my pressing him further, he snapped out: "2.50 with pitcher and basin!" (I should add that the room on the ninth floor to which the elevator shot me proved quite adequate, and that, once there, the service was all one could wish). On the other hand, there seems to be very little job-snobbery; the "executives" with whom I had the pleasure of speaking were much more approachable than their English counterparts, their welcome, if measured by the clock, was genial and direct, and they were ready to express opinions without undue fencing.

I had hardly realised how the "executive" type of character has gripped the imagination of Americans, and has become dominant even in such fields as social, educational and spiritual endeavour. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this habit of mind was a remark made to me by the President of an American University in China. On my being presented to him, he asked me what my subject was; I told him, the social reference of education, and he replied "that is one of the things I don't fuss with in operating Universities." Let me say that this comment in no way represents the attitude of American educationists in China; they are keenly aware of the importance of correlating their work with its social and economic background. All the same, the "big boss" attitude, with its stress on administration, is unmistakable, and, though expressed in an exaggerated form, entirely characteristic.

An American lady in Peking said to me : "I could not live here, I feel as if I had two thousand years on my head." Certainly, to one visiting the United States after even nine months in Asia, the most striking characteristic of that great country is its vigour, its vitality, its faith in itself, and its fundamental optimism—in a word, its Youth.

My visit to Boston and its charming "antiquities" only served to throw this impression into high relief. This youthfulness is peculiarly refreshing, in contrast, not only with the age-long rivalries of Asia, but with the jaded controversies of Europe. It is a tonic which sends the European visitor home invigorated, with new faith in human nature and in the possibilities of the future, however little he may wish to see the forms of American life introduced into his own country. In a tired World, vigour and optimism have supreme value.

CONCLUSION

In this report I have written little of Ceylon, of Java, of Indo-China, or of Palestine. The compass within which it must be written has compelled me to select, and I have preferred to deal with fewer lands at somewhat greater length. I have chosen Egypt and Japan as fairly small and united States, and China and India as examples of very complex (though widely different) problems. In India and Egypt, the British connection has been an important factor. China, though coerced, has retained her sovereignty. Japan has been throughout entirely autonomous.

In all the countries through which I have passed, I have been deeply indebted for the kindest hospitality and help. In Ceylon, especially, I was given every assistance in my study, both by British and Ceylonese. In Indo-China, representatives of the French Government and other friends helped me in every way, and made it possible for me to see much, and I only regret that the season of my visit prevented me from taking further advantage of the facilities so freely offered. In Java and in Palestine I also met with great kindness. Some aspects of the situation in the East are seen in these lands in a specially interesting light, and I cannot pass them without some reference, however inadequate.

Ceylon and Java answered most nearly to my expectation of the lusciousness and fertility of the tropics.

In Java, I wished very much that I had had leisure to study the Dutch colonial system in more detail. I have made some reference to this in an earlier chapter ; the two most interesting points seemed to be that children of mixed unions have full political and social rights, once the Dutch parentage is acknowledged, and that full advantage has been taken of the existing princedoms in Central Java as the basis of the Dutch Colonial Government. It is interesting, too, that the *lingua franca* in Java is Malay—a minority language. I am sure that all these questions and much else would have repaid detailed study ; as it was, I could give only some eight or ten days to a rapid journey through the island, and I had no time to visit the eastern portion of it, though I did spend a few days at Djokjakarta, including a flying visit to Borobudur. Even in so short a time I gained a vivid impression of a civilisation which seems to be in many points unique, and an example of a different conception of the relations of Eastern and Western races from that to be found anywhere else.

Ceylon provides many studies in methods of government. The population is roughly two-thirds Sinhalese, and one-third Tamil. Sinhalese are Buddhists, and Tamils Hindoos. Much controversy has centred round the communal constituencies which have been set up. Their supporters claim that it is essential to guarantee seats to racial minorities ; on the other hand, it is alleged that the system will perpetuate divisions. The distinction between Kandians and Lowland Sinhalese makes the matter still more complicated.

The problem of government which faces the French in Indo-China is also a fascinating study, though for

different reasons. I stayed some time in Saïgon, and ascended the Mekong to Pnom Penh. Perhaps the layout and planning of Pnom Penh may be taken as striking the key-note. The town is dominated by the Pnom, a small round hill crowned by a Buddhist temple. Round the base of this hill, gardens are laid out in a typically French style, and a wide bridge leads to the residential quarter. Yet there is no disharmony. The indigenous "Naga," a fabulous snake, has been adopted in the design for the parapet of the bridge, and the hand-rail of the steps leading to the Pnom. If my impression is correct, a similar principle has inspired French administration throughout the provinces of Cochin-China and Cambodge: it has been the policy to preserve and incorporate all that is available in the indigenous civilisation, while perforce recognising that its decay has gone too far for it to be made the basis of reconstruction. Remains are carefully protected, either *in situ* or in excellent museums, and the arts and crafts of Cambodge are studied and fostered. In the palace of Pnom Penh, Cambodian styles of architecture have been adopted and developed by French architects.

I am only too conscious that the series of notes on the countries through which I passed so rapidly during this crowded year, which constitute the present book, are often disjointed in character, and that my record, like my observation, is of necessity uneven. This was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances, and if I understand aright the purpose of the Foundation, its object could only be served by allowing myself a wide liberty to follow out such openings as presented themselves,

without preserving too rigidly the symmetry of my plans. I suppose, too, that there never was a time when it was harder "to see life steadily, and to see it whole." On the other hand, there surely was never a time when such a journey could be undertaken in more interesting circumstances; in no single country which I visited can I say that conditions are settled; in fact, hardly anywhere did I feel that the expert on the spot could predict with reasonable certainty even the immediate future.

Fortunately the Founder himself has stated that:—"The end each should pursue is thus, not the completion of any particular line of study, however interesting or important, not the intensifying or confirmation either of the ideas he may already possess, or of his individual or national peculiarities, but a free and open-minded examination of other forms of life and activity, an unprejudiced revision of his own ideas; a comparison of other human values with those he already knows." It is a relief to know that I am not called upon in any sense to judge; that it is enough that I should have received impressions, and setting these side by side, have gained a somewhat less inadequate conception of the nature of general civilisation. So much, in all humility, I think I may claim to have been the result of my travels. I dare not claim more. Even the impressions themselves, vivid as they have been, must often have left out of account much that was not only relevant, but essential to a proper understanding of the situation. If I have made bold to state some conclusions, it has been simply because some features have seemed to stand out with such clearness

that I could not believe that my impression of them was wholly wrong. In particular, I am driven to feel that the broad contrasts which I have sketched between, for instance, such a situation as that in India and the condition of China, have a certain validity; looking back on the last year, while much of the detail is blurred and uncertain, the broad outline seems to stand out with reasonable clearness. But even if here, too, my observation has been at fault, much still remains to me, and that, perhaps, the most precious thing of all. For myself, at any rate, the most valuable experience has been to see spread out before one's eyes such an amazing panorama of human achievement and aspiration, painted in colours so vivid that at times, just by closing one's eyes, one can recall in detail the tumultuous life of street and bazaar, the oppressive solitude of the desert, or the cloistered quiet of the monastery. To have been enabled to assist, even as a spectator, at a drama which is nothing less (if I see it aright) than the remaking of general civilisation, is a privilege which fails to few, and an experience for which few ages of the world's history have provided opportunity, even to the most privileged.

One rises from such a survey (however inadequate) less ready than ever to deal with life in large generalisations—if also, less tolerant of traditional formulas. One comes to regard a “formula” (outside the sphere of the exact sciences) less as the statement of a truth than as an attempt to express and clarify a deep-seated need, instinctive in its origin, which has thrust its way into consciousness. How such a need came to be awakened, or re-awakened, is itself a question with no

general answer. To take an example: the formula "self-determination" is an attempt to bring to a head a revitalised group-consciousness (allied to, but not identical with, race-consciousness).

Modern nationalism in the West (on a first superficial analysis) was the outcome of the French Revolution. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the impulse seemed to have spent itself, and there followed a period of somewhat shallow internationalism, most marked in the spheres of humanitarian effort, organised labour, and (more deeply seated) finance. In point of fact, the nationalist impulse had simply been thrown out further afield, notably into the race for the African colonies. The menace of the Central European "bloc" to national autonomy resulted in a withdrawal of effort to the threatened centres of national consciousness.

In the East, the most powerful factor in the awakening has been the victory of Japan over Russia. Ignoring all other circumstances, the East sees in the Japanese success a proof that Orientals are not inherently inferior to Occidentals. Before the Great War, the East was already reconsidering its estimate of itself in the light of this experience. Under pressure of the tremendous necessity of saving her national cultures, the West proclaimed self-determination as a natural right, common to all peoples. The East has seized upon the formula as the expression of her own need; but has also deliberately attempted to capture for herself the emotional power with which a successful battle-cry is charged. For the East believes intensely in the inherent virtue of words; much of her *popular* religion consists in the use of formulas to compel super- (or infra-)

human beings to part with power for the benefit of the worshipper—a form of spiritual ju-jitsu not unknown in the West. But here the East is a past-master.

Improved communications are rapidly breaking down the insulation of space and time behind which, till recently, most national problems were raised and solved. One of the deepest-seated causes of the present world-unrest must surely be the growth in the number and diversity of the elements brought into the life of other nations. The manners, customs and faiths of the other side of the world are no longer “travellers’ tales”; they will soon be factors to be reconciled in the mind of the average thinking man and woman. In individual and nation alike, there is felt the imperative need to find a basis of harmony and stability, in some intelligible, self-consistent ideal.

I can see in the world to-day no evidence of a rapid solution of fundamental problems. Yet the search after some basis for a World-order seems one of the very few things really common to humanity; and there is a wide-spread agreement that such a World-order can be safely based only upon the conscious harmony of human society with the inmost nature of the universe. In these two facts seems to me to lie the assurance that the political and spiritual unity of mankind will one day be achieved.



